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ABSTRACT
The European Union has the most restrictive data protection policies among democracies
today, having created a regime of digital human rights. Yet what contributed to the decision by
EU policy-makers to place supranational constraints upon personal and cyber data use? At the
national level, Member States’ preferences were influenced by three structural factors: domestic
security threats, the growing digital economy, and the work of human rights advocates around
data privacy. Law enforcement and security officials sought access to data for criminal
prosecution and anti-terrorism purposes. Multinational firms asked for the freedom to transport
data across borders, treating it as an economic commodity. Legal rights actors pressed for data
privacy and protections. While none of these preferences have been mutually exclusive, EU
policy convergence upon the digital human rights model is the result of pressure exerted by key
states. Most particularly, epistemic experts and key political elites acted on behalf of the UK,

Germany, and France to turn the EU Commission and the Council in the direction of their
national preferences for data governance. However, whether the EU can successfully maintain
digital human rights as it attempts to export these norms to the global community remains to be
seen. What is framed as human rights protections for data continues to give considerable
leverage to data brokers and law enforcement officials to use data as they wish.
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1
1.1

INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS YOUR DATA:

Economic Commodity, Security Asset, or a Protected Human Right?
In mid-March 2018, the Cambridge Analytica data scandal broke onto the international

news cycle. Over 50 million social media users in the U.S. and Europe had information about
their internet behavior collected, analyzed, and catalogued for political use by candidates during
recent elections, via the meta-data they generated while online with Facebook.1 Facebook
executive Mark Zuckerberg was called to task during subsequent hearings held by Congress and
the European Parliament. In contrast to the limited or lack of data protections in many regions,
when Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) met with Zuckerberg, they cited actual
violations of legal protections for data that had been breached. Yet, one has to ask, why had
Europe, and the EU in particular, established a more aggressive policy stance toward protecting
personal data than did other regions?2 This dissertation argues that protection of personal and
internet-based data as a fundamental human right, which I call “digital human rights”, emerged
as a result of domestic and international pressures placed on EU policymakers. Domestically
three key structural factors influenced national data laws. At the international level, membership
in multiple international organizations caused states to comply with policy recommendations that
led to data protection. In both scenarios, the strategic placement of legal and human rights
scholars contributed to the expanding scope of digital human rights.
Digital human rights protections concern two types of data. Personal data can be data that
exists in manual forms such as in traditional paper records, or in computerized databases. A
1

Granville 2018
Fuster 2016; EU policies over data began in 1973 with the Community policy on data processing. US
action began with the 1977 US Privacy Protection Study Commission, resulting in no legally binding
legislation. As of this writing, there remains no single comprehensive federal law that constrains data
collection and use (see Jolly and Loeb 2017).
2

2

specific subtype of personal data is “cyber data.” Cyber data describes information that is
collected about individuals, including their personal internet preferences and habits, as well as
private financial or personal information collected while they use the internet for any purpose.
Both personal and cyber data involve information regarding individuals’ demography, personal
beliefs, and behaviors. Data governance has varied among EU states from the 1970s-1990s,
falling into three main policy areas: treating personal data as an economic commodity, seeing it
as a surveillance tool to protect national security, or tying personal data to privacy and identity
rights. However, since the mid 1990s, the European Union (EU) has passed supranational data
policies resulting in convergence around a largely protective data regime. The resulting complex
institutional environment calls for uniformity of protection in some areas, but leaves policy gaps
open to state interpretation in other areas.
Political science research examining data has explained policy-making in some areas
areas, but has not addressed the motivations for creating digital human rights in the European
Union. One group of literature has examined the treatment of data as an economic commodity
and has looked at its impact upon the larger global economy.3 Other research has treated data as
a byproduct of larger internet governance, focusing on early internet infrastructure policies,4
attempts to explain the securitization of the internet for military purposes,5 or projects that
identified the use of information distribution on the internet as a civil society space.6 Each of
these bodies of research have not answered the question as to why digital human rights emerged
to be a mandate for the entire EU, despite the variance in national policy preferences over data
governance. This project seeks to amend this gap in understanding of how and why the European
3

Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013; Mayer-Schönberger and Ramge 2018.
Mueller 2010
5
Choucri 2012
6
Powers 2015
4
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Union policy has trended toward a particularly rights-based stance on personal and cyber data,
the phenomenon of digital human rights.
1.2

Theoretical Foundation
This dissertation posits that the origin of digital human rights in the EU began in the

1970s with the national level policies set by individual states. During Phase 1 (1970s-1990s), the
public and private sector use of computerizing personal data expanded rapidly. Individual states
had to decide how to treat the rapid growth of databank creation, automatic processing of data,
and data storage. Policies varied in three distinct directions. Some states saw personal data as
important to the flow of business in the Single Area Market, so these states sought freedom of
movement for data as a good or service. Some states also identified data as a tool to be used by
law enforcement; these states legalized access to personal data by various sections of securityfocused officials. Finally, some EU states added legislated protection of personal and later cyber
data, linking these protections to the larger human rights regime of privacy for individuals. None
of these policies are mutually exclusive, but when these interests came into conflict, each state
had to choose a hierarchical preference for how data would be treated, essentially generating a
normative and therefore legislated policy preference that drove other interests into secondary
positions.
At the beginning of Phase 2 (mid 1990s), the widespread diffusion of internet use forced
all advanced economies to acknowledge the need to set cyber data policies. As noted, individual
EU states had been legislating at the national level, but little region-wide coherence existed. In
fact, in some cases, the Phase 1 national data policies across the European Union worked in
conflict with one another during times of data transfer in business or during security cooperation
events. International governmental organizations (IGOs) such as the Organisation for Economic

4

Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Council of Europe (CoE) offered suggested a
series of protective frameworks for member states to adopt as national policies on the treatment
of all types of data that would reduce the policy confusion and facilitate better cooperation
between states. The European Commission responded to this pressure by opening opportunities
for data governance to be moved onto the wider EU legislative agenda. Following the logic of
the national laws that treated data as an economic commodity, a security tool, or an identitybased and protected human right, the EU Commission, Council, and Parliament faced policy
convergence challenges related to the differing state preferences for data treatment. During the
legislative process, the EU Commission and Council relied upon epistemic, or legal professionals
who provided advice on policy options for the Union. The preferences of particularly influential
states such as Germany (rights-based protections) and the U.K. (data commodification as an
economic tool), prevailed at the supranational level. Despite increased numbers of EU data laws,
the evolution of data protection policies remains a little understood phenomenon in the Union,
leaving scholars and laypersons alike with a lack of information on how we got to where we are
and the wider implications this stance may have not only for EU politics, but for regional and
global data governance.
The recent Cambridge Analytica scandal exemplifies the core dilemma I address in this
dissertation: How and why do personal and cyber data policies get created in relation to states’
interests for data securitization, data commodification, or protection of digital human rights? I
propose that the answer to this and related questions can be answered using international
relations scholarship. By using a theory-based approach, understanding can be found. All
democracies exist within a dense environment of multiple stakeholders when they make policies
involving multiple countries. European Union states are no exception to this.

5

When these states also happen to be members of international organizations outside the
EU, the process of policy-making gets even more complex, due to the multiplicity of
membership commitments. What we see today is a relatively aggressive and unique policy style
by the EU regarding the governance of data that emerged from this intensely pressurized policy
space. First and foremost, this dissertation proposes that data legislation in the European Union
happened at two levels.7 National policymakers were constrained by the wishes of domestic
interest groups. These groups organized and advocated for laws that would be most beneficial to
them. Second, national governments were expected to abide by the constraints of membership in
a variety of international governmental organizations (IGOs) which also placed demands on
member states to pass certain types of data laws.
1.3

The Role of Regimes
The formalization of a set of laws about an issue is known as an institution, or regime.

Stephen Krasner defined regimes as, “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures
around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area.”8 Regimes have been created to
handle the treatment of personal and cyber data at the national level in all EU states. However,
regimes also exist at the international level which also impact national and regional data
legislation. European states have joined a variety of international regimes, which include but are
not limited to, the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), and the European Union, each of which have suggested policies for states
in the areas of concern to the IGO and its larger mission. Over time, a regime complex emerged,
with potential overlap of national and international policies on data treatment. Thus, important

7
8

Putnam 1988; Milner 1997.
Krasner 1983, p. 185
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point one is: personal and cyber data policies set by individual EU states were created in an
environment of regime membership and regime complexity.9
Each regime had different goals which shaped the resulting laws. In the 1970s, personal
data was moved from paper or manual form to computerized and automatically-processed data.
National regimes (data legislation) in this period were designed to preserve the ability of
companies to collect and store computer-based, or stationary, yet nationally-networked data in
the most secure manner possible. In the 1980s, international data protection regimes were
formed. The OECD began to encourage policy convergence designed to protect data privacy, but
also asked states to allow the movement of computerized data across national borders to facilitate
economic growth and business transactions.10 EU states generally complied by adopting
legislation at the national and EU level to free transnational data flows required by economies
increasingly reliant upon service-based and technology industries. By the mid 1990s, data
transmission via the internet was treated similarly to other data, and existing policies for
computer data banks, and personal data treatment were applied to the management of this new
type of data: cyber data.
Thus I will show that the initiative behind the early days of EU data governance policies was
rooted in the economic commodification of data, and this became the first widespread EU
regime for data governance. Internet access was increasingly linked with other economic
commodities in the minds of both corporate leaders and governments, as well as in the minds of
economic development researchers. ICT products and/or services were believed to hold latent

9

To make this dissertation more manageable, and to comply with the rigors of qualitative and quantitative
methodology, I will limit this evaluation to EU Member States, rather than the entire list of European
states. A regime complex can be defined as an overlap of multiple national, regional, or international
regimes that involve shared issue concerns and at times, policy coordination.
10
Fuster 2016; OECD 2009, 2011

7

potential for contributing to economic growth.11 In time, cyber data became economically
commodified, or identified as a value-based commodity, within the ICT sector. As mentioned,
cyber data was treated as an extension of general data, to be managed with the discretion of data
processors and controllers, and policies were set to cover its use.12 The links between internet
access and economic growth, and later the role that cyber data could play in that growth was an
important aspect of policy that corporations would aggressively defend in years to come, when
the economic protections of data would be threatened by increased technological change and
demands for protection coming from the legal and human rights communities. The most
significant challenge to the commodification of data occurred in the began in the 1970s but grew
exponentially in the early 2000s.
In the mid 1970s and 1980s, several EU states experienced domestic terror attacks by
radical leftist, separatist, or Palestinian sympathetic groups. These attacks diminished somewhat
in the 1990s. However, law enforcement, criminal prosecutors, and national security officials
expanded efforts to use personal data as information-gathering mechanisms to prevent, track, and
prosecute domestic terrorists attacks that occurred during this period. Data collection and
monitoring was also seen as an additional way to ensure border security from outside terrorists
coming in.13 Many legislatures argued for data collection privileges to be legalized for law
enforcement during debates on data legislation. Such efforts intensified following the September
11, 2001 terrorist attack in the U.S., and the subsequent attacks to London and Madrid in 2004
and 2005. EU officials realized the expanded regional risk of threats to public spaces, as well as
to important data and financial infrastructures.14 Securitizing data became the new buzzwords
11

Meijers 2014
Fuster 2016
13
Choucri 2012; Longo 2018; Wallace, Pollack and Young 2015
12

14

Franda 2001
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among government and academic researchers alike.15 The heighted security concerns opened
an additional data regime space in which personal and later cyber data would be
simultaneously protected while also serving as a surveillance tool by state authorities. Areas
of securitized data legislation were broad. Early years it was as simple as giving law enforcement
access to public databanks. From the 2000s, legislative regimes were created to govern internet
infrastructure, and internet practices, including those that generate finance-based data.16 Access
to the meta-data generated by internet or mobile phone use was another part of the package of
approaches used.17 Further laws covered cyber space and telecom technology18 and clamped
down on online counter-narratives used in terrorist or anti-state propaganda flows online. 19
Personal and cyber data were securitized.20
Lastly, I propose that a third data regime exists in the European Union, in which the
framing of human rights protections has been extended over personal and cyber data to
create a digital human rights regime. At the national level, I show in my case country studies
that several EU states had histories of establishing privacy protection for personal data. In
Sweden, data protection legislation arose due to an extensive history of open access to
government records. When government records were computerized in the 1960s and 1970s, the
public and government wanted data protection legislation to ensure certain information was not
open to public scrutiny. In Germany, the public insisted on data protection as a part of a larger
effort to constrain government surveillance tendencies. As government databanks shared
information across sectors, regional governments in the Länders created personal data protection

15

Mueller 2010
Lynn III 2010
17
Meta-data: “data about the data”, R. J. Deibert, 2013.
18
Choucri 2012; Rosecrance 1996
19
Goldsmith and Wu 2006
20
Cavelty 2013; Mueller 2010 – Chapter 8.
16
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laws in the 1970s. The Hessian law in particular influenced the federal framework adopted in the
1977 federal data protection law. Finally, in the UK, human rights-minded advocates had pushed
for data legislation to no avail for over a decade. Following recommendations made by the
Council of Europe, the UK signed but had not ratified a convention calling for national data
protection which would provide regionally similar laws during transborder data flows. Only
when economic interests pushed the Thatcher government in the 1980s to either legalize personal
data protection or risk business volume loss in a competitive European environment did the
government pass such a law.
Though several bodies within the EU had proposed an EU law for data protection since
the 1980s, the momentum was slow in building.21 The Single Market initiative and technology
catch-up programs fueled enough momentum for EU data legislation in the 1990s to finally
yielded some results. The Commission issued a recommendation for a directive to cover the
matter in 1990. The Maastricht Treaty included clauses to protect data secrecy, but allow for data
exchange during police cooperation.22 Directive 95/46/EC established the first supranational EU
legislation on data protection, and served as the core basis for data protection in the region until
it was replaced in 2018. From 1997-2018 when Directive 95 was enforce, EU states’ harmonized
their national protections in accordance with the directive. Occasionally, the Commission,
Council of Ministers, or Parliament would ask for updates or amendments. Any amendments
were subject to or at times originated from a permanent working committee, the Article 29

21

1973 Commission call for Community policy on data processing – SEC 73 (final); 1979 Parliament
Resolution on the protection of the rights of the individual in the face of technical developments in data
processing; Commission Recommendation of 29 July 1981 relating to the Council of Europe Convention
for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data – OJ L247/31,
recital 5; Commission EC Adoption of Directive Proposal Com (90) 0314-C3-0232/090-SYN 287.
22
See Article 20.
22
Maastricht Treaty, p. 108, 92/C 191/01 (Council of the European Communities, Commission of the
European Communities 1992)
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Working Committee, whose sole job it was to oversee data legislation implications for the EU.
This body would vastly expand the notion of data protection rights in ways that created the
digital human rights regime referred to earlier. This committee provided core and substantial
support for the replacement law, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The GDPR
has fundamentally altered the global landscape for legislating data protection by not only
updating and expanded data protection, but by insisting that third countries abide by EU data
protection mandates.
In summary, the data regime complex of the EU is due to a combination of national,
regional, and international influences.23 National laws, EU level data regulations, and the
recommendations by the OECD and Council of Europe regarding data protection generated a
data regime complex. Furthermore, EU states have had national data laws that rivalled or
competed with neighbor states, which also conflicted with the recommendations of the IGOs.24
This dissertation will explain how the data regime complex evolved in the EU, and how policy
compromise has been reached in the wake of changing internal and external conditions.
As complex as the regimes themselves are, the research literature on the topic of data
governance has produced a variety of research on data governance. There have been three
primary turns of scholarship regarding these policies. They include the treatment of data as an
economic commodity, the securitization of the internet and internet-generated data, and the
freedom of access to data and information as a public good. By outlining the findings of this
literature, I show that the contributions of this literature to the theory of this dissertation and also

23

Orsini, Morin and Young 2013, pg. 6; definition: A regime complex occurs when, “a network of three
or more international regimes that relate to a common subject matter [exist and] exhibit overlapping
membership, and generate substantive, normative, or operative interactions recognized as potentially
problematic whether or not they are managed effectively.”
24
Drezner 2007
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the areas in which this literature failed to explain the origin of digital human rights in the
European Union.
1.4

Internet and Internet Data as an Economic Commodity
First, researchers have shown that data is linked to economic development potential.

Going back the the 1980s, the OECD promoted the idea that data commodification (treatment of
data as an economic commodity) was crucial to economic growth among its member states.
Later, it would promote internet expansion as a crucial link to improve communication and
therefore grow business volume, two key barriers to economic growth in low development
states.25 Lumping data mobility and internet access with access to telephone, electricity, or
banking services, developmental economists emphasized the importance allowing developing
states to generate economic opportunities and facilitate growth via data processing and internet
diffusion.26 A smaller section of this research disagreed with that notion, by showing that ICT
expansion, including internet connection, did not contribute directly to larger economic growth,
but rather improved trade.27 Increased trade then led to expanded growth. Cast as facilitators of
other business activity, data and internet diffusion were viewed as highly important to economic
growth according to this literature.
In a slightly different look at the financial impact of the data, newer work focused on the
economic value of “big data” generated through internet use.28 Identification of big data as an
economic commodity, similar to labor or capital, has shaped the business model of successful
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multinational corporations such as Google and Apple.29 These huge online companies whose
services generate big data have produced the largest amount of growth in technological and
service-based economies.30 As states attempt to securitize or protect cyber data, including data
managed by big data firms like Microsoft and Amazon, these corporations pushed back to ensure
that their freedom to operate a data profiteering business model was protected.31 Data-based
companies initially hid the fact that their profits depended on the continued ability to collect data
from consumers without restriction and then sell this data to other corporations. They proposed
that internet freedom is a human right of access to information, when in fact what these firms
offer is the right to access the internet marketplace.32 As noted with the Cambridge Analytica
scandal at the beginning of this chapter, the public and governments are now aware that
surveillance capitalism is the way that information brokerage firms succeed in business.
Looking forward, social scientists predict that data-rich markets will continue to evolve
and impact the mechanisms by which consumers do business.33 Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and
Thomas Ramge (2018) hypothesize that the exponential power of the internet to facilitate
communication will likely alter the value of money through an effect upon market
coordination.34 They argue that data-rich markets will disproportionately benefit big-data
intermediaries (including data brokers Amazon or Google), who will transmit the latent wealth in
data to the markets that need it most. If the banking industry and traditionally organized firms do
not adapt to the commodification of big data, and adjust their business practices accordingly,
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their ability to profit from data-rich markets will be minimized at best and non-existent at worse.
This literature would support the argument of a regime based on data commodification made
earlier.
1.5

Freedom of Access/The Internet as a Public Good
Further literature treats the internet and general data available on it as more of a civil

society mechanism.35 According to this line of thought, similar to television, radio, and the
newspaper, internet sites, social media, and the information on the internet serve as a way for
individuals to hold their governments and larger society accountable to the political expectations
of their particular culture.36 As a result, individuals and groups are able to practice an extended
form of civil action uses data as a tool of activism.37 In fact, political participation in the modern
world is handicapped if a population cannot access internet information or use information
communicated via mobile methods to voice concerns about government misbehavior.38 Lack of
internet access, or having government restrictions upon how individuals access the global
offerings of the internet and communicate with each other is identified as limiting political
human rights, similar to restrictions on public protests, or secret ballot voting.39 In addition,
internet diffusion and cyber information access has opened political opportunities to
communities previously politically disenfranchised.40 Online activism has occurred around
many issue areas, including contentious multilateral investment agreements,41 NGOs pushing
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for the international mine ban treaty,42 and the Arab Spring protests.43 Research shows that the
internet has become an informational tool and a new public space for the exchange of political
debate.44
One additional group of literature has addressed the internet as political tool used by
states rather than non-state actors.45 For instance, China and Russia created the International
Code of Conduct for Information Security inside their Shanghai Cooperation Organization in
2011, primarily as a challenge to US hegemony in international cyber structure policy. Alongside
trying to determine how the international community treats cyberspace, China has set the most
aggressive protection against global internet exposure, by setting protocols programmed into
routers or software at key choke points designed to block content for citizens.46 Needless to say,
the lists of prohibited content include anything critical of state practices or the Communist party,
in addition to any Western entertainment content deemed a threat to Chinese culture. China is not
alone, as Russian authorities have blocked access to Skype and Facebook, among other online
locations, with access to such sights deemed “politically disruptive”.47 While Western states
identify internet access as a space insuring political participation, non-Western states fear the
threat to control of citizens. Notably this entire section of literature discusses access to
information, some of which is online, but leaves out the implications of internet governance that
involves collection and dissemination of personal data.
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1.6

Data Securitization
The last body of literature indirectly discusses data governance, with the main focus upon

state-driven security policy. States utilize the internet as a form of cyber and informational
warfare, and rely upon it for data surveillance. The underlying assumption in this literature is the
ever-present threats between states which drives states to get creative and look for new ways to
utilize information and develop “virtual weapons” as strategies for national defense or offense.48
Cyber attacks can be perpetrated by other states or private actors who use “deliberate actions to
alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy computer systems or networks or the information
and/or programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks.”49 Cyber defense strategy
that utilizes personal or cyber information includes surveillance mechanisms, deployment of
espionage software to spy on other states communications, and denial of service attacks on
critical infrastructure like government or banking websites (purportedly used by Russia against
Georgia and Estonia).50 “Confidentially attacks” (illegally obtaining intellectual property) have
contributed to sticky relations between the U.S. and China.51 Lastly, harnessing social media for
“fake news” or release of previously secret files or data is another way states can seek to
influence geopolitics.52 Deibert (2013) notes states’ focus on protection of military or economic
interests, making data utilization a byproduct of the end goal of national security.53 In another
example of the impact of information surveillance on average citizens, the Snowden leaks
revealed how states used data surveillance as a mechanism of anti-terrorism. States have vastly
expanded surveillance tolerance laws resulting in mass invasions of personal and cyber data
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privacy.54 Snowden’s revelations also inspired research looking at how individuals and other
states respond to the invasive use of data surveillance inside and outside state lines.55
1.7

Prior Internet and Data Governance Research
A small group of literature has begun to address personal and cyber data policy as its own

category of research. Since the 1990s when internet diffusion occurred in academia and
governments, policy convergence models expected policy convergence due to the widespread
invasion of privacy potential within networked databanks and internet use.56 Milton Mueller
(2010) provided an extensive look at how states respond to threats to general sovereignty due to
transnational interconnectivity and increased communication between private actors.57 Like
Mueller, Abraham Newman (2008) expected global policy convergence favoring consumer data
privacy given the pressure the EU has placed upon MNCs to protect individuals’ identity when
using EU citizens’ data.58 Yet since Mueller and Newman have conducted the above research,
policy convergence has not occurred outside Europe. For instance, the US/Asian model relies
upon corporate self-regulation of data privacy, while the EU has codified a more top-down
regulatory model.59
In general, the data privacy literature has tried to explain legalization of the privacy
aspect of data and how these laws effect states’ behavior in terms of surveillance.60 Internet
policies could continue to address behavior-based protections, cover general functions of the
internet, and/or allow for some “virtual forgetting” of digitized data when demanded by
54
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consumers.61 There is worry that increased privacy protection could increase information costs to
internet users, who will have to choose between free online services, or increased data
protections.62 Problematically, governments can and do collect data on individuals, and do not
classify that practice as surveillance, but classify the collected data as a neutral commodity
disconnected from the individual on the other side of a screen somewhere.63 In other words, if a
computer program collects the data and sifts it for dangerous activity, governments may not
define this activity as an invasion of personal privacy. Despite these practices by the U.S. and
other states, some of the public are willing to forego freedom of control over their data if it
ensures protection against terrorists, or others seeking to harm the public.64 Again, these
expectations are driven by the convergence model.
1.8

Gaps this Project Will Fill
Little to no work has looked at the reasons behind differences in national policy

outcomes. Why did high levels of protection first occur in Sweden and Germany, and not in the
U.K.? Why did the U.K. finally acquiesce to EU data protections in the 1980s? The coordination
of data policy during EU legislation has important implications not only for data policy research,
but also as it exposes the compromises necessary when states have existing national legislation
that conflicts with each other but must agree on shared policy to meet EU needs. How these
differences were accommodated in the 1980s and 1990s when setting EU-level data policy is of
crucial importance in an era of increasing political fracturization in several issue areas.
Divergences in states preferences continue to matter in the long-run, even after EU policy
is set. For instance, increased economic woes in several EU states led to conflicts over EU fiscal
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policy following the 2008 financial crisis. Member States such as Hungary or Poland have
sought to regress on matters of judicial independence since 2015. The Brexit drama was largely
motivated by disagreements over shared EU immigration and trade policies obligations. Given
the fact that a convergence toward digital human rights has emerged in the Europe Union, and
nowhere else, explaining this case of policy compromise can add understanding of EU
policymaking. This study also generates important discoveries for the human rights and data
governance literature, by seeking to explain further about which actors matter most during policy
coordination and why some human rights-regimes emerge in a regional or global system.65
There are many factors that shaped the development of digital human rights legislation in
the EU. The European Union was founded to ensure economic integration first and foremost, and
the protection of the Single Market remains a priority. In the 1970s and 1980s, the EU
Commission started multiple EU programmes to increase growth in various industries of the
Information, Communications, and Technology (ICT) sectors. Even as late as 2014, the EU
Commission added a strategy for a Single Digital Market to the Single Market programme,
bringing data governance to center stage once again .66 The interaction between economic
interests intersected with human rights issues has gone virtually unexplored. Furthermore, the
change to data policy following the September 11, London, and Madrid bombings has yet to be
explained by prior literature on EU data governance. Key questions that remain unaddressed
include:
Why did the national laws created by EU states follow three particular pathways (data
profiteering, data as a surveillance tool, data protection)?
Why did the EU settle upon the digital human rights model, rather than continue to
pursue data commodification (the first EU data policy)?
65
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What role did key elites play in the adoption of or blocking of a comprehensive EU
digital rights policy?
This dissertation will address these gaps in the literature with the following chapters.
Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical argument. Here I explain two phases of the causal
path toward EU digital human right development. Structural factors contributed to national
policy preferences. These factors included domestic security threats, contribution to the economy
by ICT firms, and the input by legal and human rights scholars during initial national data
legislation. National policies were created between 1970-1999, which I call “Phase 1.” During
“Phase 2” (the mid 1990s-present), the European Union created EU Directives and Regulations
resulting in the emergence of digital human rights as the primary mechanism of policy for
personal and cyber data. During this phase, states had to decide which national preferences
would prevail at the EU level, and which compromises would be accepted when national policies
were at conflict with one other.
Chapter 3 outlines the mixed methodology used to test the argument developed in
Chapter 2. Phase 1 includes case studies of Sweden, Germany and the UK, where I trace the
evolution of data policy outcomes (dependent variable) that occurred in the early days of data
proliferation. I support these findings with descriptive statistics showing how key structural
factors (independent variables), such as domestic terror incidents, economic dependence upon
ICT sector growth, and the consultation of legal experts shaped national laws. I then evaluate
policy-making during Phase 2, by looking at EU data policy (dependent variable) reached when
key states (pushed their preferences independent variables and key experts served on advisory
committees for the Commission and Council of Ministers. Testing of the Phase 2 hypotheses
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includes analysis of communications by EU Commission and Council members, along with the
placement and advocacy activities of relevant epistemic elites and professional experts.
Chapter 4 provides the details and findings for testing of Phase 1, during which the
national policy preferences develop. This chapter argues that the United Kingdom and Germany
developed quite different policy stances regarding data; the UK protected economic growth for
ICT firms, and Germany federalized the regional policies of data protection. To trace the national
policy process, I used qualitative analysis of legislative debates and committee reports for each
national legislature during the law-making process. I also examined the professional background
and types of consultants used to offer “expert advice” to parliamentarians when data laws were
created or changed.
In Chapter 5 I explain the EU policy-making of Phase 2, during which supranational
policies emerged for all EU Member States. This chapter introduces the role played by EU
elites, including EU Commission Presidents and epistemic experts. Each states’ preferences
along the three main factors of security, economic commodification, and digital human rights
provide predictions for the data policies France, Germany, and the UK will seek for wider EU
law. To support the argument that key national elites influenced EU policies, I reveal how the
policy agenda pursued by EU Commission presidents from 1990-2015 contributed to the opening
of political opportunities for setting data policies at the EU level. I then look at how national
epistemic communities expanded the scope of data protection into becoming digital human
rights, with particular impact made by the Article 29 Working Party.
Chapter 6 will summarize the findings, and the expected impact to scholarship. During
Phase 1, individual states made national data policies clearly influenced by structural factors of
importance to each particular state. For Sweden, the emergence of tech-industries occurred late
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in the 20th century, making the ICT impact upon data policy less of a factor than the impact of
open records access to all government files. The Swedish population was so motivated to protect
computerized data, the country developed the first national law for data protection in the world in
1973. Germany’s history of personal rights violations that occurred during the Holocaust
continued to shape national political discourse and preferences, both of which led to strong and
ground-breaking data protection law of 1977. The United Kingdom’s history of civil turbulence
in Northern Ireland combined with a significant dependence on ICT industries drove national
laws protecting data to preserve business activity, while preserving data access for security
officials. The European Union policies during Phase 2 revealed the impact of policy preferences
by the particular states. When French representatives served as President of the EU Commission,
they were quite influential in opening the door for new data policies. However, the individuals
serving on the Article 29 Working Party committee held disproportionate impact above that of
EU Commission. Their ability to shape EU policy to the highest level confirmed the arguments
of past IR theorists about the role that epistemic experts play in human rights diffusion.
In conclusion, this dissertation serves many beneficial purposes for broader social science
scholarship. First, it applies relevant international relations paradigms to data governance,
something not done in previous literature. Secondly, it uses qualitative research with extensive
case studies and content analysis of national laws to show that certain interests really matter
when it comes to national and international political outcomes. Next, it will help fill the gaps in
our understanding of how EU Member States work within a contested and competitive regime
environment to influence EU level legislation toward their preferred policy outcome. Lastly, this
project will contribute to our understanding of how states respond to their organizational
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membership requirements, especially when policies set by the organization conflict with national
preferences.
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2

THEORY IN-DEPTH: REGIME COMPLEXITY AND DATA PROTETION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
Chapter 1 introduced three important questions:
Why did the national laws created by EU states follow three particular pathways (data
profiteering, data as a surveillance tool, data protection)?
Why did the EU settle upon the digital human rights model, rather than continue to pursue
data commodification (the first EU data policy)?
What role did key elites play in the adoption of or blocking of a comprehensive EU digital
rights policy?
This dissertation answers these questions by theoretically arguing that data protection

policies in the EU occurred along two-levels, national and regional (EU). At the national
level: key structural interests drove each state toward particular types of data policies that
would preserve the concerns raised by those interests. At the EU-level, powerful states
influenced the policy model to align with their national preferences. At both levels,
strategically placed legal and human rights protecting elites expanded data protection to
create a digital human rights regime for the European Union. The process of interaction
between domestic and international interests seen in EU data policy outcomes has the potential to
inform policy-making around other issues, specifically as regards policy coordination more
broadly. As policy coordination occurs at the regional level in multiple areas of the world, this
dissertation contributes to the larger international relations and comparative politics literature
about the process of policy negotiations.
European Union member states (MS) make technology policies following Putnam’s twolevel games argument: at the national level, domestic institutions have emerged to address data
treatment, and at the international level, states were and are pressured by multiple international
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governmental organizations (IGOs) in which they are members to set policies that agree with the
mission of the IGOs.67 In the early years (1970s) of computer use and computer network
expansion, state policy-makers relied upon domestic structural components such as security
concerns, the contribution of the ICT sector to the national economy, and legal rights activism
around data protection as the primary variables driving national preferences on policies about
data creation, processing, storage, and re-use. By the 1980s, the second level of coordination
began inside the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Cooperation and Economic
Development (OECD), where each IGO created a list of suggested policies for member states to
adopt concerning data treatment. The presence of outside pressure from IGOs and inside pressure
from key actors in the Union eventually caused the EU Commission to open the doors for a
Union-wide policy for data governance. As a result of this ‘policy opening’ promoted by EU
Commissioners throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the EU passed multiple mandates that
would impact member states’ domestic policies, most importantly, Directive 46 (effective 19952018). EU policy on personal data and now cyber data has evolved to include digital human
rights protections for data, in many ways above any security or economic concerns for the use of
data.68
This chapter explains these claims. First, I outline the theoretical background of
institutional theory, also known as regime theory, and how policy formation is conditioned by
institutional creation, both domestically and internationally. I then develop the empirical
argument that traces the causal claims between domestic structural factors and national data
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policy preferences. Next, I discuss how regime theory explains the creation of EU data policies.
Specifically, how the structural components of powerful states within the Union try to leverage
their preferences for data treatment laws that will align with their own security, economic, or
human rights concerns. Concerning EU legislation, I trace how EU policy-making is purportedly
intergovernmental, but in the case of data policy it has increasingly leaned toward
supranationalism.69 I conclude with the argument the United Kingdom and Germany have
shaped policy mandates for the entire Union. My argument is built on the foundation of
institutional theory at the domestic level and regime theory at the international level.
2.1

National Level Policy-Making and Institutional Creation: Phase 1 (1970s-late 1980s)
Institutions, or the “rules of the game” serve as tools to protect the interests of various

domestic actors who wish to see to particular policy outcomes that will benefit them.70 There are
numerous arguments by comparative political scientists and and sociologists that have shown
how domestic institutions are created to protect a variety of key interests: economic, power base,
or cultural.71 72 Douglass North (1990) maintained that institutions were created to improve upon
the economic status quo, especially as regards economic efficiency and coordination.73 To
North, a rule/institution would be created and stay in place as long as it promoted wealth
maximization and economic growth. Migdal (1988) showed that once government institutions or
policies are in place, middle-level government agents will work to keep the institutions in place
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as long as they served the interests of these individuals.74 Tilly (1990) agreed with Migdal’s
proposal; the bourgeoisie will initiate the creation of policy-making agencies, whose ongoing
function is to protect state bureaucratic interests, particularly in capitalist states. To Milner
(1997), institutional creation is a rational way to coordinate policy outcomes and increase the
likelihood of Pareto-optimal outcomes for states, by promoting distribution of goods better than
during past arrangements.75 In agreement with each of these scholars, I propose that domestic
data laws are a form of institutional creation to serve the needs of domestic interests.
Policy development involves a few vital steps. The first stage is for policy-makers to
decide what is defined as an important issue, thereby making it onto the national policy agenda.76
Once the issue has been added to the agenda, policy decisions hinge on the need for cooperation
on the distribution of various resources or goods, influenced by the nature and structures of
domestic political power. 77 Wide institutional variance exists among EU states, in terms of
parliamentary structures, political party participation, executive power distribution, and judicial
oversight. The purpose of this dissertation is not to explain the variance in political institutions
that exist among EU states. However, structurally speaking, all legislation at the national level of
EU states operates according to basic rules of democracy – with parliamentary offices held by
elected officials.78 Political parties will thus seek public support for election and re-election using
party issue platforms designed to ensure long-term political careers.79 In the case of data policy
in the European Union, what particular characteristics or interests at the domestic level pushed
policy-makers into setting data policy and in what direction? I propose that European
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governments who seek voters’ support will introduce and/or pass national policies (dependent
variable) involving data regulation to meet the desires of interest groups in three structural areas
(independent variables): economic interests, security concerns, and/or human rights protections
for personal data. I now examine how each of these factors are important to the domestic
interests of EU states.
2.2

Economic Interests
The literature evaluating the intersection of the economic interests of voters, corporate

actors, and the state is quite complex. Economic voting research has uncovered mixed findings
about the role of sector-based employment and voting support. Voters will punish incumbent
governments, holding the government responsible for economic downturns.80 Attribution of
responsibility for periods of economic growth is less proven, however; voters seem to hold
governments accountability for reversal of economic gains, rather than a lack of growth.81 We
do know that political and corporate interests can interact in ways that favor particular firms or
sectors. Industries will most likely enjoy political influence when broad public-private coalitions
exist allowing firms to lobby on behalf of industry concerns.82 If low levels of conflict exist
between the desires of political decision-makers, or if the interests of an economic actors and
politicians align, governments will pass public policies that are favorable for these firms.
Technology-related sectors are known contributors to the economic growth of OECD
states participating in the global marketplace during Phase 1 (1970s-80s).83 The economic
contributions by technology firms to economic growth was quite consistent, and EU states
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experienced similar linear patterns to that of U.S. firms.84 In the 1990s, technology sector
growth primarily came from manufacturing of computers and communications equipment, and
software development.85 Economic gains made by ICT investment and diffusion varied among
EU states during Phase 2 (after late 1980s), and this growth lagged behind US performance.
Despite the lag, EU states backed the potential by continued ICT investment through the 1990searly 2000s using a combination of investments in technology infrastructure. Investments
matched increased demands for telecommunications and internet services.86 Between 19952000, share of ICT value added to the economy of OECD states averaged 9.5%, with some EU
states seeing growth from ICT at 16.5%.87 By 2011, growth had cooled somewhat to a European
Union wide mean of 6.0%, but again, averages for some states persisted above 11%.88 The
substantial contribution by ICT firms to economic growth helped Member States to experience
growth in technology-based industries while manufacturing in other sectors has declined. In
addition, the demand for persons with ICT skills remained steady or increased slightly since the
mid 1990s, even in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Eurostat reports cite that:
“More than two fifths (42 %) of large enterprises recruited or tried to recruit personnel for
jobs requiring specialist ICT skills in 2016, while more than one fifth (22 %) of large
enterprises reported that they had hard-to-fill vacancies for jobs requiring specialist ICT
skills. By contrast, the corresponding shares for medium-sized enterprises were 17 % and 8
% respectively, and for small enterprises they were 6 % and 3 % respectively.”- Eurostat89
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2.3

Security Issues of the State Involving Data
In addition to the role that ICT dependence played in the national debate, the provision of

national security has become a largely data-driven endeavor. Since the 1970s, states utilized data
as a surveillance tool within their larger defense arsenal to reduce security risks from both
individuals and state-level actors. Following the advent of the 9/11 attacks in the United States,
countries worldwide realized the need for improving border patrol and security screening
procedures over individuals entering and living within their territory.90 Nowhere has this
become more relevant that among member states of the European Union, where the U.K., Spain,
and France have experienced a comparatively disproportionate numbers of deaths related to
terrorism compared to other states in Europe, according to the Global Terrorism Database.91 The
increased numbers and visibility of attacks against the public can reduce trust and support for
governments in power.92 States have responded to public fears and the increased attacks with a
variety of measures. These include more bilateral, collaborative border management, increased
funding for law enforcement, and additional legislation designed to facilitate and widen
surveillance of potential perpetrators of violent attacks.93 This last measure is significantly reliant
upon access to “Big Data”,94 sometimes generated by government, at other times co-opted or
coerced out of private sector data brokers such as Google or mobile phone service providers.95
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Use of Big-Data for states’ security purposes has significantly affected data use by
governments. As noted by Matt Longo (2018), states now utilize public and private sector data
for multiple security-related purposes, much of which is tied to counter-terrorism efforts after
9/11.96 First and foremost, data can be used to assess the security risks associated with people or
goods entering the state at airports or ports of entry. Border security personnel increasingly
utilize biometric and biographic data profiles to improve accuracy and speed of processing
human movement across borders. Lest one think this surveillance trend is solely for tracking
non-citizens’ activity, surveillance officers in many countries rely on face recognition software
tied to CCTV camera feeds watching the mass public for the purposes of law enforcement.97
Lastly, Big Data is a resource used for speeding up the movement of legal citizens re-entering
the country, such as through the FAST Entry or TSA-Pre-check program in the United States,
Registered Traveler in the U.K. for U.S. or Commonwealth citizens, or the Schengen Visa
freedom of movement provided for EU citizens. All of these measures are used by states and
state representatives to ensure that border flows are both safe and expeditious, all whilst
simultaneously preserving state sovereignty and security. Though this may seem counterintuitive
to the data privacy wishes of citizens in democracies such as the U.S. and Europe, research
shows that perceptions of threat by terrorism may increase public willingness to forego civil
liberties related to privacy. 98Data researchers predict only increases in the application of Big
Data collection, use, and brokering by states performing security-based activities.99
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In addition to the use of large-scale data to monitor people inside or entering their
borders, states are increasingly reliant upon data and meta-data100 to surveil other states, and a
variety of non-state actors, such as politicians, diplomats, and high profile economic actors. With
the diffusion of internet use and the propagation of data that occurs around its use, states see the
cyber realm as another space in which to spread and exert power.101 Thanks to the low barriers
for entry, both big and small states can enter into this space and perform both defensive and
offensive actions against other states or national interest targets.102 Unfortunately, the very
nature of internet infrastructure means that vulnerabilities in cyber-linked assets are often only
exposed after an attack is perpetrated, giving offensive actors a seeming advantage over those
seeking to deter cyber attacks.103 Private data loss is a potential casualty during attacks which
result in data breaches. Thousands of individuals have experienced data privacy losses during
the data breaches associated with the Estonian government and banking industries in 2007, the
US Office of Personal Management in 2015, and the German Reichstag attack in 2015.
Often the best way to accomplish cybersecurity is to use data for proactive surveillance of
state and non-state targets seen as potential threats to the states. Covert surveillance can be
accomplished without attrition of accountability by the states, especially when contracted actors
perform the surveillance on behalf of the state, at least until the perpetrating state is caught and
“shamed.”104 Even if the actors performing the surveillance espionage are publicly identified, the
state actor behind the action will try to distance itself from the exposé. For example, U.S.
embarrassment when caught spying on German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s mobile phone
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conversations resulted in public efforts by U.S. officials to throw the focus on Edward Snowden,
framed as an individual who acted in opposition to his own state.105
Currently, states primarily use digital surveillance with data as a tool of espionage, less so
than as an offensive weapon. Unwilling to react in kind to cyber attacks with cyber retaliation, or
by use of conventional weaponry, states result to living in a condition of “unpeace” with each
other, broken by occasional outbreaks of open attacks if the target is seen to be vulnerable, or
cyber-attacking another states if it is economically useful to the aggressor state or its interests.106
China in particular has been known to practice significant amounts of economic espionage to
acquire intellectual property advantages for state-backed industries.107
Due to the nature of increased cyber vulnerability, the public and state concern over
terrorism, and the desire of states to protect vital civilian and military assets, I propose that that
conventional security threats, cyber threats, or the perception of risks of such threats now drives
states toward seeing data as a security tool. As a result, legislation or institutional creation can
occur around giving law enforcement, criminal investigative, and security officials easy access to
data. States justify the loss of privacy or data control as being tied to the greater good, protecting
national interests such as crucial infrastructure, and as part of the state’s overall sovereignty and
security mandate. Given the increased number of attacks by terrorists and extremist groups in
European states, I propose that data access is now being framed as a useful mechanism for state
security provision, providing another example of a how a domestic institution was created
around the issue of data.108
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2.4

Data as a Privacy Concern, i.e. Digital Human Rights
The final structural variable that shapes EU states’ national data policies is that of the key

legal and human rights advocates who encourage rights-based data protections. According to the
ideational literature, members of civil society play a large role in getting states to adopt particular
human rights policies. Civil society includes, but is not limited to “… human rights
organizations, religious groups, political parties, and student organizations…”.109 This
scholarship has shown that human rights policies can be adopted as a result of both internal and
external pressures, in a ‘two-level’ spatial environment.110 Depending on the issue being debated,
researchers have looked at both levels to explain how policy success occurs. Thomas RisseKappen (1995) outlined the necessity of researching domestic and international actors and
structures, as it is neither all state nor all society that fully explains human rights movements. As
data policy emerged at the domestic level first in Europe, I argue that the causal pathway begins
at the national level.
Policy change cannot happen without an opening in the legislative agenda, thus making it
conditional upon a window of political opportunity being opened in the agenda space of
legislators.111 Reimann (2006) found that advocacy is more successful when new openness meets
advocacy action.112 Tsutsui and Wotipka (2004) agree with Reimann; during the early stages of
advocacy around an issue, domestic political opportunities are especially crucial to increase
numbers of citizens participating in a cause.113 We know several key facts about how non-state
actors can push for new openings regarding human rights policies. Activists rely upon measures
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such as information politics, leverage-building campaigns with high-profile actors, or rationalist
arguments to pressure governments to develop human rights policies. Domestic activists will
also resort to linking with outside networks if the state is resistant to outside change.114
Placing the pattern of behavior for activism regarding human rights within the context of
data policy, there is emerging scholarship to show that civil society has embraced activism
related to technology and its impact to individuals’ rights. Recent interviews of multiple ICT
(information, communications, and technology) activists in Europe revealed that privacy and
data protection were high among missions undertaken by various groups and individuals in
activism. For instance, Irish activists worked to monopolize newspaper headlines in order to
increase public support and pressure governments into policy protections for data (this in
response to the growing use of data as a commodity by telecommunications firms).115 Other
activists have utilized traditional social movement mechanisms, such as protests.116 In the late
1990s and early 2000s, still other groups brought court cases against states or the private sector,
with the goal of pushing policy-makers into acknowledging data rights within the realm of
fundamental human rights. Lastly, Löblich and Wendelin (2011) have shown that ICT policy
activism has created coalitions of multiple stakeholders, including individuals from industry
alongside civil society actors.117 This “networking” of rights-motivated activists (human rights
insiders) and private sector industry representatives (outsiders) concerned with the impact of
technology use upon human rights aligns with past networking of other human rights groups,
such as those opposing land mine use, or weapons bans.118
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On additional factor exists that may elevate issue activism to be taken seriously by
government policy-makers: involvement by epistemic experts. An epistemic community is “a
network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and
an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area.”119
Epistemic experts provide professional, substantive expertise for governments who seek
specialized expertise in an environment of imperfect information. This is particularly true during
policymaking for laws that intersect new technology and legal rights, as most politicians do not
come from technology-based fields prior to serving in government. Haas (1992) pointed out that
epistemic experts share normative beliefs along with technical knowledge. Several scholars
found that the normative preferences on policy shared amongst members of the professional
community can diffuse throughout the international system, as these individuals consult with
multiple governments and international organizations.120
In their landmark work on transnational advocacy networks, Keck and Sikkink (1998)
described networks of liked-minded individuals from NGOs, social movements, foundations,
media, trade unions, IGOs, or even sections of government.121 These individuals create influence
by designing issue agendas, helping to set institutional procedures, and ultimately, influencing
state behavior, through the crucial elements of “issue resonance, network density, and target
vulnerability.”122 I propose that legal and human rights professionals in the European Union
created linkages between government policymakers, the legal rights community, and ultimately,
the oversight bodies of data protection at the national and EU level. They used the consulting
space they were given as a platform to frame and promote fundamental human rights for
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personal and cyber data. As Haas stated, “To the extent to which an epistemic community
consolidates bureaucratic power within national administrations and international secretariats, it
stands to institutionalize its influence and insinuate its views into broader international
politics.”123
To summarize this section, regime/institutionalist theory applied to EU Member States
will show domestic institutions being created to protect and preserve policy that matters to
particular interest groups. There are three key groups to whom policy on data treatment is
crucial. Government security ministries, law enforcement, and criminal prosecutors see data as a
tool for protecting state sovereignty and national security. The ICT sector identifies data as a
powerful economic commodity and would like to keep control over how data is collected,
processed, stored, and moved. Lastly, legal professionals and human rights advocates
increasingly identify data use and abuse as a component of fundamental human rights and will
use their consultative power to promote digital human rights. Given the three main interests
which are focused on data as a policy concern, I expect to see the following in my national cases:

In EU states with large-scale economic dependence on ICT firms, states will pass economic
commodification polices (i.e., national institutional regime) protecting the use of personal
and/or cyber data for profit.
In EU states with a history of numerous domestic terrorist attacks, the state will promote
securitized policies for cyber data (i.e. a national institutional regime), resulting in state and
law-enforcement gaining access to the databanks of both public and private sectors.
In EU states where legal experts or academics based in human rights disciplines are used as
legislative consultants during the law-making process, these states will extend human rights
protections over data legislation (i.e., a national digital human rights regime).
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Now that I’ve explained the national characteristics that lead to policy-making around
data, I turn to EU-level policymaking.
2.5

International Regimes and Regime Complexity: Putting Pressure on States from
Outside
The prior section established the main domestic interests that should shape national data

laws. I now turn to examine the regional or EU-level causal pathway for data legislation. Recall
that my theoretical argument states that data protection policies in the EU occur along twolevels, national and regional (EU), in a complex regime environment. I have two expectations
for this time period and level of policymaking.
At the EU-level, powerful states will attempt to influence EU policy to align with their own
national preferences.124
The presence of strategically placed legal and human rights experts will lead to expanded
human rights protections over data, creating a digital human rights regime.125
In the 1980s, some IGOs began to push their member states to adopt policies to converge
upon a specific type of data management policy - primarily that of data commodification. These
recommendations aligned with the domestic interests of some EU states, making policy adoption
simple. As pressure from these IGOs grew and diffused throughout the international system, the
European Union Commission added data governance to the list of issues it wanted to decide
according to an intergovernmental fashion. Coordinating data policy could facilitate ongoing
economic integration and peace in the Union. During the EU policy formation process, key EU
member pushed against some Community policy recommendations in the 1990s and 2000s.
Despite the conflict, today, EU policy has generated a “digital bill of human rights.”

124
125

This is based upon Hegemonic Stability Theory, explanation in the subsequent paragraphs.
This follows the logic of the epistemic networking established by Haas, Keck, Sikkink, and others.

38

To explain how EU policy reached this convergence point, I now discuss the international
regimes and policy mandates that have led to these outcomes. The relevance of how EU states’
coordinated efforts to make a Union-wide digital human rights policy has implications for EUpolicymaking on other issues, and could inform scholarly debate in other regions of the world
that work to coordinate policy on shared issue agendas. In short, to understand the end policies
such as Directive 95/46/EC and the GDPR, I build upon past IR scholarship regarding regime
creation and function. I utilize the conceptualization provided by Stephen Krasner, who defined
regimes as, “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor
expectations converge in a given issue-area.”126 Each of the main IR theories of realism, liberal
institutionalism, and constructivism contribute to my argument.
2.6

Realism, Liberal Institutionalism, and Constructivism: Three Approaches to
International Regimes
At the systemic level, Keohane and Nye (1989) predicted that as utility of force declined,

and economic interdependence grew during the 20th century, states would find greater advantage
in participating in international regimes which would give them more control over shared
issues.127 Despite the fact that international regime creation has exploded since WWII,
international relations theories attribute different reasons for the creation and maintenance of
regimes. Each of the main IR paradigms explains an aspect of regime structure and functioning
that underpins this dissertation. Realist regime theory explains the role of “hegemonic” or
powerful states128 in creating regimes, which I apply to some members of the EU. Liberal
126
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institutional theory explains how and why a hegemon is not necessary for regime stability or
continuity, helping to show why EU states have continued to follow data policies set out years
ago. Constructivism clarifies the contribution made by social factors such elite networks, by
allowing regimes to be adaptive and receptive to the influence of epistemic experts working with
the Commission. I now examine each theory for its contribution to the digital human rights
regime.
2.7

Realism
At the heart of realist theory, there is no expectation that states would desire to create a

regime at all, given that it will likely impinge on the most sacred norm of states: sovereignty.
Realist scholars overcome this constraint by utilizing systemic structure and states’ goals to
explain the propensity of states to create regimes.129 Krasner (1983) noted that self-interested
states will allow spontaneous regime creation, will negotiate regime creation via agreements, or
will impose regimes upon less powerful states when it is their interest to do so. Realists also
expect that most regime initiation will be done by the predominantly powerful, or “hegemonic”
states.130 After all, these states have more resources to provide the public goods needed by the
community and have the capability to punish free-riders.131 As a trade-off for providing some
public goods to all states within the regime, the hegemon expects to control the issue agenda.132
Several things challenge the rigidity of regimes. Internal contradictions can become
apparent over time during application of the regime rules, or power shifts can occur within the
international system that alter who fills the hegemonic space. Pure realism cannot explain why
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regimes persist, if the original purpose no longer exists, or if the hegemonic state which first
created the regime begins to decline. Hegemonic Stability Theory proposes that when the
hegemon declines, the regime it created and maintained should decay.133 Scholars such as
Ruggie (1982) counter this claim. 134 To Ruggie, if other states continue to benefit from the
framework of the regime, then regime instruments will be reshaped to adapt to shocks to the
regime such as loss of the regime leader, but the regime may not die altogether. Realism expects
hegemons to create a regime in order to control an agenda and achieve a goal. Reaching the goal
is possible because less-powerful states will join the regime to free-ride in the provision of public
goods of some kind, or to avoid sanctions by hegemonic states who get to control the issue
agenda.
2.8

Liberal Institutionalism
Omission within the realist argument can be addressed using the ideational framework of

liberal institutionalism, and by applying this to the formation of data protection in the EU. First,
realism assumes that shared states’ interests provide the motivation for states to forego forego
sovereignty in particular areas. 135 A liberal institutional counter argument was made by Keohane
(1984), who noted that regimes can be self-perpetuating, given the rules that lock states into
ongoing participation. These rules can persist long after the original conditions ted have changed,
ensuring regime longevity long after the initial utility function has decayed. When we understand
the nature of regimes to be long-term, membership in the regime signals a credible commitments
and long-term accountability to other states during multiple iterations of interaction around the
issue. In addition to improving accountability, regimes reduce transaction costs, increase
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economies of scale, and increase goods provisions. Finally, international regimes give voice to
small and mid-sized states; they will work to preserve regimes as a leveling agent over shared
issue arenas.136 The data regimes created by the OECD and Council of Europe, and later by the
European Union exemplify Keohane’s proposed long-standing regimes. EU Member States that
have joined these organizations have made commitments to various regimes built into the
mission of the IGOs.
Returning to the power state argument, regime membership binds member states to the
preferences of the states which achieved agenda control for the regime.137 Early regime literature
examined security regimes but expanded in the 1980s to include economic regimes.138 Since the
focus of this paper is not on security-based regimes, I will forego discussing the security
literature. Economically-speaking, national governments want to take successful domestic
economic policies and scale them up to the international level if seen as beneficial to the national
economy.139 However, regimes that were created on the basis of one shared concern can
experience “mission creep” as members add new dimensions to the original institutional agenda.
European Union competences present an instance of mission creep. What began with the goal of
economic integration in the European Steel and Coal Community of 1951, led to exponential
policy spread into multiple issue pillars involving economic, security, and justice affairs by the
Maastricht Treaty of 1992.140 Today, the EU aquis communitaire has incorporated all types of
issues into the scope of governance under EU control, including trade, financial systems
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regulation, genetically-modified agriculture restrictions, climate change policies, intellectual
property protections, and of interest to this dissertation, internet and data policies.141
Liberal institutionalism adds the element of domestic economic concerns to the variety
explanations for why states create, join, and cooperate with international regimes, including
those that include data governance. Yet this paradigm lacks an explanation for how states
determine which interests should be carried into the international space. Wendt (1992) points out
that both realist and institutionalist arguments rely upon the presence of social threats, but neither
approach explains how social threats emerge or change.142 Both realism and liberal
institutionalism simply assume that diverse threats exist, secondary to the primary interest of
protecting state sovereignty. Wendt proposes that the main motive of states – protecting
sovereignty – is actually a socially constructed and accepted norm, implying that the
development of interests is a learned process, constantly evolving across time, and impacted by
an interactive process with the domestic environment.143 The constructive approach provides the
final missing piece to explain the emergence of a data protection regime in the EU.
2.9

Constructivism
Constructivists contend that the structure of the international system is interactive. Social

actors build the structure of states that constrains their own Behaviour, which then leads to
international constraints upon Behaviour.144 These constraints can be institutional organizations,
or regimes. Identifying the intersubjective nature of the international order and by implication the
intersubjectivity of regimes gives scholars the ability to explain that regimes are based in the
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identity of states, and that this identity often has normative factors. Crucially, constructivism
points out that individuals, including professional or epistemic actors, contribute to the evolution
of domestic norms that can then be diffused throughout the international system.145 By allowing
for cross-interactions between the domestic and international spheres, the constructive approach
acknowledges that identities and interests are constantly being reassessed for value and for
instrumentality.146
Constructivism also provides explanation on how sociopolitical factors impact regime
adaptation across time.147 Frieden (1999) suggests looking at domestic actors’ features in the
context of the political environment when trying to understand national preferences, which in
turn shape strategies the state will pursue when negotiating internationally.148 The preferences of
domestic actors, particularly elites and firms, in addition to the aggregate population will
influence a state’s foreign policy .149 Without the contribution of constructivism, the role played
by non-state actors in determining policy changes in the EU would be completely overlooked.
Constructivism thus provides important tools to explain the transformation of data regimes
across time and space, making a necessary contribution to this dissertation when explaining the
emergence of these regimes.
To reiterate: regime theory explains the framework for developing institutions to
coordinate policy in shared issue areas, which could include personal and cyber data governance.
Realist regime theory attributes the origination of regimes to hegemonic, or powerful states,
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seeking to internationalize their domestic goals and interests. Liberal institutionalism explains
regime continuity and the credible commitments that bind states to ongoing compliance even
after hegemonic decline. Constructivism fills in the gaps of the other two approaches, by
explaining that the a priori power of domestic norms and the international activities of normentrepreneurs can diffuse these values via international networks, as they act to advice and shape
policymaking within IGOs. Together, these international relations paradigms explain why and
EU regime for digital human rights could emerge and persist. I now apply regime theory to EU
data governance.
2.10 The Context of Regimes Applied to Data Policy in the European Union
International regimes have huge potential to impact the policies and preferences of
governments of EU states seeking to insure a particular outcome around important issues. When
states create (or join) international regimes, the goal is to design formal institutions and
organizations to set constraints and expectations around states’ behavior on a particular issue or
set of issues. Examples of formal international regimes joined by EU Member States include the
United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). Without regimes, states suffer from the coordination problems:
conflicting interests, incomplete information, and a lack of overarching enforcement bodies.150
The presence of regimes to govern a particular issue area should promote less friction and
provide more certainty for states regarding how other states are going to act around an issue.
Because regimes are expensive (involving foregone areas of freedom or cost to certain actors)
states must determine if the reward for creating regimes or participating in regimes is more
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valuable than the price paid.151 In addition to passing laws and creating domestic agencies to
address data treatment at the national level, EU Member States are willing members of multiple
international regimes, as seen in Table 1.
Table 1: EU Member States’ International Regime Membership

Country
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Republic of
Cyprus
Czech
Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovak
Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
United
Kingdom
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European Union

OECD

1995
1958
2007
2013
2004

1961
1961
*
*
*

Council of
Europe
1956
1949
1992
1996
1961

2004

1995

1973
2004
1995
1958
1958
1981
2004
1973
1958
2004
2004
1958
2004
1958
2004
1986
2007
2004
2004
1986
1995
1973
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United Nations
1955
1945
1955

NATO

1960

*
1949
2004
2009
*

1993

1993

1999

1961
2010
1969
1961
1961
1961
1996
1961
1962
2016
*
1961
*
1961
1996
1961
*
2000

1949
1993
1989
1949
1950
1949
1990
1949
1949
1995
1993
1949
1965
1949
1991
1976
1993
1993

1945
1991
1955
1945
1973
1945
1955
1955
1955
1991
1991
1945
1964
1945
1945
1955
1955
1993

1949
2004
*
1949
1955
1952
1999
*
1949
2004
2004
1949
*
194
1999
1949
2004
2004

2010
1961
1961
1961

1993
1977
1949
1949

1992
1955
1946
1945

2004
1982
*
1949
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2.11

Regime complexity – The General Environmental Context

Regimes can have overlapping, and sometimes competing goal; the presence of multiple,
overlapping regimes or in produces a “regime complex.” Regime complexes involve, “a network
of three or more international regimes that relate to a common subject matter; exhibit
overlapping membership, and generate substantive, normative, or operative interactions
recognized as potentially problematic whether or not they are managed effectively.”152 Alter and
Meunier (2009) rightfully state that regime complexes can be parallel (having no formal
overlap), overlapping (multiple institutions exist that each have authority over an issue), or
nested (competence over issues located in concentric circles of regimes).153 In other words, new
institutions can mirror the functions of old ones, or new and old institutions can cover the same
issue area but conflict in behavioral requirements, or new and old institutions can overlap in
certain aspects of an issue. I argue in this dissertation that data governance in the EU occupies a
space of regime complexity.
EU states have created domestic regimes for data governance (national laws) and they are
members of multiple international organizations that also have data policy recommendations. As
seen in Table 1, EU member states are members of the European Union, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe (CoE), the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United Nations (UN). All of these regimes have
suggested policies associated with personal and cyber data governance. The most significant data
regimes regimes include Convention 108 of the Council of Europe, ETS 185/the Budapest
Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe, Article 8 of the European Convention of
Human Rights, and the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
152
153

Orsini, Morin, Young, 1981, p. 6
Alter and Meunier 2009

47

Personal Data.154 As members of the Council of Europe and OECD, EU states are held to
voluntary compliance regarding these mandates. National legislation is expected to reflect the
norms and practices agreed upon by the consensus within the community of states that have
joined these organizations. This can be problematic for states.
When the policy recommendations made by IGOs do not agree with each other, or do not
agree with domestic laws, states that are members of multiple organizations face competing
policy demands. The policy recommendations of the Council of Europe, OECD, and UN are
voluntary, however those of the European Union, if violated, could endanger membership in the
Union itself. Multiple domestic data laws have been in place since the 1970s. From the 1980s,
multiple IGOs promoted data law convergence toward protections during automatic processing
and transborder data movement. A data regime complex can be said to have emerged due to the
“overlapping institutions from both an issue-area, and a regional perspective.”155 Literature in the
last ten years has acknowledged the regime of internet governance, but has not discussed the
ways that this and other regimes overlap to affect cyber data governance in particular.156 Figure
1 offers a visual representation of this overlap in interests which compete for policy influence for
EU states making data policies. (See Figure 1, next page).
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Figure 1: Data Regime Complex

2.12 International Level Policy Coordination – Setting EU Data Policy
In this section, I address the critical components for policy coordination in the EU,
particularly when a new issue is added to the policy agenda. There are two primary steps
involved during EU policy evolution: opening an opportunity for policy introduction, and the
cooperation and compromise necessary to decide what policy will be adopted Union-wide. Thus,
the work in this dissertation that traces the evolution of policy introduction and coordination for
data policy has wider applications for policy scholarship across many issue areas, both inside and
outside the European Union.
2.13 New EU Policy Agenda Power: The Commission
I propose that a new issue will be added to the policy agenda at the EU level when a
tipping point of interest is reached among two or more hegemonic states regarding an issue
deemed of shared importance.157 This is a novel and innovate idea being introduced to the
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understanding of EU policy-making. The legislative structure of the European Union requires
that new policy be initiated by the European Commission or the European Parliament (although
the Parliament can only initiate a call for action if it feels the Commission has neglected to
respond to suggestions by the Parliament).158 Parliament’s ability to suggest new legislation is a
more recent addition to the legislative process, added with the 1992 Treaty of the European
Union/Maastricht.159 In reality, Parliament uses its increased “co-decision” power to pass/veto
new legislation; the power to initiate legislation still stands with the Commission.160 Therefore,
the crucial and necessary element for an issue to be considered for community-wide governance
is that it is introduced by the Commission. Furthermore, this introduction is conditional upon
interest being taken by whichever state serves as the presidency of the EU Commission, who
chooses to place the topic onto the issue agenda during its term as president of the Commission.
Once the Commission adds an issue to the agenda, it will ask the Council of Ministers to
research the topic and consider the need for community-wide governance. The Council could
issue a recommendation (not legally-binding for Member States), suggest a Directive, or work
with the EU Parliament to pass a Regulation, the latter of which requires states to implement the
policy into national law. Thus, the Council can act as a filter for new policy opportunities within
the Union, as it decides whether to move forward with the Commission’s request.161
Unlike past scholars, I am not arguing that the Commission possesses sole power over
initiating policy for the larger Union. I do suggest that the Commission can at times serve the
role of principal to initiate legislation on behalf of the agents (states). At other times, the
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Commission will act as agent for the Council during the policy-making process, by facilitating
the will of the Council (agent).162 In the former scenario (principal role), the Commission serves
as an initiator for opening political opportunities for policy-making in the Union. Research has
shown that the Commission designs the wording of policy to match what it believes will elicit
the most support from Member States.163
When the Commission issues a new proposal, it has opened a new political opportunity
for those on the Council and in Parliament.164 In other words, the call for a new Directive or
Regulations opens the door for new influence to be exerted by national representatives on issues
of importance to their state, i.e. creating political opportunities that did not heretofore exist.
After a new law is suggested by the Commission, national representatives serving in the Council
and any advisory committees walk into the new opportunity determined to shape EU legislation
in the direction of their state’s interests. While Council or even Parliamentary members may
have wished to alter EU-level policy on that particular issue in the past, their ability to do so was
limited until the Commission opened the door by making a new proposal. Those serving in the
Commission therefore have a significant level of agenda power by controlling the opening (or
not) for new policy.
Members of the issue-relevant Council of Ministers also hold a significant level of power,
as the Council researches and plans the particulars of the proposed regulation. EU Council
members and those serving on Commission and/or Council research committees are charged
with the responsibility of research, giving these entities the power over information given to the
Commission, the Council, and Parliament. Information can reduce or erect barriers to
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institutional agreement, or regime creation.165 Researchers shape new legislation via information
seeking and provision, and via the policies suggested to the Commission, Council, and
Parliament. Epistemic experts on these bodies may have considerable latitude as policy-shapers
to incorporate normative elements into new policies, such as identifying data as a privacy
concern, and therefore within the fundamental human rights protections of Union law. In this
way, research committees can influence the outcome of new norms that may have been
unleashed by new policy opportunity opened by domestically interested representatives serving
on the Commission when it delivered a proposal.166
Since the Commission and the Council of Ministers members hold the highest amount of
agenda-power during the initial stages of policy creation, they can act as crucial “nodes” or
gatekeepers who control the policy-making process at the supranational level, potentially
working to ensure that their states’ preferences are preserved in EU law.167 Thus, while the
Commission opens the door, the causal map that began at the national level (during Phase 1)
continues to the EU-level (Phase 2) during which the Commission and any advisory bodies
present their suggestions for EU law. Given these powers, I expect:
The EU Commission president will act as the primary actor opening doors for new data
legislation policy for the EU Community.

2.14 The Power of Hegemonic States
My next argument concerns which particular member states ultimately hold the greatest
chance of success in seeing their preferences emerge within the final EU policy.
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To insure their preferences are prioritized, powerful states may serve as norm
entrepreneurs during the policy-shaping phase of the legislative process, pushing other states
toward the “rightness of their views.”168 For example, the U.S. as the primary hegemon of the
post-Cold War era was disproportionately influential in matters of setting global internet policies
on the maintenance of internet infrastructure, largely due first mover advantages in developing
the internet technology. The U.S. also worked to achieve data commodification protection for
mobile data within the OECD data privacy recommendations, to the benefit of U.S. multinational
data brokers.169 Whether powerful states and their representatives hold disproportionate power
over personal cyber data governance in the European Union is a point on which the literature
remains less established, but one that I intend to address.
In the past, the policy wishes of great power states in the EU such as Germany or the UK
have often been successful in becoming Community-wide law. In his work on EU policy
coordination, Hussein Kassim (2001) points out that there are two views by scholars on how
policy cooperation is likely to occur.170 The “convergence” approach, combines rational theory
with sociological ideas to expect convergence based on efficiency and shared values. The
“continuing divergency” approach contends that strategic, issue specific legislating is more likely
as states will fight for protections over domestic policy idiosyncrasies. While Hussein proposes
that in reality a bit of both occurs, to Hussein the importance of state governance style, interests,
and state structures is significant. For instance, federal-style Germany was a “locomotive” when
promoting European integration, following the two world wars. In “brake states” like the United
Kingdom, there is a propensity to oppose any policy that encroaches on intergovernmentalism.
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The U.K. prefers mandates that allow equal amounts of national controls, or at least the ability of
each state to insert exclusionary clauses into the EU legislation. More “passive” states only get
involved when the legislation is of keen interest to them
I return to the debate on how states are able to diffuse domestic policy into the
international system. Two key works of literature have shown that it is the interaction between
domestic and international interests that can alter states’ participation in international
agreements.171 In his classic “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games”
Robert Putnam (1988) proposed that national governments will work during diplomatic
negotiations to preserve domestic interests, whilst simultaneously trying to avoid international
losses. 172 The larger the “win-set” or the wider the number of domestic actors who are satisfied
with an internationally-proposed policy, the greater likelihood that the diplomat can agree to
terms dictated by her diplomatic colleagues, or by a membership organization.173 Milner (1997)
concurred, in that international cooperation will be filtered through the policy preferences of
domestic actors.174 This speaks directly to the expected behavior of powerful states in the EU
during data policymaking. I suggest that France, Germany, and the U.K. meet the criteria for
more powerful states of the EU, given their population sizes, military power, capital access, and
market sizes. This model predicts that when they hold the Commission presidency, they will seek
data policies that benefit their own domestic interests. In my final hypothesis, I summarily
propose the following due to the power held by hegemonic states, and their ability to control
“carrots” and “sticks”:
As a result of their hegemonic power, the domestic preferences of powerful EU states will
more likely be the convergence point for EU data policy.
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2.15 Epistemic Advocacy Power
Lastly, similar to the argument made for national data laws, the EU Commission
routinely relies upon epistemic professionals to provide expertise on technical and legal matters.
As Pollack (1997) pointed out, the informal agenda setting power built into many EU institutions
allows considerable power to those not formally appointed directly by the Member States, nor by
directly elected by EU citizens.175 In other words, the process of policymaking in the European
Union has built in informal power for those without direct ties to governments in so far as they
were not elected into office or perhaps do not serve as permanent appointees. I propose that
epistemic professionals (agents) that give advice during the policy consideration phase can
leverage their professional knowledge and the normative consensus of their network to promote
a particular policy agenda to the principle actor (the EU Commission, Council of Ministers, or
Parliament). Building on the work of Kingdon (1984), Pollack also argued that successful policy
entrepreneurs exhibit three crucial characteristics. The person must be seen as an expert, be
known for network connections, and be persistent in waiting or a new policy window to open.176
Members of epistemic networks possess all of these attributes.177
Therefore, my last expectation is that:
Legal and human rights experts serving in advisory capacity to the EU institutions will
advocate for fundamental human rights protections for personal and/or cyber date in the EU,
creating an EU digital human rights regime.
In the next section of this dissertation, I explain the methodology used to test these
arguments.
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3

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This dissertation utilizes a variety of methods to test the theoretical argument introduced
in Chapter 2. For reasons I outline below, the primary testing was done with qualitative
methods. To explain the creation of national data laws during Phase 1, I used case studies
combined with historical process-tracing to map the evolution of national data regimes in a
sample of EU Member States. Descriptive statistics support the structural arguments made at the
national level for the three independent variables (economic commodification of data, domestic
security incidents, the presence of legal rights experts during the national legislative process).
The types of data laws to emerge at the national and EU level serve as the dependent variable at
both levels. All laws are manually coded with an original coding scheme and extensive content
analysis explained below. During Phase 2, I created a new composite measure to predict the
preferences for data commodification sought by the most powerful states of France, Germany,
and the UK at the EU level. The data used to predict the states’ preferences for the other two
structural variables (security incidents, role of legal experts) remain the same as at the national
level.
The logic of combining case studies and process-tracing in Phase 1 follows the
methodology suggested by Bennett and Checkel (2015), George and Bennett (2005), and Herb
(2017).178 Bennett and Checkel (2015) argue that process-tracing allows researchers to perform
deductive testing upon hypothesized relationships between causal mechanisms. Links can be
uncovered between the independent variable(s) and the outcome of interest during the causal
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process, based upon the inferences made about the causality.179 George and Bennett (2015)
propose that,
“The method and logic of structured, focused comparison is simple and straightforward.
The method is ‘structured’ in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the
research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide
and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation
of the findings of the cases possible. The method is ‘focused’ in that it deals only with
certain aspects of the historical cases examined.”- p. 11
When process-tracing of individual cases is combined with case comparisons, this creates
a powerful, synergistic tool for comparative historical analysis.180 Past comparative literature
incorporating this combination of methods includes Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions
(1994) and Wood’s Forging Democracy from Below (2007).181
3.1

Case Selection
I have chosen to test the national level of data policy development in the countries of

Germany, the United Kingdom, and Sweden. While case studies of all EU Member States’ data
policies would expand data governance scholarship, time will not permit studies on all the EU
states during this dissertation. My cases reflect both a “most similar” and “least similar”
selection approach. All case states are developed economies with democratic regimes, as well as
being EU, OECD, Council of Europe, and UN Member States (i.e., an overlap of regime
memberships). Similarity in organizational membership allows for the regime complexity
argument to be controlled in the respect that the IGO memberships are all the same. Economic
indicators reflect additional similarities; each of these countries have high levels of international
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trade in GDP (Germany 46%, UK 30%, Sweden 44%), and high average incomes in GDP per
capita (Germany $42, 161, UK $40,412, Sweden $51,844, all in USD).182
Dissimilarities include population sizes (Germany 82.5 million, the UK 65.6 million,
Sweden 9.9 million)183, dates of accession to the EU (West Germany 1958, UK 1973, Sweden
1995)184, and participation in the Eurozone (Germany participates, the UK and Sweden do not).
A final dissimilarity is location: Germany is in central Europe, the UK in western Europe (noncontinental), and Sweden is in northern Europe. Dissimilar factors allowed me to rigorously test
the argument that policy convergence should occur across multiple states (recall that the 1980s
literature expected technology policy convergence among democracies). Finally, the independent
variables of epistemic expert involvement (highly prominent in Germany and Sweden),
economic dependence on ICT firms (lower in Germany and Sweden), and frequent
security/terrorist attacks (highest in UK) show variance in the independent variables as
recommended by King, Keohane, and Verba (2012) during qualitative social science research.185
3.2

Time
Data times measure from 1970-2015/2016 dependent upon data availability. I began in

1970 as this was the approximate time point during which state agencies and private sector firms
began to utilize computerized data management and storage. By the 1990s, internet use was
diffused throughout government offices and academic research facilities, and internet use began
to spread to public and business sectors. National policies matched this pattern diffusion, with
national data laws enacted early in the 1970s in some European states. When computer
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networking expanded internet use and data transmission, states incorporated cyber data policies
into their larger data legislation from the 1990s forward.
3.3

Predicted Outcomes: National Laws on Data Governance (1970-1999)
Recall my expectations at the national level:
In EU states with large-scale economic dependence on ICT firms, states will pass
economic commodification polices (i.e., national institutional regime) protecting the use
of personal and/or cyber data for profit.
In EU states with a history of numerous domestic terrorist attacks, the state will promote
securitized policies for cyber data (i.e. a national institutional regime), resulting in state
and law-enforcement gaining access to the databanks of both public and private sectors.
In EU states where legal experts or academics based in human rights disciples are used
for legislative consultants during the law-making process, these states extend human
rights protections over data legislation (i.e., a national digital human rights regime).
The outcome of interest (Y) during Phase 1 was the type of national data laws created by

EU Member States. During the early years of this phase, data was computerized due to
technological breakthroughs and adoption by public sector bureaucracies and private sector
firms. In additional to manual data transfers to computer databanks, data could now be processed
automatically, with no type of human oversight in processing. States had to determine how these
activities would be legislated, in terms of data treatment during databank creation, and data
processing and storage. States also had to decide if the new laws would apply to both state and
non-state actors. The wording or content of laws could indicate:
•
•
•

use of data as an economic commodity, and/or
use of data for security purposes of the state, and/or
protection of digital human rights for individuals’ data.

I do not assume that three main preferences would generate mutually exclusively types of
laws. However, when these interests came into conflict, lawmakers would have to prioritize
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which of the three preferences will be granted the most leverage. To measure this outcome, I
analyzed national laws that were introduced or passed in the case states during from 1970-1999
as regarding general personal data (pre-internet data).
Information on the national data laws was obtained from multiple research sites and
official state sources. German data laws were obtained from two online repositories. English
copies of some German data laws were sourced from the German Law Archive, a repository of
over 2000 German legal documents translated into English by researchers at the University of
Oxford, UK.186 For laws unavailable at the aforementioned site, I retrieved the original laws in
German from the Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz website, a law
repository site maintained by the Germany Ministry of Justice.187 The two most important laws
originally unavailable in English were the 1977 and 1990 data protection laws. I located the 1990
law on the Bundesministerium website in html format, and subsequently translated the law into
English using Google translate. The 1977 law was unavailable in a copiable format; I hired a
graduate student majoring in German language acquisition from the University of Alabama to
translate the law into English.188 The Government of Sweden maintains a website for Swedish
statutes in translation, provided by the Ministry of Justice; this was used as the source for
Swedish data protection laws.189 Laws unavailable in English were retrieved from the same
website and were translated into English using Google translate. British data protection laws
were retrieved from the government website legislation.gov.uk.

186

Many thanks to the researchers involved in establishing this archive: Gerhard Dannemann, Christopher
König, and Lorenz Böttcher. https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org
187
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/index.html
188
William Thomas, student at the University of Alabama, provided the English translation of the 1977
BDSG German Data Protection Law.
189
https://www.government.se/government-policy/judicial-system/swedish-statutes-in-translation--judicial-system/

60

To assess each data law and categorize it as either protecting the data economy, giving
access capability to law enforcement, intelligence agencies, or other governmental actors, or
assign it as digital human rights, I performed manual content analysis. Chong and Druckman
(2011) note that no standardized method exists for assessing the framing built into textual
content and political communications material.190 However, Chong and Druckman, and Rubin
and Rubin (2012) all identify commonly used practices for researchers wishing to identify
thematic patterns in qualitative data.191 These steps include identifying the issue/person/event of
interest, isolating the attitude of interest based on the research question, inductively creating
original frames using past literature, and then choosing the material to analyze.192 Prior to
coding the actual documents, clear specification must be written to identify the frames that will
subsequently be coded in the current material under investigation. Counting the frequency of
frames, and whether they use positive/negative connotations can determine salience of a topic.
Volume of mention or use of a particular frame can also indicate valence of an issue to the
individual or organization issuing the communication. While the intent of this dissertation is not
to measure the effectiveness of particular types of communications used by those writing the
laws in each country or in the EU, I do argue that mentioning an issue in either a positive or
negative light indicates intent to either support or remove support in a particular area. Lastly,
using documents from the timeframe of key debates on policy change will ensure that a useful
sample of material is evaluated for policy change.
For this dissertation, I therefore developed the following coding scheme in each case
state:
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Table 2: National Law Coding Scheme (using Sweden’s 1998 law as example)

Economic use of data
Security/law enforcement
access
Protect data/privacy rights
TOTAL

Positive mentions per
sentence
0, 1
0, 1

Negative mentions per
sentence
0, 1
0, 1

0, 1

0, 1

Net Score
0
0
1
0 = economic use of data
0 = security/law access
1 = protect data

Example: Sweden’s 1998 Personal Data Act, Section 1 Reads, “Be it enacted as follows. General Provisions,
Purpose of this Act, Section 1: The purpose of this Act is to protect people against the violation of their personal
integrity by processing of personal data.”

The above example from Sweden was coded 1 for one sentence with multiple words in
favor of protecting data (protect, violation, integrity).
Thus, laws could be coded accounting for the possibility of multiple goals for data
treatment. For example, if the the law included positive or negative mention or word associations
when discussing any of the three frames (data commodification, security use of data, protecting
data). The net score created during coding of laws indicates the overall hierarchy among the
policy preferences for data treatment. For laws that treat data as an economic commodity will
have words and phrases that discuss keeping data open for economic use, giving permission for
data movement, and/or granting data controllers the ability to destroy or keep data indefinitely,
according to their preference or need in doing business. Laws that securitize data will have
words that give more access to government actors for security purposes such as permitting law
enforcement or criminal investigators permission to collect or retrieve data from either public or
private sources. These include court orders for surveillance, requirements for data processors
(“controllers”) to submit data when requested by state officials, or asking data controllers to
retain data for certain periods of time if needed by government for criminal investigation or
prosecution. In some cases, the laws even provide for data mobility during international criminal
investigations or prosecution, whereby state officials could transmit data on a state’s own
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citizens across state borders to assist partner states with security processes. Finally, laws that
legalize digital human rights will provide protection for personal data, such as limiting how
processors collect, store, maintain, or re-use data (including selling or moving data to third
parties). If the net score was equal for all three preference areas, it will be noted.
3.4

Measuring: Data Economy, Security Threats, Epistemic Expert Presence
The independent variables for Phase 1 included economic contributions of the data

generated by business and personal use, domestic security/terrorism incidents, and legal or
human rights experts used as consultants during law-making. I now explain the
operationalization of these variables.
3.5

Economic Impact of Data
In EU states with large-scale economic dependence on ICT firms, states will pass
economic commodification polices (i.e., national institutional regime) protecting the use
of personal and/or cyber data for profit.
Deciding how to measure the economic impact of data involved choices on how to

operationalize the impact. The economic commodification of data is conceptualized in this
project as any attempt by public or private actors to receive monetary gains from data, be it
personal data collected and held on individual computers or computer networks, or cyber data
created by individuals’ participation in online websites and during use of smart and mobile
phones. Data in these forms can be attached to personal identity, or anonymized, but it is being
used for the purposes of generating profit for many types of industries, including firms that
operate as “data brokers.” Data brokers include public and private collectors, users, processors,
and storers (i.e., “controllers”) of personal or cyber data.
The digital and data markets are recent phenomena within the global economy. In Phase
1 (1970-1999), profits were made firms using data in many ways, such as firms that
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computerized data, processed it, and/or created greater storage and movement technology.
Economic gain from the ICT sector has been attributed to many industries by the OECD and
World Bank, including manufacturing, telecommunications, retail, insurance, and financial
services firms.193 Unfortunately, as the technology sector developed unevenly across the EU, the
resulting available variables to measure profits from data was inconsistent across EU states in the
early years of computer automation of data. The most reliable measures collected across multiple
EU states include ICT services exports (1961-2016), investment in ICT supply (1985-2016), high
technology exports (1988-2016), and insurance and financial services (1985-present).
In order to best capture the impact of data upon the domestic economy of my case states,
I chose to use variables used by the EU Commission in the 2017 Policies on the Data Economy
Report as well as variables used by the IMF when measuring the digital economy.194
These include ICT services exports (% of service exports), investment in ICT supplies (%
of total non-residential gross fixed capital formation), 195 high tech exports (% of manufactured
exports), and insurance and financial services (% of services). The variables of ICT services
exports, high tech exports, and insurance and financial services exports are all collected from the
World Bank World Development Indicators database, when used during this dissertation.196
Investment in ICT supplies was collected from the OECD database. Descriptive statistics of the
four variables were compared in each case state.
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During Phase 2, the profit model shifted toward the production and utilization of big or
meta data, in addition to the previously mentioned activities.197 Big data brokers and generators
of big data include “pure players”, or firms whose core products create data-based products and
services, alongside “mixed players” who combine traditional business practices with data-driven
components.198 Each of these industries generate massive quantities of data either directly as a
result of their business model or as a by-product of their regular activities. The data created by
these companies therefore has potential to serve as an economic commodity either to the
producing firm or to other firms to which the data is sold in the global marketplace. After 2000,
much more data became available, in terms of annual, country-level figures, and in terms of an
increasing variety of measures for ICT sector impact. From 2000-2016, I utilize a
comprehensive, composite measure I have created to test the impact of ICT and data generation
on the domestic economy. These measures will be discussed in the separate section of this
chapter that explains Phase 2 methodology. I also used the single variable, Value Added as
percent of GDP; this data was retrieved from the OECD database.
3.6

Security Incidents
In EU states with a history of numerous domestic terrorist attacks, the state will promote
securitized policies for cyber data (i.e. a national institutional regime), resulting in state
and law-enforcement gaining access to the databanks of both public and private sectors.
Security incidents are measures of threat perception of domestic security risk.

“Incidents” are conceptualized as any domestic attack against state or non-state targets that could
be perceived as a breach of state sovereignty, including attacks on territorial spaces, and physical
infrastructure, whether military or civilian targets. I measured incidences of threats to security by
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counting the frequency of such attacks (bombings, personal attacks, etc.) during Phase 1 in each
case state. Data on security was sourced from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) project
which is organized and maintained by the University of Maryland.199 The GTD is “an opensource database including information on terrorist events around the world from 1970-2016”,
containing over 170,000 data points. I provide descriptive statistics for Germany, Sweden, and
the UK for Phase 1. For Phase 2, I add statistics for France as I discuss the predictions for the
hegemonic states’ preferences on data policy for the EU. While I had originally intended to also
measure cyber attacks occurring in the 2000s, there is no single, reliable source for such attacks
at present. The Council of Foreign Relations has an online list of reported attacks, but the
accuracy of this list is conditional upon self-reporting by the attack targets. Given the
questionable validity of this data, I made the decision not to include cyber attacks within the
security incidents calculations.
3.7

Digital Human Rights
In EU states where legal experts or academics based in human rights disciplines are used
as legislative consultants during the law-making process, these states will extend human
rights protections over data legislation (i.e., a national digital human rights regime).
Digital human rights is the term I developed in the introduction chapter to describe

rights-based legal protections of personal data, and later, for cyber data. I argue that states which
extend human rights protections over data may do so through the influence of legal and human
rests experts who come from judicial or academic backgrounds. This argument follows the logic
in the human rights and social movements literature, which has shown links between the pressure
of non-governmental actors who seek changes to current law or additional human rights
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protections and positive government responses.200 Pressure can be applied by “strategic use of
information to garner attention...201 Based on this literature, I originally intended to evaluate
human rights activism for data protection by following the example of following the example of
Ron, Ramos, and Rogers (2005), who tallied the number of privacy-based NGOs involved in
data protection activism. 202 Unfortunately, identifying these groups proved highly unsuccessful,
as groups dedicated to this mission did not emerge until the mid to late 2000s. 203I was therefore
unable to create my own comprehensive list of organizations that worked at the national level on
this topic in each of my case countries.
I then attempted to assess information campaigns waged promoting data protection at the
national level. Media coverage is assumed to contribute to the larger movement success, as it
promotes public awareness of topics, builds urgency into calls for action, and facilitates
increased membership in social movements, all of which impact funding sources and further
movement potential.204 I had intended to measure information warfare campaigns about data
protection and digital human rights for both phases by looking at news coverage and news
advertisements from 1970-2016. Unfortunately locating news stories covering information
campaigns about data protection proved equally difficult. Major news outlets did not digitize
newspaper content in the Lexis-Nexis system until at least the mid to late 1990s. They also did
not backdate the digitized content, so all content present in Lexis-Nexis is only from
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approximately 1995-forward. This left no way to access the news coverage of such campaigns
during Phase 1.205
I developed a proxy measure for human rights advocacy around data. As outlined in the
theory chapter, epistemic experts can and do alter policy outcomes by drawing on community
norms within their profession. To measure the influence of epistemic experts I looked at
legislative investigatory committees and consultants sought during the research phase of new
data legislation in each case during Phase 1. Each national database listed in the prior section on
data legislation coding was also queried for committees, consultations, public hearings, and other
support meetings held prior to each major piece of data legislation, using the terms “data, protect,
rights, personal, integrity, privacy, and computer.” I also outline the personal professional
training and background for each national supervisor placed as the head over each country’s data
protection authority agency. I assume that those coming from legal, jurist, and judicial
backgrounds are more likely to promote data protection rights, than those from business, ICT, or
non-legal, non-academic professional histories. The shortcoming of this method is that one
cannot establish directly the motives for individuals outside their personal statements, but when
available, personal quotes and official text released by these persons were used to support each
case.
3.8

Supranational Data Policies in the EU (mid 1990s-2016)
The presence of strategically placed legal and human rights experts will lead to
expanded human rights protections over data, creating a digital human rights regime.
To test the expectations for Phase 2, I used several mechanisms to trace the influential

components and outcomes from the mid 1990s-2016. First, I confirmed the preferences of the
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powerful states along the three causal factors from Phase 1 (data commodification, national
economic dependence upon the ICT sector, and digital human rights). I use these preferences to
predict what each state will promote during their tenure as EU Commission President, during
which the country has greater capacity to drive the legislative agenda for the Union.
Regarding economic dependence upon the ICT sector, I created a composite mechanism
to measure the impact specifically for this dissertation, which I will explain below. Domestic
terror attacks recorded by the Global Terrorism database were compared across three powerful
states to predict propensity to support data securitization. The professional background of
national agency heads for data protection were utilized to measure legal epistemic influence,
since these agency heads often serve as the points of contact between the EU Commission and
Council of Ministers and the various national authorities responsible for implementing EU data
law.
Next, I performed content analysis of media communications and official documents
released by the EU Commission to identify any framing used by the Commission presidents
when attempting to call for new EU data legislation, or when asking for amended legislation that
reflected their states’ preferences during Phase 1. Finally, I compared the expected national
preferences to the calls by EU Commission presidents for legislation against the types of actual
EU laws passed to determine if the hegemonic states’ preferences prevailed. To summarize, the
national preferences serve as causal factors, while the types of data laws are the outcomes.
Regarding the influence of epistemic experts, their presence in key research bodies is a causal
factor and I expect to see them make calls for expanded high levels of data protection as attempts
to influence policy toward digital human rights.
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3.8.1

Phase 2: 1990 to 2015

At the EU-level, powerful states will attempt to influence EU policy to align with their
own national preferences.206
The case states identified as “hegemonic” or powerful states follow the parameters
established by Morgenthau (1947), Keohane and Nye (1989), and Krasner (1983), in their
respective works on balance of power theory, Hegemonic Stability Theory, and regime theory.207
Hegemonic, or great power states, are those possessing more military and economic power than
that of the near neighbors in their region, or even globally. In the European Union, I apply this
definition and find that the United Kingdom, France, and Germany are the predominant
hegemonic states in the EU. Thus, these states could have more power to push their policy
preferences at the EU level.
During Phase 2, technology diffusion occurred simultaneous to technological
advancement. More extensive data on the economic impact of data became available from 1991
forward. To measure the increased dependence upon economic growth in ICT , I created a
composite measure I call the Data Technology Exports Contribution (DTEC). This covers the
additive effect of economic gains from exports made by technology-based firms from 1990-2016
in each country. The DTEC contributes greater understanding to our knowledge of the economic
power of these industries by highlighting growth in exports of data. Recall that data mobility was
one of the first motivations for data protection promoted by the OECD and Council of Europe.
Measuring separate variables is helpful to understand which firms within ICT may be growing
faster than others, but use of individual variables does not answer the cumulative effect of sector-
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wide growth. The DTEC offers an expansive look at the varieties of ways in which data-driven
industries will contribute via exports within the global digital economy. See Figure 2.

High-tech exports

ICT goods

Insurance/financial

exports

services exports

ICT services
exports

Data Technology Export
Contribution (DTEC)

Figure 2: Demand: Export Value of ICT Firms
To create the composite measure, Data Technology Contribution, I take the raw data for
the variables indicated in Figure 1 for each of the three case states (explanation on choice of
states to follow), standardize all variables, and calculate the mean value in five-year periods for
each indicator.208 The DTEC composite identifies case country trends in digital technology
impact, which I use to predict propensity to support data commodification within EU data
legislation. Secondary to the first prediction:
National representatives serving on the Commission will promote calls for new
legislation for EU legislation that align with the national interests during Phase 2 (data
commodification, data securitization, digital human rights).
The independent variable for this hypothesis was calls for legislative action taken by
national representatives to introduce EU legislation that align with national policy preferences.
As established in the theory chapter, agenda-setting on EU legislation is primarily done by the
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EU Commission. The starting point was to look at communiques from those serving on the
Commission, with a focus on Commission presidents, and officials within the DirectorateGeneral for Justice and Consumers who hold responsibility over justice, consumer rights, and
gender equality issues. I also studied the communiques of representatives serving on the Council
of Ministers within the Justice and Home Affairs Council (responsible for supervising this issue
area for the Council).
Finally, I added key investigatory committees, such as the EU Commission Working
Party 29, which began in 1995. The Working Party was “established by Article 29 of Directive
95/46/EC…. [and] provides the European Commission with independent advice on data
protection matters and helps in the development of harmonised policies for data protection in the
EU Member States.”209 Working Party 29 began research in 1995 and continued until 2018
when the GDPR went into effect. The party included representatives of the national supervisory
bodies in the Member States, a representative of the European Data Protection Supervisor’s
office, and an EU Commission representative. The group contributed significant amounts of
research and policy recommendations to the Commission, in the form of press releases, official
documents and opinions on policy suggestions, and issued annual reports with suggested policy
directions for data governance. After identifying the crucial actors involved in opening
opportunities for new legislation, I could collect the documents that spoke to their intentions for
EU data policy.
Any official press releases, calls for a proposal, presidency mission statements, or other
communications that were generated from the Commission, Council of Ministers, or Working
Party 29 during Phase 2 (1990-2016) were studied for intent to legislative data along any of the
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three preference alignments. If the elites called for legislation, but the framing of the text within
the proposed EU legislation included concerns not addressed by my hypotheses, OR if the
wording was in opposition to my predictive patterns this would confirm that
intergovernmentalism was not at play.210 In other words, through communications or activities to
push national preferences rather than reach a coordinated compromise during times of policy
conflict, EU Commission Presidents, Council representatives, or those on the WP 29 committee
could show attempts at supranational agenda controls. Evidence of promoting nationally
preferred policies at the expense of coordinated intergovernmentalism would challenge some
scholarship that has argued for intergovernmental policymaking. Contrarily, if these leaders
and/or WP 29 By suggest alternatives to my three proposed policies or suggest “middle ground”
compromises, these individuals would indicate they were considering the community-wide
interests in conjunction with national interests on the issue of data governance. In other words,
community concerns would overshadow states’ interests if the null were true.
The presence of strategically placed legal and human rights experts will lead to
expanded human rights protections over data, creating a digital human rights regime.
Epistemic experts at the EU level are expected to play a similar, but expanded role, to
that of the national level argument. Similar to during the investigatory phase of national policymaking, the EU uses experts as consultants to many EU institutions and oversight bodies. I
looked for how these individuals were utilized as information providers and the positions of
influence they held as relates to the most powerful bodies of EU lawmaking: the Commission
and Council of Ministers. WP 29 formally released three types of documents to the Commission
on a regular basis: Opinions, Recommendations, and Annual Reports. Each of these contained
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assessment of current conditions, validity and effectiveness of current laws, and examination of
the current social, economic, and political conditions that may warrant changes to EU data laws.
Suggested changes were also provided in these communiques. If EU laws expand human rights
protections when WP 29 suggested protection expansion, or in spite of opposition by security or
economic interests, the argument for the importance of epistemic experts in changing EU policy
can be supported. The coding scheme for evaluating the documents from WP 29 is explained in
the following paragraph.
Next, the EU laws are examined as outcome variables for the increased pressure placed
on EU lawmakers. The presence of increased laws for data protection as a fundamental human
right further supports the argument that a digital human rights regime has been created in the
European Union. The process of passing the following list of laws as relates to EU data
legislation was examined at length. Given the lengthy content of these laws, they were not
manually coded as were the national data laws. Batch coding was automatically applied using
MaxQDA Software. Using an a priori coding scheme of the frequently used descriptions for the
main three variables (data commodification, data securitization, or data protection rights), each
law received a lexical search for the key terms. Each law was then auto-coded for word
frequency of each term. This provides a blunt instrument to measure the content of each law. The
search term scheme is indicated in Table 3.
Table 3:Auto-code Search Terms

Data Protection
Search Terms
Processing of personal data
Protection of personal data
Right to privacy
Fundamental rights and freedoms
Fundamental right
Consent

Security
Search Terms
Security
Police
Judicial
Court
Defence

Economic Commodification
Search Terms
Economic
Business
Marketing
Free movement of data
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While it does not allow for sentiment analysis as with the national laws, the code
frequencies are capable of establishing the main focus of each law along the three preference
areas. See Table 4.
Table 4: EU Personal Data Policies
Year

Directive/Regulation

Source/Description

1993

Maastricht Treaty

Includes brief mention of secrecy responsibilities for data
accessible by some EU staff
EU Commission: Establishes fundamental rights of natural
persons as regarding processing of personal data; forbids
restriction of free flow of personal data between Member States
EU Commission: Proposal for Council Directive on personal
data/privacy as relates to public digital telecommunications and
mobile networks
Incorporates protection for personal data during automatic
processing alongside facilitation of free movement of data

1995

Directive 95/46/EC , Article 1 *

1997

Directive 97/66/EC

1997

Amsterdam Treaty

2000

Treaty of Nice

NO mention of data protection at all

2000

Charter of Fundamental Rights

Included the right to protection of personal data; UK opposed this,
stating Convention did not have this competency

2001

Regulation No. 45/2001

2002

Directive 2002/58/EC

2006

Directive 2006/24/EC

2007

Lisbon Treaty

2008

Directive 2008/977/JHA

2012

Code of EU Online Rights, Chapter 4

2016

General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679

2016

EU-US Privacy Shield

EU Commission: Provisions for processing personal data by
Community; created European Data Protection Supervisor
(EDPS)
EU Commission: Regulates protection of data and privacy during
use by electronics and telecommunications firms
EU Commission: Requires traffic data retention for 6 mos-2 yrs.
for prosecution of serious crimes
EU: Modified legal structure by abolishing pillar structure,
including past Treaty Provisions for protection of personal data;
establishes data protection as a fundamental right by this moving
of the issue into a first pillar area of competency
Justice and Home Affairs Council framework for data protection
during police cooperation
EU Commission: Establishes basic rights for EU citizens when
using online networks and services.
EU: Extends the protection of processing of personal data as a
fundamental right; preserves free flow of data; mandates third
country compliance
EU Commission: Establishes minimal standards of processing
protection for EU citizens' personal data transferred to US during
use of digital marketplace or social media

Finally, the theoretical basis for this dissertation proposes that EU states occupy
international spaces that include overlapping, nesting, or duplicative regimes at the international
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level that may compete with their domestic regimes on data legislation. I evaluate the regime
memberships in which EU states are members as relates to the calls for data governance by each
regime. This allows me to test the impact of pressure by these regimes upon EU states to pass
laws the align with the treaty commitments of the regime.
Now that I’ve described the various methods used to collect data and test the expectations
for the national and EU-level of data policymaking, I turn in Chapters 4 and 5 to explaining the
outcomes found.
4

THE DEVELOPMENTOF NATIONAL PREFERENCES ON DATA PROTECTION
POLICIES, 1970-1999

4.1

Findings - Sweden
I began with the state of Sweden, which was the earliest adopter among my case

countries to create any type of data-specific law or statute. The first law passed was the Data Act
of 1973 (Datalagen), and was designed to prevent “undue encroachment” on individual privacy
of personal data. Aspects of data protection addressed in the law included data collection,
treatment, and storage, descriptions about the properties of the data subject,211 and the level of
permission required from the data subject. Most importantly, it served as a template for
subsequent legislation adopted in many western European states.212
The 1973 law also set the pattern for future data laws in Sweden, taking the stance that
personal data should be protected by the state. The justification written into the laws and given in
statements by the data protection authorities stated that using data represented a risk of loss to the
data subject. The Swedish language does not have a word that directly translates into “privacy”
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“Data subject” is a frequently used term among data laws and data policy suggestions by various
international organizations. It refers to the individual(s) about whom the data is collected.
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in English, but the references to data protection in the 1973 law and following laws repeatedly
refer to the protection of the data subject’s “integrity”. Data controllers213 are obliged to prevent
such a breach from happening, or suffer a variety of penalties, such as fines, prosecution, or even
imprisonment. In other words, Sweden took a very hardline stance toward personal data
protection as a human right almost as soon as data collections were amassed in large-scale data
banks in the 1960s and 1970s. The 1973 was the first of thirteen laws passed during Phase 1 that
affected personal data in any way. Two laws concerned only the agency staffing and regulatory
authority, without mention of the data treatment itself.214 All laws that directly impact personal
data treatment are listed, along with their net scores, in Table 2, next page.

Table 5: Swedish Data Laws, Phase 1 (1970-1999)

Year

Name of Law

Description

1973

Data Act (Datalagen)

Prevention of loss of
personal privacy
through data use

1973

Credit Information Act
(Kreditupplysningslagen)

1974

Debt Collection Act
(Inkassolagen)

1978

Act on Names and
Pictures in Advertising
(Om Namn Och Bild I
Reklam)

Regulate licensing for
credit and debt
collection firms that
collect data; Created the
Data Inspection Board
(DIB)
Regulate use of
automated personal data
files; no collection of
religious, political, or
race data to be kept.
Regulate personal data
use in advertising.

213

Total Coded
Sentences
37

Text Analysis
Scores
+ 2 Econ Pos
-8 Data Protect
+27 Data Protect

Net Score

36

-5 Data Protect
+31 Data Protect

+31 Data Protect

8

-4 Data Protect
+4 Data Protect

0

7

-3 Data Protect
+4 Data Protect

+1 Data Protect

+2 Econ
+19 Data Protect

“Data controllers” is defined as individuals, businesses, or public actors who are responsible for data
collection and management of data regarding data subjects in any form.
214
The 1982 Data Fee Ordinance (Förordning om avgiter för Datainspektionens verksamhet), and the
1987 Ordinance for Authorization for the DIB to Execute on Automatic Data Processing in Tax Audit
(Förordning med bemyndigande för datainspektionen att databehandling vid taxeringsrevision) did not
directly impact data protection or treatment.
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1980

Secrecy Act
(Sekretesslag)

Allows for data
movement between
governmental
authorities.

1981

Credit Information Act,
amended

1981

Debt Collection Act,
amended

1982

Data act, amended

1987

Ordinance with
Instructions for the Data
Inspectorate (Förordning
med instruktion för
datainspektionen)
Personal Data Act
(Personuppgiftslag)

Changes to credit
record-keeping; data
banks have to update
DIB if credit info
services are ended.
Changes to debt
collection practices, but
no significant data
changes
Reduced licensure
requirements for data
processors, except for
sensitive data banks.
Raised fees to help
recover costs of DIB.
Instructions for DIB
officials on conducting
inspections for data
controlling registries.
Regulate identity data
among "data controller"
firms in Sweden. Align
Swedish national laws
with EU Directive
95/46/EC

1998

50

+8 Security Pos
-1 Econ Neg
+6 Econ Pos
-14 Data Protect
+21 Data Protect

+8 Security Pos
+5 Econ Pos
+7 Data Protect

3

+3 Data Protect

+3 Data Protect

2

+2 Data Protect

+2 Data Protect

6

-2 Data Protect
+4 Data Protect

+2 Data Protect

2

+2 Data Protect

+2 Data Protect

86

+2 Security Pos
-1 Econ Neg
+4 Econ Pos
-30 Data Protect
+49 Data Protect

+1 Security Pos
+3 Econ Pos
+19 Data Protect

Source: Swedish Law Repositories located at http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/ and https://www.regeringen.se/

Conditions prior to the establishment of new laws play into the theoretical argument on
why laws were created and which interest groups the law may serve. The years prior to the 1973
law saw a high level public anxiety over a proposed public census and responses by the
government to involve academics and jurists in particular, as expert witnesses to the Riksdag
(parliament) regarding the need and types of laws that should be considered for data.
In the early and mid 1960s, mechanized record and data management expanded in
Sweden. Yet expanded technology adoption alone did not create public concern over personal
data use until the late 1960s. To explain this, one must understand two factors: the proactive
nature of Swedish governance, and the structural conditions present at the time.215 Scholars have
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shown that the Swedish government has taken a proactive stance toward policy-making, rather
than wait until conditions become negative and need correction.216 In addition, existing laws in
Sweden in the late 1960s and 1970s allowed access to governmental document archives for
members of the press and the public.217 The government proposed a population wide census for
1970; this proposal led to public concerns over the ways that census data would be managed and
who would have access to the data collected.218
One additional condition that facilitated public fears over the information that could be
released as a result of the updated census in the era of computer-based data was that universal
adoption of national identification numbers (PINs) for all members of Swedish society. PIN data
includes birthdate and sex, and have been used by all private sector and governmental agencies
when providing services to people, similar to social security numbers in the U.S. census data
were collected, and individuals were identified and listed by PINs, given the public access of all
governmentally-collected data, then anyone in society would have access to whatever
information was collected by the Census enumerators. Finally, heightening public concerns also
radiated around the potential for computer linkages of the census data using PINs to other
databanks not authorized to possess the information collected by the government during the
census enumeration.
Responding to public fears, the Riksdag delayed the census, and instead fell back on a
structural practice of creating an advisement committee to investigate the issue further before
moving forward. Parliament established a Royal Commission on Publicity and Secrecy of
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Official Documents in 1969.219 While the commission was completing its report, the Supreme
Administrative Court, the highest civil court in the state, issued a ruling in 1971 ruling that
magnetic tapes used for storing information were de facto documents, making them subject to
public access similar to other documents under the Freedom of the Press Act. This raised the
question on what types of limits should be set for the access to documents, and automatic data
processing (ADP) under the Freedom of Information Act.
The 1972 report, “Computers and Privacy” concluded that new ways of collecting and
storing data did indeed present “… new threats to threats to personal privacy. Compared with
information kept in documents it is principally a matter of degree, but the difference is such that
the situation has changed in a decisive way.”220 Following this report, the Riksdag passed the
Data Law in April of 1973, which set the initial restraints on data treatment by public and private
actors. Importantly, the law institutionalized the protection of personal data by forming a Data
Inspectorate Board (DIB), which would be permanently responsible for oversight on the
implementation and monitoring of compliance with the law. The creation of this investigatory
commission by the Riksdag and the passing of the 1973 law set the foundation for personal data
rights as a normative practice in Swedish data policy. All data laws that were passed after the
1973 law throughout the Phase 1 period until 1999 followed the precedent set by this law in
protecting personal data, and later cyber data, as a right to privacy, or “integrity” of the
individual person.
After looking at the coded laws for the Phase 1 period, and the initial law creation, it is
clear that the overwhelming outcome for the case of Sweden was the establishment of data
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protection as a digital human right. I now turn to test the three hypotheses to see if the
contributing factors confirm the outcome as being tied to elite activity around data protection.
The first hypotheses proposed that dependence upon ICT firms will predispose a state to allow
for data commodification.
4.1.1

Economy

The Swedish economic model is one with foundations in the 1930s.221 Similar to many
states during the worldwide depression of the 1920s and 1930s, Swedish politicians and
economists developed state policies designed to ameliorate the effects of the depression. First
efforts at social welfare were motivated by the desire to reduce industrial conflict, as strikes and
wage-based disagreements were frequent occurrences in the early 20th century. In 1928, the
Saltsjöbaden agreement was reached between the Swedish Employers Association (SAF), the
Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), and the government. The Social Democrat party
maintained control over the government for over 40 years, from 1932-1976. The Saltsjöbaden
agreement and having the same government in power provided the foundation for corporatist
negotiations and policy agreements between management, labour, and the state for the remainder
of the 20th century. In the 1940s, the ministry of finance attempted modified Keynesian demand
policies to fuel growth; tax rates rose and restrictions were placed on planned investments and
reserve fund withdrawals. From the 1950s and 1960s, additional taxation, and reduced currency
movement were implemented at the suggestion of economists Rehgn and Meidner. The RehgnMeidner plan of structural rationalization was aimed at offsetting the overheated economy. The
plan promoted a wage plateau and elimination of unprofitable firms, whist retraining and

221

Magnussun 2000 was the data source for the industrial and economic history of Sweden during the 20th
century, references in this section of the dissertation.

81

relocating the unemployed. By the end of the 1960s, labour market policies were the most
popular economic tool used by the government.
Sweden experienced a severe recession in 1971. The 1973 election created a balance
between socialist and non-socialist blocs; economic policies during this period such as “tax
reductions, industrial stockpiling, releasing of investment reserves…” did lead to wage increases
of 4%, but exports fell considerably due to the overpriced currency (krona). These factors in turn
created severe unemployment, stagnant industrial growth, and large deficits in the balance of
payments resulting in a severe depression by 1976. Stagflation took hold. In 1976, the Social
Democrats experience losses during the election and their power bloc in parliament. The new
non-socialist government had different ideas on how to manage the economic crisis. They
introduced tax reductions and releasing of investment reserves. Most importantly, the
government devalued the krona three times; values fell 14% between 1976-77, and an additional
11% by 1981. Traditional mechanical production sectors suffered the worst damage during this
era. Shipbuilding, iron, steel, and mining all had production fall by between 30-50% from 19741982. The government spent considerable amounts to support benefits to employees in these
industries, much of which was borrowed from overseas. Despite the eventual economic plateau
and then recover, these industries did not resume their pre-depression production rates. By 1982,
competitiveness had returned to the Swedish economy, exports began to rise, and unemployment
started to fall again.
The 1980s and 1990s saw a crack in the strength of the compromise model that had been
established since the 1930s. In 1982, the Social Democrats were turned to power, and party
leader Olof Palme and his minister of finance Kjell-Olof Feldt mimicked Margaret Thatcher’s
“first way” policy with a “third way” for Swedes. In addition to keeping the krona value in the
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competitive range, wage solidarity policies and trade union loyalties were firmed in order to cap
wage increases. The Ministry of Finance released money and financial market restrictions,
releasing capital flows, which then prompted speculative property investing. The prior imbalance
of payments was corrected by the mid 1980s, but the third way policies had set in motion other
outcomes that were less favourable. Inflation grew. Unfortunately, the manufacturing and exportoriented engineering sectors experienced a labour shortage that subsequently reduced
productivity in the areas of the economy that had grown most substantially during this period.
Despite the currency devaluations, resource transfers were not able to compensate for these
deficiencies in the export sector of tech-based industries, which had begun to flourish as
traditional manufacturing exports shrank. The overheated economy of created a series of “crisis
policies” on the part of the Social Democrats in 1990: strikes would be banned, and wages frozen
again. The Social Democrats resigned after an uproar in parliament over the suggested policies.
Sweden felt the slowdown of the global economy in late 1990, and deflation resulted as the
Moderate government had to break its campaign promise to prop up the value of the krona. By
the mid 1990s, Sweden had undergone a series of banking crisis, requiring government bailouts
in 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993.
To summarise: the picture of economic contribution in Sweden during Phase 1 follows
the pattern of many industrial states in the West. Immediately following World War II, Sweden
relied upon a corporatist bargaining model and industrial manufacturing of consumable goods
such as iron, steel, and less so, but still including some agricultural components for economic
stability. A recession/depression in the 1970s led to increased mixed economic policies whereby
the government began to experiment with the core “Swedish economic model” in order to offset
increased oil prices, inflation, and an overvalued currency. While the corrections were successful
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in the short-term, they were accompanied by changes in the global market that reduced demand
for traditional manufactured goods, plus increased wage competition from overseas. Swedish
businesses began to adapt by growing into mechanical engineering and technology based
production more broadly, and technology and service sectors more specifically at the middle of
the 1980s until today. As a result, the percentage of persons employed in tech sectors increased,
and the resulting dependency of economic growth upon ICT sectors increased as well.
The theoretical argument set the expectation that in EU states with significant economic
dependence upon ICT firms, these countries will be likely to pass national regimes protecting
data commodification. The data available in the early years of Phase 1 to measure the
contribution of the ICT (information, communications, and technology sector), involves two
subsectors of ICT services: ICT services exports, and the insurance and financial services
exports. Both variables were measured by the World Bank as a percentage of overall commercial
services exports, and were found in the World Development Indicators database.222 Looking at
the latter part of Phase 1, the data on investment in ICT supplies and high tech exports becomes
available, giving a more in-depth picture of the role that ICT sector firms played in the Swedish
economy during this period.
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Table 6: ICT Services Sector Contribution, Sweden, 1970-1990

ICT Services
Y
Exports, % of
Year
services exports
1970

9.35

1971

8.70

1972

9.96

1973

Investment in ICT
Supplies, % of total
non-residential gross
fixed capital
formation
*
*

High Tech Exports,
% of
manufactured
exports

Insurance & Financial
Services, % of commercial
services exports

*
*

6.70
7.03

*

*

7.48

9.70

*

*

5.89

1974

10.10

*

*

4.84

1975

14.07

*

*

5.20

1976

13.29

*

*

6.49

1977

14.15

*

*

5.32

1978

15.53

*

*

4.69

1979

13.53

*

*

3.73

1980

11.36

*

*

4.02

1981

10.49

*

*

3.14

1982

31.53

*

*

6.74

1983

31.14

*

*

5.57

1984

34.27

*

*

5.40

1985

17.55

15.04

*

5.43

1986

17.47

15.43

*

7.24

1987

13.71

15.80

*

7.70

1988

12.42

16.48

12.34

8.70

1989

13.41

15.48

12.71

9.69

1990

14.20

15.21

12.90

9.26

1991

14.67

16.80

13.29

12.64

1992

14.76

19.83

13.31

12.71

1993

15.58

26.45

12.97

3.53

1994

16.56

25.46

12.83

2.97

1995

18.32

24.84

16.41

2.47

1996

19.45

24.08

17.94

2.48

1997

22.38

25.59

19.44

2.72

1998

35.33

27.76

19.82

3.05

28.80
21.54
1999
36.40
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Database; OECD
* Indicates no data available for these years
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Table 6 reveals the upward growth in the ICT sector in general, with services exports,
high-tech exports, and ICT investments experiencing several peak periods in Phase 1, and a peak
in Fin-services exports in 1992. ICT services exports in the 1970s contributed 9.35% of all
service exports, but had nearly doubled by 1978 to 15.53% of service exports. ICT services
exports struggled in the late 70s and early 80s, but had doubled again to 34.27% of services
exports by 1984. Oddly the sector contribution halved in 1985, and didn’t recover to previous
highs until 1998 and 1999, with rates of 35.33% and 36.40% respectively. Unlike ICT services
exports, Investment in ICT Supplies (as a percentage of total non-residential gross fixed capital
formation) experienced steady growth in the years 1985-1993, rising from 15.04% to 26.45%.
Here the levels essentially plateaued, rising slightly to 28.8% by 1999. High tech exports as a
percentage of manufactured exports experienced a similar pattern to ICT investments, by rising
steadily between 1988-1999, from 12.34% to 21.54%. Finally, Insurance and Financial Service
exports (as a percentage of commercial services exports) were quite volatile from 1970-1982;
figures began at 6.70%, dropped to 3.14%, then bounced up 6.74% of commercial services
exports. From 1982-1992, the general trend was upward, reaching 12.71% in 1992. After this
point, figures dropped dramatically, never rising about 3.53%, thus contributing much less to the
economy.
We know that the environment for tech and ICT firms between 1955-1980 was somewhat
positive; there was a positive market for entrepreneurship of these firms. According research by
MIT and the Swedish Board for Technical Development, the fastest growing firms in Sweden by
1980 were those whose product or services were primarily in technological fields.223 Out of
250,000 persons employed in manufacturing, 85,000 people worked in technical engineering
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firms, or approximately 34% of those working in manufacturing altogether. Interviews of 77
firms revealed that 25% of these firms formed after 1955 had revenues above $1 million USD by
1980. In addition, surveys of engineering-based firms employing at least 20 people between
1955-1980 were independently owned in Sweden, making tech-based entrepreneurship a
significant portion of the start-up businesses of the time.224 Compared to the other two cases,
Sweden falls in the middle of the three countries in terms of employment in technology
industries. As the data in Table 3 shows, three of the four variables of available data on the ICT
sector for this period indicate a significant contribution by these firms to the Swedish economy.
It is less clear why the ICT insurance and financial services did not experience the growth of the
other ICT products and services industries. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to address
this deviation from the other variables, but it is certainly worth investigation in research for the
future.
Unfortunately, as I have shown, the overall economy of Sweden was not experiencing
steady growth from 1970 to 1990. Sweden’s annual GDP per capita of growth of 1.99%, which
was below the OECD average of 2.71%. Overall, in the case of Sweden, while ICT firms
experienced generally positive growth, and provided an increasing contribution toward the
Swedish economy, these contributions do not seem to have impacted the protection policies
chose for data by the Riskdag. Data commodification was not codified into a majority of the
laws, and minimally codified into the Secrecy Act of 1980 and the Personal Data Act of 1998. I
conclude that Hypothesis 1a is not supported in the case of Sweden.
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4.1.2

Security

As indicated in the methodological chapter, security incidents include “any attack
against state or non-state targets that could be perceived as a breach of state sovereignty,
including attacks on territorial spaces, and physical infrastructure, either military or civilian
targets.” The more frequent and numerous are security incidents in the state, data access for
security, police, and law enforcement personnel will become more important. To test this
expectation, I looked at data for these types of attacks during Phase 1; this data was acquired
from the Global Terror Database (GTD).225 Table 4.3 provides an overview of the frequency of
conventional security incidents in Sweden during Phase 1 (see next page for full table).
Table 4.3: Security Incidents, Sweden, 1970-1999
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Year

Fatalities

Injuries

1971

1

2

1972

1

0

1973

0

0

1974

0

0

1975

3

13

1976

0

0

1977

0

0

1978

0

0

1979

1

0

1980

0

0

1981

0

0

1982

0

0

1983

1

0

1984

0

0

1985

0

0

1986

1

1

1987

0

0

1988

0

0

Note: There were no cyber attack incidents during this period, due to the nascent condition of
the computer industry as a whole. Data reveals that states and non-state actors had not begun to
use cyber offensive attacks among the case states until after 2005.
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1989

0

0

1990

1

11

1991

1

1

1992

2

5

1993

0

0

1994

0

1

1995

0

0

1996

0

0

1997

1

1

1998

0

0

1999

0

4

Total

13

39

Source: Global Terrorism Database

Recall I expected states with numerous domestic terror incidents to be more likely to pass
national regimes of data securitization, yet Sweden did not experience a significant number of
such incidents. Looking at Sweden’s data on security incidents, statistics reveal the most activity
in 1975, 1990, 1992, and 1999. These figures confirm that among the case states, Sweden
experienced the least numbers of terror attacks. Looking at the four years of heightened activity,
we see that each of these occurrences were unusual events in some way, and disconnected from
any larger, organized and long-term security threat to the state. The 1975 attack involved a
stand-off between five guerilla members from the German Baader-Meinhof, or “Red Army
Faction” militia group stormed the Swedish Embassy in Stockholm. The extreme Marxist and
anti-Semitic group was active in Germany from approximately 1970-1998, and used violent
means such as bombings, kidnappings, and gun battles with police as a part of their wider goals
to generate a revolution against the disproportionate power of the industrialized states against the
rest of the world.226 During the 1975 attack perpetrated against the Germany Embassy in
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Sweden, five RAF members held embassy staff hostage, whilst making demands for the release
of 26 RAF group members imprisoned in Germany. Swedish security and German authorities
refused to negotiate with the militants, and after approximately 12 hours, two people were dead
(two embassy staff persons, one militant).227 During the melee, the militants set off an explosion
that blew up the embassy, and caused burns and injuries to members of the group and remaining
hostages in the building. This event represents the single-most loss of life connected with a
security attack in Sweden during Phase 1, however, the overall effect was intended to target not
Sweden, but the German government and its policy.
All of the subsequent security attacks during Phase 1 involved isolated individuals or
groups as the targets. The highest profile, politicized attack took place with the 1986
assassination of Social Democrat Prime Minister Olof Palme. Investigators blamed a thenunknown gunman, who appeared off the streets of Stockholm to shoot Palme as he was leaving a
theatre with his wife one evening. A petty criminal was convicted in 1989, but this ruling was
later overturned in 2004.228 Multiple theories abound as to the root cause of Palme’s death,
including accusations against arms dealers from India, Kurdish rebels from Turkey, or a former
witness interviewed by police after the killing, Stig Engstrom. To this day, no concrete proof has
been offered as to the motivation nor has the real killer been identified, causing the attack on the
prime minister to be categorized as an isolated incident.
Following the prime minister’s death, the next national security challenges arose in the
early 1990s. A far-right Swedish extremist by the name of John Ausonius (“the laser killer”)
shot members of various Stockholm communities in 1991-1992.229 He was convicted in 1995
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for a total of 11 attacks, resulting in one death, all against immigrants or persons of non-Swedish
appearance. On 5 April 1992, the Iranian embassies in nine countries were simultaneously
invaded by rebel group members in opposition to the government of Iran. The Swedish embassy
was one of the multiple sites attacked. Approximately 50 protesters set fire to two buildings and
six cars in Stockholm associated with the Iranian diplomatic core. The ambassador’s wife and
children were treated for shock, but no one was killed. Swedish security officials arrested 21
persons connected to the event. 1999 ended with a peak of activity in the summer, with two
incidents purportedly involving neo-Nazi groups. Peter Karlsson, an investigative journalist, and
his son, were injured during a bombing of their car on 28 June in Nacka. Karlsson had been
researching the activity of the neo-Nazi group, the Ariska Bordraskapet (“Aryan
Brotherhood”).230 Less than a week later, two policemen suffered several injuries when
investigating a stolen car that exploded when they approached it.231 This crime were attributed
alternately to either another neo-Nazi group, the Nationalsocialistick Front (NSF), or the Hells
Angels.
Altogether, while these events were certainly disturbing and disruptive, they did not
represent a larger pattern of security risks endemic to the entirely of Swedish society, there
was little need for increased law enforcement access to data. There were a total of 39 persons
injured, and 13 deaths from terror-related attacks between 1970-1999. The mean casualties were
1.79 per year. As the total population of Sweden during this period was a mean of 8.4 million
persons, one can conclude that security fears were not a high risk factor taken under
consideration by Swedish policy-makers when addressing data governance.
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4.1.3

Digital Human Rights

In states with a more active legal and academic elite pushing for more codification of
human rights, we should see an increased attempt at identifying and protecting data within the
human rights policy umbrella. To evaluate this, I looked at the roots of Swedish data law and the
roles given to various jurists, judges, and academic faculty, during consultation with the Riksdag
in the years prior to and during Phase 1. In the case of Sweden, record-keeping practices by the
government were particularly impactful.
Swedish society has a precedent of over two hundred years of open access to information
collected by the government, or what Anderson calls the “principal of public access to official
documents.”232 This practice dates back to a change of party in power when the the “Caps”
(mössorna) party won control of Parliament in the 18th century. Following the takeover by the
Cap party, their government pass the Act of 1766 to reverse censorship practices by the prior
party in power, the “Hats” (hattarna). Importantly, freedom of access was coupled with norms of
avoiding secrecy by government actors. Since that point in time, the press (and thereby the
public) have enjoyed legal access to government files.233 This purposive reversal of censorship
opened the door for the population to expect the Swedish government to be transparent on how it
was doing business. No core changes were made to this policy during the 19th or 20th centuries,
though minor revisions were made to access and secrecy laws in 1810, 1812, and 1949.234 The
revisions continued to support public access, expanding it to local government files in 1937,
although granting local officials the right to appeal given particular grounds.
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The Swedish population continued to grant freedom of collection to the government
regarding private information in the late 20th and early 21st century, as long as was held in check
by public access to whatever records were obtained. This included supportive attitudes to the
addition of a personal identity number system, which was given in 1946 to every resident.
Similar to, but more comprehensively utilized than the U.S. social security number, this number
was assigned to Swedes from birth to death, and was an identifying tool attached to all
documents, legal and commercial, regarding all individuals. As an example of the ongoing
expansion of Swedish governmental record-keeping, in 1968, the tax-payers’ registry was given
permission to computerize record-keeping on all taxpayers. The taxpayer’s registry accumulated
data on 6.5 million people, using local manual sources of records on the population, and
computerizing all data collected for tax purposes.235
The government kept monitoring application of the access laws as time progressed,
creating a Publicity Committee (Offentlighetskommitté) in 1960, that issued a report in 1966 to
the Ministry of Justice on recommended practices for the future. The formation of the research
committees designed is crucial to how the Riksdag approaches revision of past laws or
formulation new laws, and this practice is integral to the argument of this dissertation.
Committees typically include civil servants, legal officials or jurists, members of the press, and
academics.236 The specific composite mix of advisors on the 1960 Publicity Committee used
their legal professional perspectives to inform the types of recommendations made for multiple
laws that impact information policies, including the 1937 Secrecy Act, the 1973 Credit Act, and
the 1972 Data Act which was to come. Member of the Riksdag and the civil service were heavily
slanted toward a background as lawyers, judges, and/or academics.
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The general feeling amongst the members of the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) was
positive and supportive of expanding the use of computers and data management for government
purposes.237 The public sector’s role as “early adopter” cannot be overstated. Colin Bennett
(1992) notes that as early as 1963, the Swedish government was collating databanks for
population registration, land records & automobile records, and social services, all under the
management of the Central Bureau of Statistics, or Statistiska Centralbyran (SCB).238 In
addition to government attempts at collecting data and harnessing data banks for bureaucratic
purposes, the private sector saw adoption of computerization to be part of wider goals to
rationalize trade and industries in order to improve the economic bottom line. 239 A few officials
within the bureaucracy did express some reservations. Minister of Justice Kurt Hugossen worried
that local housing authorities’ records were increasingly being tapped for commercial purposes,
as businesses used the records for marketing and advertisement canvasing.240 Despite this, use of
computers to collect, organize and store data moved forward, as it was largely seen as a part of
improving oversight into government actions, an attitude which has been firmly entrenched in
Swedish society for centuries. Only in the very late 1960s, did a debate emerge around data
collection and treatment, centered on several factors related to computerization of data.
The public was largely unconcerned about data collection by the government until the
census records were scheduled to be updated in 1970.241 The proposed 1970 Housing and
Population Census became the trigger for a larger debate on data treatment. People expressed
concern over the exponential effect of data appropriation that would be possible with centralized
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and computerized data banks.242 Particular fears swirled around the potential for personal records
from the Census being linked and matched to other types of governmental records, reversing the
anonymity related to non-Census record collections. Additional fears related to the difficulty in
correcting false information once data was logged into a large, government computer network.
Lastly, public apprehension about the Census was matched by increased hesitancy on the part of
parliamentary officials to adopt a computerized census model without further debate. The
Riksdag responded to the public concerns by delaying the collection of the 1970 Census, and
instead created another advisory board to investigate the potential for data breaches to privacy
and anonymity that might occur as a result of adopting computer-based data management, rather
than traditional paper records for the Census. As referenced in the economic hypothesis section
for Sweden, the late 1960s and early 1970s were a turning point for increased demands in
accountability by voters toward policymakers; this included the desire for more responsive turns
to fears about governmental record-keeping.243
In January of 1969, two members of the RIksdag (Kaj Björjk and Kurt Hugosson)
introduced bills that concerned citizens’ rights to privacy. Both MPs wanted parliament to
address the potential for violations in privacy regarding already existing legislation, such as the
Secrecy Act. The government established the Committee on Publicity and Secrecy Legislation
(Betänkande av Offentlighets- och sekretesslagstiftningskommittén, or OSK) in April
1969.244 The findings and suggestions made by the OSK would have a huge impact upon
Swedish data legislation, laying the foundation for the types of laws and oversight the state and
the public would expect.
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First, the OSK committee was comprised of intellectuals with a combined background of
expertise in legislation, statistics, public administration, ministry of justice bureaucracy, and
legal academic faculty. The committee consisted of Erick Adamsson (parliamentary council
chairman), Allan Eriksson (philosophy academic), Jan Freese (court of appeals lawyer, Assistant
Secretary of the committee), Hans-Olaf Hansson (actuary), Kurt Hugosson (parliamentarian),
Sven-Erik Larsson (former farmer, now career parliamentarian), Karl-Olof Lidin (assessor), Åke
Polstam (parliamentarian), Edmund Rapaport (statistician), Kent Skoog (consultant), Hans-Olov Stark
(ministry of justice), Erik Svedberg (parliamentarian), and Per Svenonius (public management expert).

According to Dr. Lars Ilshammar245, academic and national archivist who conducted extensive
interviews with many of the OSK members, the committee had a two-fold mandate. They were
charged with making proposals for how individuals’ privacy could be protected whilst
simultaneously allowing for the Swedish norm of public access to records. The task was
challenging to say the least. The public concerns were represented in the committee by several
parliamentarians, who together came from four of the five parties holding seats in the Riksdag at
the time. The Chairman was Rune Hermansson, a Social Democrat, with prior experience as a
judge of appeals, and a minister with the Department of Justice between 1960-1966. Under
Hermansson’s leadership, the OSK was able to present an initial report to the Minister of Justice
Lennart Geiger by June 1972. The OSK recommended revisions to the current Freedom of the
Press Act, but the core of their suggestion was the creation of an entirely new data act, and
importantly, a new governmental agency which could serve as the supervisor of records
management for computerized data. I argue that this report served as a critical juncture for
Swedish data policy, laying the foundation for digital human rights in Sweden.
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The Data Inspection Board (DIB, XXX in Swedish) was a novel approach to
computerized personal data for several reasons.246 First, the law set government, not the
computer users, or private citizens, with the bulk of the responsibility for fair data treatment.
Multiple scholars note the precedent set by Sweden for data legislation, which was followed by
numerous European states247. By registering all databanks collecting personal data, the law
would allow manual record-keepers to continue their current practices unchanged. The data aw
regarding computer-based personal data would apply to both public and private databanks,
making oversight the norm across all segments of professional computer use. Lastly, it was a
first-point of use law, meaning that the government would be informed as to every existing and
new databank holding personal data, and would be able to inspect practices on site, ensuring
compliance once a databank was registered.248 The OSK was suggesting a data law that would
formally institutionalize personal data protection. The bill was presented to the Riksdag in
February of 1973, and adopted on April 12, 1973.
The next step taken by the Riksdag truly solidified Sweden’s pathway toward a policy of
digital human rights. The Data Act of 1973 (Datalagen), was the first national law regarding data
treatment in Sweden, and stated that its main purpose was “to prevent undue encroachment on
individual privacy.” 249 250Board members would serve four year terms, with a Director-General,
as the head of the agency, chosen from candidates with judicial experience. Director-Generals
and eight Deputy-Directors could serve indefinite terms. The DIB board would four legislators,
someone form the major trade unions, one representative from major industries, a member from
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the public administration, and researchers. All together this would include ten other board
members outside of the Director-General, and all chosen by the Cabinet of the Riksdag. All
databanks in Sweden holding personal data would be required to obtain a license upon
registration with the DIB. Only the Riksdag itself was exempted from this requirement. The
initial duties given the DIB through the 1973 Data Act were to license data banks, supervise
compliance, and administrate. The new Data Inspection Board (DIB) was to be an autonomous
agency given responsibility over how data was collected, from whom it could be collected, and
concerned with the permission of the data subjects about whom the information was taken. As a
result of this responsibility, the activities of the DIB encroached upon additional law compliance,
such as that of the Credit Reporting Act, and the Debt Collection Acts.
The final aspect of the impact of particular actors upon the development of data
protection as a human right in Sweden can be seen in the leadership styles of the DIB DirectorGenerals (DGs).
Table 7: Directors-General of the Swedish Data Inspection Board

Years Served in
DIB
1973-1977
1977-1987
1986-1989
1989-1992
1992-1998
1998-2004

Name of Director
General
Claes-Göran Källner
Jan Freese
Mats Börjesson
Stina Wahlström
Anitha Bondestam
Ulf Widebäck

From 1973-1983, the DIB largely focused on licensing databanks. After the law was
revised in 1982, the scope of responsibilities expanded into supervision and on-site inspections.
Källner brought his experiences as a legal expert to the DIB, having served as a court lawyer
since 1955, as a minister of the Interior from 1963, and the Head of the Department of Civil
Affairs just prior to his taking on the DG role at the DIB. Without doubt, however, Jan Freese,
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who was the second DG in Sweden, led the country and much of Europe toward a digital human
right framework for data protection since the 1960s. Prior to working at the DIB, Freese had
been a court of appeals lawyer and judge from 1964-1973. At the DIB, he took a proactive role,
often advocating for the importance of data protection and the agency with the media. In fact,
Freese saw himself as a policy-maker, not just a policy implementer. Noting the lack of a word
in Swedish equivalent to the English word “privacy”, Freese argued that the spirit of the 1973
law essentially promoted, “individual’s right to be left alone.”251 In 1978, Freese actually
opposed a tighter reconceptualization of the word “integritet” in the proposed revision of the law,
preferring to give the DIB more leverage on interpreting the levels of encroachment being
perpetrated against data protection by registered data banks. He also actively opposed linking
databanks from multiple agencies, stating, “The road to 1984 is paved with good intentions.
Besides that, you can’t compare apples and pears – two data banks could have different rules for
collection, and then can affect the quality of information.”252 Freese advocated for data
protection throughout Europe and globally during the 1970s and 80s, writing multiple documents
and working papers regarding the topic, and appearing at data policy conferences.253 Among
Data Inspection Board Directors in Europe, Freese served the second lengthiest term of service
in management capacity, second only to Spiritos Simitis in Germany.254
In 1986, Freese accepted a role as the Deputy Managing Director and Head of the Social
Policy Department of the Swedish Industrial Federation, and the management of the DIB
switched to Mats Börjesson. Börjesson served only three years from 1986-1989, focusing mainly
on ”guiding” the DIB through implementation of the 1982 Data Law revisions, rather than acting
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as a policy innovator as had Freese.255 In 1978, the Riksdag revisited the Data Law, wishing to
address concerns on burdens of protection as relates to ”sensitive data” such as health problems,
criminal history, etc., that may have inadvertently been exposed to public access as a result of the
ambiguous wording of the 1973 law. A new advisory commission, the Datalagskommittén, or
Data Act Committee (DALK)256 looked at the exemption of government databanks from the
general protection requirements of non-government facilities, and found that it was necessary to
update the 1973 law to address sensitive data protections. DALK issued policy revision reports
on a regular basis between 1976-1984. Suggested revisions in 1978 included protections for
sensitive data, but the core areas of restrictions in the 1973 law remained the same. The most
significant changes that occurred to the DIB in Phase 1 included 1982 changes to the licensure
paperwork, making it more of a registration than a permission-seeking framework, and 1997
revisions to the Data Law, in order to comply with the 1995 Directive passed by the EU
Commission (Directive 95/46/EC). None of the directors following Freese aggressively sought
media exposure for the agency to the degree of Freese, however they did work with the Riksdag
to influence proposed legislation that would impact their work with data protection. While many
if not all had legal expertise similar to Freese (Wahlström and Widebäck were both court
attorneys or legal consultants for the Riksdag), subsequent DGs kept the” status quo” of the DIB
functionality, following the pattern of professionalization and civil service created by Källner,
and sustained by Freese before then.
In the case of Sweden, there is substantial support for the idea that the legal exports
chosen for regulatory committee research and as managers for the DIB have moved
forward the agenda of digital human rights for Sweden.
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4.2

Findings: The United Kingdom
Table 8: UK Data Laws (Phase 1:1970-1999)
Year

Name of law

Description

1974

Consumer
Credit Act

Individuals granted
right of access to
credit source
information for
correction purposes.

1984

Data Protection
Act

1998

Data Protection
Act

Regulates use of
automatically
processed personal
data regarding
individuals;
designed to ensure
compliance with
CoEurope
Convention 1981
Created new
provisions for
regulation of
processing personal
information;
designed to ensure
compliance with EU
Directive 95/46/EC

Total
Coded
Sentences
32

Text Analysis
Scores

Net Score

+4 Security
-2 Security
+1 Econ
+ 17 Data Protect
- 8 Data Protect

+9 Data Protect
+ 2 Security
+ 1 Econ

191

+13 Security
-4 Security
+5 Econ
+125 Data Protect
-76 Data Protect

+49 Data Protect
+9 Security
+5 Econ

464

+18 Econ
-7 Econ
+44 Security
-19 Security
+218 Data Protect
-151 Data Protect

+67 Data Protect
+25 Security
+18 Econ

Source: www.legislation.gov/uk

The United Kingdom was the last of my case states to adopt data protection legislation
(Sweden 1973, Germany 1977, UK 1984). A core barrier to developing data protection
legislation in the U.K. lay in the lack of constitutional structure for human rights protections.
More than any of the other case states, Britain also experienced a somewhat politicized approach
to the topic, with political will regarding data legislation waxing and waning across time based
upon whether the Conservative or Labour party held the majority in Parliament. Security fears
involved both data security and the need for access to data by government security actors.
Finally, data protection legislation was pushed through by a combination of private actors in the
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legal sector, and the ICT business community, the latter motivated by its primary fear of market
losses without such protections, the former by the need to protect the public from data privacy
losses.
As noted by Bennett, one of the main hurdles for data protection legislation in Britain
was the lack of a formal, written constitution.257 Unlike the countries of Sweden, and Germany,
both of whom had constitutional precedent that established a base set of human rights, the United
Kingdom did not have such a document. In addition, the norms of privacy protection that exist in
the German case due its history of oppressive Nazi surveillance simply did not exist in Britain.258
Unlike Sweden, there was no established history of public expectations for government
transparency about information collected on the population. Public access to data collected about
the British public did not exist until an incident involving a Labour MP in 1982, an incident I
will discuss in the next paragraphs.
I note in brief, that when computer technology advanced in the whereby personal privacy
could be affected by actions taken during government overt or covert surveillance of the public,
the U.K. had no foundation on which to build legislation for data protection or treatment as a
whole. As a result, the process toward legislating data management was much more piecemeal,
and driven by an odd combination of the legal community, academics, and the ICT sector itself.
Politicians and law-makers were the last to arrive at the conclusion that such laws were
necessary. As in the case of Sweden, it is crucial to trace the structural factors that contributed to
the willingness by the Thatcher administration to finally submit a data protection law to
Parliament.
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Prior to Phase 1, there had been a few scattered attempts at introducing legislation that
would protect against information abuse by media and the government during investigation of
the private lives of citizens. In the House of Lords, Lord Mancroft introduced an unsuccessful
bill in 1961 to prohibit “… any unjustifiable publication relating to his private affairs and to give
him rights at law in the vent of such publication.”259 On the House of Commons side, several
individual attempts were made to introduce legislation. MP Alex Lyon attempted to be a catalyst
for privacy protections by introducing a “Right of Privacy Bill” in 1967, but it failed to receive
general support. Mr. Brian Walden initiated the “Privacy Bill” in 1969, which also died. The
“Control of Personal Information Act” sponsored by Huckfield and Coombs in 1972 asked for
the creation of a data bank tribunal to regulate and monitor personal information management.
The bill did receive a second reading in April of 1972, but was defeated in 1973.260
While individual MPs were interested, broad political will to actually pass legislation on
the part of the Labour government was non-existent. Though Britain did not have a plan to
develop centralized databanks as in the case of Sweden, individual MPs were increasingly
worried about the potential for abuse as computerized record-keeping grew in practice, and these
MPs kept pressuring the Home Office to do something. Government responded to their concerns
with the Justice Report Privacy and the Law, released in 1970, which did offer a draft Bill based
upon Walden’s Privacy Bill. The recommendations in the report were met with press opposition
due to fears of serious restrictions to freedom of the press and speech.261 The continued pressure
by parliamentarians upon the Home Office to be proactive regarding information privacy

259

Lord Mancroft, HL Debs., 5s., 13 march 1961, col. 607.
HC Deb 21 April 1972 vol 835 cc967-1012, comments by Mr. Leslie Huckfield. HC Deb 21 April
1972 vol 835 cc967-1012. See also Price 1984.
260

261

Dworkin 1973

103

legislation let them to call for an investigative body to research the issue further. The hope was
that a compromise could be reached which did not impinge upon press freedom to perform
investigative journalism on members of the public.
The Younger Commission, headed by Sir Kenneth Younger, first met in May of 1970,
and initially looked only at the issue of privacy as relates to the public sector. (The Committee
did include private sector concerns as well, after receiving feedback from various industries to
expand the breadth of the evaluation). The committee was told to “consider whether legislation is
needed to give further protection to the individual citizen and to commercial and industrial
interests against intrusions into privacy by private persons and organizations, or by companies,
and to make recommendations.”262 As a part of the investigation, a series of public opinion polls
were conducted to measure the level of public support for privacy legislation. 38% of Britons
considered privacy as important, 29% as very important, and 16% extremely important.263 The
Younger Committee Report on Privacy responded with a series of suggested measures, but
disagreed in a 14:2 vote among committee members that the government should go so far as to
propose a law codifying the “right to privacy.” The majority in the committee did not want a
prosecutable law that would require civil court officials to choose between an individual’s right
to privacy and “public interest.”264 The committee also feared that a bill to protect information
privacy would unfairly restrain the press, a sector which had strongly opposed the idea of a
privacy bill from the very start. Rather, the Younger Committee asked that the Press Council
institute a voluntary code of ethics, and it called for a new Complaints Commission to accept and
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examine public complaints regarding invasions of privacy during press investigations. Both
instruments were subsequently rejected by the press.
The Younger Report offered ten principles for data treatment, primarily focused on the
finance industry and data processing involving computers.265 Personal information should be
collected only for specified reasons, data access given only to those duly authorized, and data
stored for a prescribed period of time. In addition, computer systems designed to manage
statistics should anonymize data.266 Credit agencies and banks received particular attention;
credit reference information should not be released by financial institutions without the consent
of the credit subject. In all of these sectors, monitoring security should be designed into the
information systems to make “precautions against the deliberate abuse or misuse of
information.”267 Data accuracy should be maintained. Lastly, they recommended a Standing
Commission be appointed to “examine the use of computers, particularly for handling personal
information.” Heath’s Conservative government agreed to establish the standing committee, but
had no plans to legislate data protection as a result of the initial report. Much of the Younger
Committee’s suggestions were virtually ignored. The only suggestions that did become law from
the initial report were those regarding credit information protections, enacted in the Consumer
Credit Act of 1974.
During the early 1970s, the public continued to raise concerns over the intent of British
officials to record and store personal information during a series of data collection events, some
of which caused enough angst on the part of the population that the government did react. The
format of the 1971 census in Britain resulted in the “biggest outpouring of public concern about
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privacy ever witnessed in that country.”268 As the over 100,000 census-takers went throughout
the country collecting data, people opposed participation by complaining of the invasive nature
of questions regarding personal details such ethnicity, and the number of persons living per
household. Some residents refused to participate altogether, a few lawsuits were filed, and an
official investigation was launched to address census procedures.269 Further public outcry arose
from the formation of the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Centre in 1973; the Centre centralized
over 33 million records on drivers in Britain.270 Mr. Leslie Huckfield complained during the
House of Lords debate over the Control of Personal Information Bill that the licensing center
was just the beginning of public sector computerization of personal information recordkeeping.271 The Department of Health and Social Security were preparing to digitize social work
paperwork, the National Police Computer kept criminal history records in databanks, and other
databanks were housed by the Departments of Defence, Trade and Industry, and the Civil
Service Department. Most troubling to members of the public and therefore to some MPs was the
discussion over linking many of these databases, which would risk the further exposure of
private information to individuals not authorized to see types of information from other state
agencies. (MPs regularly mentioned fears of Nixon-like Watergate scandal, should data
protection not be addressed by Her Majesty’s government.272 It would be left to the Labour
government that came into office in 1974 to act upon the findings and recommendations of the
1972 Report.
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As mentioned, the only distinct action taken by the government was to establish a
standing research committee on the topic. The Lindop Committee, led by Sir Norman Lindop,
met beginning in July of 1976, and met over 50 times in the next two years. Much of what the
committee addressed concerned how to define many terms which had not been addressed in the
Younger report, as well as to outline the scope of protections needed by the government. Data
privacy was identified as, “the individual’s claim to control the circulation of data about
himself.”273 Their first report, released in 1978, called for legislation that would create a Data
Protection Authority, which would then implement codes of behavior for data treatment,
including “collecting, processing, and storing personal data on computers” based on “fair
information principles.”274 Unfortunately, the issue was politicized again, as the Labour
government asked for additional input by the IT industry; the Lindop Committee generated a list
of 250 organizations and asked them for feedback. When Labour lost control of the government
through a no-confidence vote in 1979, and Thatcher’s Conservatives were elected in 1979, they
delayed action again, finding the Lindop suggestions suspect, being instigated by a Labour
initiative.
As several scholars point out, civil liberties groups continued to apply the pressure to the
Home Office to write a data protection law throughout the 1970s.275 The Home Office Secretary
responded in 1981, indicating the government had no intentions of acting on legislation, arguably
caught between its dual mandates to act as protectors of justice (Ministry of Justice) yet also
serving to protect national security (Department of Interior).276 Only links between the concerns
of the private sector, and U.K. membership in the Council of Europe combined together
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provided enough of an incentive to change the collective mind of the Thatcher government. In
1981, the Council of Europe held a meeting specifically to address data policy: the Convention
for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Data (“Convention
108”), which concluded in a treaty open for signatures by all member states.277 The treaty
outlined several recommendations for member states that would set data protection for
automatically processed personal data, and codify this within legal systems that would protect
storage and use of such data. This protection should simultaneously allow for data transport
across state lines during business transactions, a matter of concern for the rapidly developing
ICT sector of several Council of Europe and OECD member states.
In fact, the U.S. had pushed the initiative throughout the Convention in order to benefit
the growing ICT sector in the country. Britain had signed the treaty. When 1982 was declared
by the Thatcher government to be the “Technology Year” as an effort to play catch up with U.S.
gains in the ICT sector, British ICT firms joined human rights activists in pushing the
government to finally act on the issue. In fact, they feared profit losses if they were unable to
reassure other European firms and governments that the minimal requirement set by Convention
108 were being met and monitored by the British government. Finally, the issue was framed in a
way that the economic policy and trade-focused Thatcher government could embrace. Timothy
Raison, Secretary for the Home Office, announced a forthcoming White Paper which would
explain the government’s intended legislation.
The White Paper of 1982 did address data protections, but in reality, followed none of the
core suggestions made by either the Younger or Lindop Committees. Instead of a permanent
agency to act as a Data Protection Authority (DPA), the paper suggested a registry be created for
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personal data banks, to oversee the cataloguing of computers processing personal, nonanonymized data.278 A bill was formally introduced in the House of Lords in December of 1982,
and received a second reading in January of 1983, but was unable to pass through both sides of
Parliament before the May break. It was again introduced and passed in the Lords in June/July of
1983, and taken up by the Commons in January of 1984. The bill passed with a vote of 226 to
104 at that time, securing according to Gerald Kaufman, “... the absolute minimum the
government can get away with.”279 The wording angered civil liberties groups, as it provided no
protections for manual (paper-based) data, and it allowed for cross-border data transfers. Despite
these weaknesses, it was the first data protection law of the United Kingdom, and its success was
due to a mixed alliance among the “… business community, the trades unions, the consumers’
associations, the computer industry, the medical and other professions, and the civil liberties and
human rights interests…”280
I now turn to explain how each of the three major factors (economic commodification,
security, and human rights activism) contributed toward the 1984 law and the subsequent 1998
revision.
4.2.1

Economy

Britain’s economic history is first understood by the evolution of industrialization and
technological change in the state. First-mover advantage took place during the age of
industrialization in the 18th and early 19th centuries, and Britain adopted textile processing for
cotton and British inventors created steam engine power and other mechanized improvements
that increased labor efficiency. By 1851, the country was one of the world’s largest exporters of
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manufactured and commodified goods, including textiles, engineering products, steam engines,
coal and iron.281 Unfortunately for Britain, it was unable to maintain this advantage, and by the
20th century was obtaining much of its advanced technology from other states, as the Fordist
mechanisms adopted in the early 1900s were not adaptable to ICT product and service diffusion
in the latter part of the century.
Regarding economic policy prior to Phase 1, during the interwar years, the country
functioned as “managed economy” whereby free trade policies gradually shifted toward
protection policies, including general tariffs on manufacturing in the 1930s, cartels and foreign
investment controls in the 1930s, which also led to abandonment of the gold standard in 1931.
Following the end World War in 1945, during the “Golden Age of European economic growth”,
the U.K. went its own way, as the government chose not to adopting the corporatist strategies
used in the Scandinavian states or Germany. Instead of using collective bargaining to facilitate
wage restraints, British leaders chose to subsidize failing industries, incentive technology
invention, not diffusion, and keep owners and industrial controls separate. By the 1980s, the
U.K. was experiencing unemployment levels similar to the depression years of the 1930s,
matched with decreased in production from 9.3% in 1963, to 1.2% by 1986. The Thatcher
government had to significantly reform fiscal, economic, and trade policy to privatize key
industries, and reduce the “propping up” of outdated sectors to improve competitiveness sin the
global market.
To assess the contribution of the ICT sector upon the economy, it was necessary to
compare this sector to the contributions to GDP growth made by more traditional sectors.
Primary sector indices reveal slow growth or contraction from 1964-1979 (agriculture in
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constant prices grew from 55 to 71.93; mining contracted from 187-109.2).282 In the secondary
industries, manufacturing grew (72.6 to 90.6) faster than did construction (65.9 to 69.4). Only the
tertiary industries saw significant positive changes; post and telecommunications more than
doubled from 30.6 to 59.7, and financial and intermediate industries grew from 27.6 to 59.6
during the same period. GDP during this period grew from 58.7 to 76.5 by 1979. Production as a
whole gained from 62.6 to 87.6.
Adding complexity to the environment of mixed output growth, the exogenous shocks
created by the OPEC output restrictions of 1973 and 1979 led to reductions in demand on carrelated products. This motivated the U.K. to develop and expand its oil extraction capabilities in
the North Sea. A “petrocurrency” environment emerged, whereby the value of the pound was
correlated with oil prices. This was both good and bad, as rising oil prices added the value of the
pound for investors, but falling pound prices encouraged more exports by UK manufacturing
products. Keeble (1989) notes that even during economic decline years such as the early 1980s,
aggregate decline in technology employment fell much less than did traditional manufacturing (7.7% compared to -27.7%, between 1979-1986.283
As growth in technology industries cooled in the U.S., U.K. firms stood ready to fill some
of the worldwide demand for ICT goods and services. Between 1977-1984, high-tech
manufacturing grew 46%.284 Computer services grew 48%, and electronic data and computer
processing equipment grew 23%. 285 This in turn created significant demand for high-skilled
staff; high-skill workers expanded 24% to make up 55% of the work force between 1978- 1984,
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while unskilled labor shrank 19% to comprise 22% of the work force in 1984.286 Furthermore,
exponential employment opportunities occurred among startup firms in ICT; 99% of net growth
in employment between 1980-84 occurred in companies with fewer than 50 employees, formed
after 1975.
Looking at the data on contribution by ICT to the British economy, using the four
variables of measurement also used for Sweden, we see confirmation that ICT goods and
services were increasingly an important portion of the U.K. economy.287 ICT services exports
comprised anywhere from 23-32% of exports, investment in ICT supplies few from 13.95 to
27.18% of capital formation, high tech exports increased from 24.74 to 29.92%. Similar to the
case of Sweden, insurance and financial services firms experienced the most volatility in growth;
they contributed 20.88% in 1986, fell to 13.34% in 1991, then grew again to 24.65% by the end
of the period. All four measures ended the period at levels higher than when data first became
available in 1985. (See next page for table.)
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Table 9: ICT Services Sector Contribution, United Kingdom, 1970-1999

Year

ICT Services
Exports, % of
services exports

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

*
23.47
*
*
*
*
25.08
26.31
24.85
26.35
25.12
27.65
27.83
32.56
30.26

Investment in ICT
Supplies, % of total
non-residential
gross fixed capital
formation
13.95
15.60
15.80
15.93
16.18
15.93
18.21
18.51
19.06
20.82
22.98
25.12
23.85
25.58
27.18

High Tech
Exports, % of
manufactured
exports

Insurance &
Financial Services,
% of commercial
services exports

*
*
*
24.74
25.20
23.61
24.65
23.59
25.97
25.70
27.03
26.69
27.09
28.68
29.92

*
20.88
17.56
16.91
14.75
16.43
15.34
15.78
16.74
17.28
17.53
19.18
22.12
20.06
24.65

I expected that states with large-scale economic dependence on ICT firms will likely pass
economic commodification polices (i.e., national institutional regime) protecting the use of
personal and/or cyber data for profit. There is considerable support for this prediction in the
case of Britain. While the primary and secondary sectors continued to contract and/or plateau,
ICT goods and services followed an overall growth pattern during Phase 1.
4.2.2

Security

To test the impact of national security threats in the U.K., I again measured the frequency
of domestic terror attacks during Phase 1, using data from the Global Terror Database (GTD).
Table 10 provides an overview of the frequency of conventional security incidents in Sweden
during Phase 1.
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Table 10: Security Incidents, United Kingdom, 1970-1999

Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Total

Fatalities
20
110
368
210
235
245
264
103
81
133
78
86
95
77
69
64
63
104
372
66
76
88
94

Injuries
1
1
223
275
329
129
19
17
113
146
92
118
152
186
249
175
80
120
276
174
123
235
453

66
11
14
23
46
7
3268

177
5
395
35
259
161
4718

Casualties
21
111
591
485
564
374
283
120
194
279
170
204
247
263
318
239
143
224
648
240
199
323
547
0
243
16
409
58
305
168
7986

Among my case countries in Phase 1, the U.K. experienced the most catastrophic and
consistent attacks upon domestic security. The Troubles years (1968-1999) of internal conflict
within Northern Ireland shaped the national debate on terrorism and national security not only
during that time, but since that period. While it is beyond the scope of the dissertation to
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perform a thorough explanation of the causes and implications of the conflict, general patterns
that occurred during the Troubles can be used to test Hypothesis 1b.
Northern Ireland enjoyed home rule from 1922-1972, with the Unionist Party forming
government outside of Belfast at Stormont, based upon the social power held by Protestant
fraternal groups. Catholic disenfranchisement was assured via gerrymandering, and social
subjection practiced through housing discrimination and denial of various cultural rights.288
Scholars and journalists cite the protest by Catholic populations in 1969 over voting rights
discrimination as the catalyst for political contention that subsequently occurred. The Irish
Republican Army split from the Official IRA party in 1969 over strategies of enhanced violence
to promote political concessions from Westminster.289 When the local constabulary was unable
to manage the violence that escalated by Catholics and Protestants, British troops were sent in to
settle the unrest from that point.290 While civilian deaths began at that point, the first British
officer wasn’t killed until February of 1971, when shot by the IRA.
Looking at the data in Table 10, peaks in violence and casualties occurred in the years of
1972, 1984, 1992, 1996, and 1998. Each of these peaks contributed to the perceived need of U.K.
security and government officials to monitor the activities of the IRA through surveillance and
information gathering. Data is needed for surveillance and prevention of attacks. During a civil
rights march in Londonderry on “Bloody Sunday”, 30 January 1972, 13 civilians were shot by
the British Army, and dozens more injured (this was the single most violent event during the
early 1970s). The U.K. government responded to the increased violence by dissolving the self-
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rule Stormont Government, and instituting direct rule from Westminster. This event served as a
critical juncture for U.K. security policy in the region until the 1980s.
Between 1972 and 1984, civilians and military casualties occurred, with various incidents
taking place during which government troops or high-ranking officials become targets of IRA
violence. Christopher Ewart Biggs, the British Ambassador to Ireland, was murdered by a car
bomb in Dublin, July of 1976. In 1979, Airey Neave, an advisor to Prime Minister Thatcher, was
killed by a car bomb as his car leaves the Houses of Parliament in March. Prince Charles’
godfather Lord Mountbatten was killed by a Provisional IRA bomb exploding in his boat in
Sligo in August of 1979. Finally, the Grand Hotel in which PM Thatcher was staying was hit by
a bomb in October of 1984. Each of these incidents involved a high-profile target associated
with the government in Britain.
The explanation for the peak figures lay in several factors that explain surges of violence
by actors on both sides. First, the British army instituted counter-insurgency tactics following
Bloody Sunday. Meanwhile, opposition forces splintered into several IRA factions, with the
most extreme “Provisionals” bent on achieving full island independence from Britain by forcing
them into compliance by means of extreme violence. Additional violence took place between
rival factions of IRA groups, which targeted one another. Loyalist paramilitaries killed over 300
Catholic civilians during the mid-70s, and expanded their bomb attacks to areas outside of
Londonderry and the Northern Irish border. The British attempted to de-escalate tensions
between the Northern Irish and the British army; an “Ulsterisation” policy returned control to the
RUC (local) police. Secondly, the government created an internment without trial policy for
paramilitary activists, as a way to by-pass traditional legal outlets for accused attackers, and to
“speed up” the justice process, thereby raising the cost of violence against the U.K. government.
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Imprisoned loyalists called hunger strikes resulting in the death of approximately 10 republic
prisoners. Third, during the 1980s, IRA leadership changed hands, the IRA moved targeting to
British soil in some cases, and the Crown aimed to target IRA fighters and avoid civilians. The
overall casualty rate of the 1980s decade was lower than during the 1970s. Finally, a provisional
ceasefire was declared unilaterally by the Provisional IRA in 1994, broken in 1996 with a mass
bombing in London, but reinstated in 1997. Talks eventually resulted in the Good Friday, or
“Belfast” Agreement of 1998. The terms have maintained an overall peace in Northern Ireland
ever since.
Parliamentarians discussed security implications of the proposed data legislation during
the Troubles, especially during the 1980s when the new data law was being debated in
Parliament. In April of 1983, Mr. Whitelaw argued in the House of Commons that the Official
Secrets Act cannot be skewed within the wording of the new data law to provide,
“…a data subject with access to his file, where the file relates to police suspicions about
his criminal activities, would be nonsense…we all believe in the protection of national
security.”291
Michael Meacher, who had suffered personal embarrassment when his medical records
were obtained and printed in a news story carried by The Sun, countered the idea that
information access even by law enforcement is innocuous, saying,
“We all know that police information—after all, the police are fallible, like us all—can
often be irrelevant, out of date, incomplete or inaccurate and that the unchecked
circulation of such material can often be extremely damaging.”

In other words, Meacher argued that individuals should have a measure of control over
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data that police or law enforcement collect about them. In the House of Lords, Lord Gardiner
protested the already free access to personal information by security personnel of information,
indicating it was already a privacy invasion when this information was released to nonauthorized parties. Gardiner stated during a July 1983 debate,
“… there was close contact with police officers at local stations and the practice of
exchanging mutually useful information had developed on a quid pro quo basis. The
police denied this statement categorically, and in a Home Office answer to a
Parliamentary Question this denial was maintained: 'Any suggestion that the police give
facilities to debt collectors and private investigators is quite without foundation.' We
were assured by the police that the sources of information for private detectives were not
police sources.”292
In the end, the 1984 law was subsequently passed to include some restrictions upon law
enforcement’s use of personal information, but still making much more provision than did
Swedish laws for information access when pursuing matters of national security. Despite the
reduction in Northern Irish violence during the mid 1980s, and the signing and keeping of the
Good Friday Agreement in 1998, the 1998 updated version of the data law tripled the power
given to security or law enforcement regarding access and use personal and cyber data. As a
result, there is support for data securitization in the case of the United Kingdom.
4.2.3

Digital Human Rights

In the United Kingdom, the impact made by legal and human rights experts upon data
legislation changed across time, but these individuals did not have the same level of influence
upon data governance as their counterparts in either Sweden or Germany. Even with public
complaints about information collection and digitization in the early 1970s, the British
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population was originally less concerned with data protection as a topic than were their Swedish
counterparts.293 This opinion did change across time; in 1972, only 16% of Brits felt that privacy
issues were “extremely important”, but by 1987, the figure had risen to 73% of the public which
felt that privacy issues were “very important.”294 Unlike the German case to follow, British
citizens had not suffered under a totalitarian regime, causing the public to be highly sensitive to
information surveillance practices of the government. Each time the public did express
reservations about increasing powers of data collection or data-sharing across agencies, the
official government response was to establish investigative committees that would report to
Parliament, who would then respond with a decision on the necessity and scope of any
subsequent legislation. Therefore, testing the contribution of legal and academic elites involved a
hard look at the power and activities of the Younger and Lindop Committees.
The first official British government efforts to address privacy in the computer age was
through the release of the Justice Committee report Privacy and Law in 1970. This followed the
failed efforts by various MPs to introduce and pass a bill protecting personal data privacy.295
This initial report offered a draft bill based upon the previously failed bill introduced by Brian
Walden in 1969. The draft argued that,
“each human being needs to able to limit the area of his intercourse with others… Above
all we need to be able to keep to ourselves, if we want to, those thoughts and feelings,
beliefs and doubts, hopes, plans, fears and fantasies, which we call ‘private’ precisely
because we wish to be able to choose freely with whom, and to what extent, we are
willing to share them.”296
293

In 1976, Swedes ranked privacy of the people in the top 3 issues of concern. Source: Bennett 1992, p.
42, and “Public Attitudes to Data-Processing in the Information Society”, English Summary of the Report
from the Swedish Central Bureau of Statistics, Stockholm: Data inspektionen, January, 1985.
294
1972 statistics from Great Britain, Home Office, Report of the Committee on Privacy, Cmnd. 5012
(The Younger Committee); 1987 statistics from Data Protection Registrar, Third Report, London, HMSO,
1987, p. 40-45.
295
Dworkin 1973
296
Privacy and Law, 1970, p. 4.

119

The precise policy suggestions in Privacy and Law were not acted upon, however, at least
the door was open for further discussion on data protection by Parliament and the government.
Next, the Younger Committee was created as a response to both Walden’s rejected bill
and the recommendations in the Privacy and Law paper. To pacify Walden for the blocking of
the bill after by the Home Office after its second reading in the Commons, the Home Office had
promised to establish the study group to evaluate the issue and report back to Parliament. Sir
Kenneth Younger, who had previously practiced law from 1932-1939 was chair of the
committee, and set the stage for future boards of inquiry established by future governments
regarding the issue of privacy and data governance.297 Younger had an extensive history in
government service. He joined Parliament as the winning Labour candidate from Grimsby in
1945, and would later serve in the Foreign Office under PM Bevin in 1950-51. In the 1960s and
70s he was an advisor into legal and penal matters for the government. He acted as the chair of
the privacy committee from 1970-76, during which he also a directorship of Chatham House –
the Royal Institute of International Affairs research body. He died prematurely in 1976, just as he
had been appointed to serve as chairman for the second research committee set up by Parliament
regarding data privacy matters.
Under Younger’s leadership, the Committee delved deeper intro privacy concerns than
perhaps the Home Office had anticipated. The background of three of the Committee members
undoubtedly shaped the approach by the committee to the issue. As stated, Younger had a legal
background. So did Alex Lyon, the Labour MP from York, who joined Parliament in 1966. Lyon
had supported British entry in the the European Economic Area in 1971, and was appointed by
Wilson to serve as minister of state regarding race and immigration issues in 1974. Another
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committee member, Lord Donald Ross, has been a legal advocate since 1964, and held positions
such as Sheriff of Ayre and Bute in the 1970s, Chairman of the Judicial Studies committee in the
1990s, and retiring as Scotland’s second most senior judge.298 Voting with the minority in the
committee which wished for a significant data privacy law, in a Parliamentary speech he argued
that the major human rights conventions should inform British policy: “from the point of view of
principle…” the UK law “should now be brought into line with these important declarations.”299
Both Lyon and Ross signed the dissenting, minority opinion that the Committee should have
formally suggested a new law, and not only voluntary practices to protect personal data by the
Press and others. Despite the fact that the majority opposed an actual law, the Younger Report
released in 1974 laid the foundation for digital human rights protections through the suggestions
of informational security, anonymity of statistical data collections, and the importance of data
accuracy and monitoring by the government.300
The next body to undertake research toward the topic was the Justice committee, which
fulfilled the promise made by the government to create an official White Paper in response to the
1974 Younger Report. The 1975 report Computers and Privacy (Cmnd). 6353) agreed with the
Younger suggestion on legislation to restrain computer use of personal information, and the
necessity of a permanent government agency responsible for database monitoring. The latter
suggestion was another critical point in the path toward data protection; this new “Data
Protection Authority” could ensure that safeguards over personal information were being
followed by public and private sector computer users. Notably, MP Alex Lyon served on this
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committee as well, as did Paul Sieghart, another influential jurist and human rights advocate that
would shape British data policy in substantial ways during the 1980s and 1990s.
Finally, the government reached a place where in the early 1980s, it had received a
tipping point of pressure by not only civil liberties groups, but also from the public, the computer
industry, and persistent members of Parliament from various parties. A “Data Protection
Committee” of ten persons, was established in July of 1976, under the leadership of Sir Norman
Lindop. Lindop had previously worked as a Lecturer in Chemistry at Queen Mary University in
London. Lindop’s Committee was given stricter guidelines than were given to prior committees:
address the concerns over computerized data privacy. Out of the ten committee members, the
mix of professions included those with backgrounds in legal or academic professions, as well as
the IT industry, the latter being a point of contention for civil liberties groups.301 Professor James
Durbin was a statistician who taught at London School of Economics between 1950-1988. John
Hargreaves as an IBM executive. Dr. Charles Florey was the son of Lord Howard Florey, the
discoverer of penicillin, and a public health expert in his own right.302 Charles Read was the
director of the Inter Bank Research Organization. Ken Potts held the Chief Executive post of the
Leeds City Council. Professor F. M. Martin taught social administration at Glasgow University.
Celia Good hart and Bridget Paton served in local government bodies. Sir David Pitblado was an
auditor general. Hugo Young, a member of the press, wrote for the Sunday Times. Only Paul
Sieghart had a background in privacy advocacy. Sieghart had a profound influence upon not only
the Lindop Committee work, but subsequent Justice Committees, working tirelessly for various
human rights initiatives throughout his career.
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Paul Sieghart, of Jewish ethnicity but Catholic religious heritage, fled Austria with his
mother to live in England in 1939. After dropping out of a mathematics degree program at
University College, London, he eventually chose to practice law until being rejected for a “silk”
Queen’s Counsel merit appointment by his fellow lawyers. He then switched careers to become a
human rights author and advocate. As mentioned, Seighart served on the British section of the
International Commission of Jurists, as well as the Justice and Lindop committees. He pushed
the Home Office to appoint him to the permanent Data Protection Committee that was
established after the 1984 Data Law was passed. A prolific author, he wrote titles covering
international human rights, as well as issues discussing computers, technology, and personal
privacy. Sieghart’s perspective on digital human rights can be summed up with a statement made
during an appearance at 1984 conference on data protection hosted by the University of
Leicester.
“There are no harmless data. Or to put it another way, it is not the data that are
harmless, it is what people do with them that is the problem.”303
The Lindop, or “Data Protection Committee” Report on Data Protection of 1978 had
conducted surveys with over 300 organizations and individuals.304 The report suggested several
additions to the Younger Report of 1972, including needs to legislation that would be flexible
enough to cover manual and digitised data which may evolve over time. It also suggested scope
application to include public, and private sectors, with frustration expressed at the reticence of
the police and secret services who “refused to answer any questions. After more police
stonewalling the committee relied upon information uncovered by an investigative journalist to
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explain applications over national security information-gathering. Seven broad principles were
introduced, including:
•
•
•
•
•

Data subjects should be informed on data collected about them, for how long it would be
kept, and by whom it would be used.
Personal data can only be used for reasons authorized by the data subject,
Personal data accuracy should be maintained
Users should only handle personal data in lawful interests
The community should be protected from prejudice resulting from data access.
Though a new Conservative government delayed action when elected in April of 1979, as

stated in the political history evolution of Great Britain, eventually the government acquiesced to
pressure by the ICT industry itself, wishing the government to pass formal legislation to avoid
risking loss of international business. The 1984 Data Protection Act was passed a full 170
months after the first government commission had been created regarding the issue of data
protection.
The next successful data law passed in 1998, following a similar pattern: government
reluctance, eventually submitting to international pressure by powerful organizations, and
internal pressure from civil rights advocates and legal professionals. The 1998 Data Protection
Act was largely in response to pressure from the European Commission. In 1995, the
Commission adopted Directive 95/46/EC to signal regional compliance among EU Member
States with the Council of Europe Convention 108, to which the member states had been
signatories and many states had ratified.305 The Commission had stipulated EU Member States
were required to adapt their national data protection laws to the parameters of Directive
95/46/EC within three years of its passing. The U.K. balked at the demands of privacy being an
actual “right” as this had not been codified into the 1984 law. The 1998 U.K. law did not add

305

The UK ratified Convention 108 in 1987.

124

“privacy” as a protected right within the new law, but did agree in 1998 to have U.K. courts
apply the rights within the ECHR, including Article 8 which indicated a right to respect for
private life. The ramifications of the Commission demands will be discussed more in the next
substantive chapter which examines the supranational policy process regarding data protection.
Suffice it to say that the remainder of actions taken during Phase 1 provided little expanded
scope of protection for data, other than those mandated by Directive 95/46/EC.
In the United Kingdom there is limited support for the idea that the legal exports
chosen as consultants and parliamentary research committee members were able to
successfully shape the 1984 and 1998 data protection laws. One could say that the laws were
passed due to dual linkages between domestic rights activists such as Alex Lyon and Paul
Sieghart, who championed the digital human rights being mandated by the Council of Europe
(more economic in scope), and the European Union (included rights-based applications).
My next section will review the case of Germany.
4.3

Findings: Germany
The first law passed in Germany explicitly regarding data protection was the 1977

Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG), or the “Law on Protection Against the Misuse of Personal
Data in Data Processing.” The law was designed to protect against misuse of personal data that
could be connected to a specific, physical person, during all phases of data use, including
“storage, communication, modification and erasure…”306 As pointed out by Professor Hans
Peter Bull, one of the first German Data Protection Commissioners, data protection was a means
to an end in Germany; the overall legal goal was to protect citizens against harm.307 The first
federal data law applied only to commercial data, and required data anonymization and use of
306
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data only for pre-specified tasks. It also required inaccuracies to be corrected, and once the
original task was complete, the data should be erased. Violators could be punished with prison
time.
Second only to the impact made by the 1973 data protection law of Sweden, Germany
helped set the European standard for the legalization of personal data protection. As will be
discussed further in the next chapter, German Data Protection advocates and Commissioners
were frequently part of advisory committees and used for consultation in setting similar laws
elsewhere across Europe during the 1970s and 1980s, during a time when data computerization
raised fears over privacy loss across the region. To understand the evolution and impact of
German data laws and the Data Protection Commissioners within Germany, it is necessary to
trace the creation of laws at the regional, or Länd level, the laws that were passed for West
Germany prior to unification, and the laws that applied to the united German state after 1990.
See Table 11 (next page) for a summary of all national laws passed by Germany during Phase 1,
as well as their coded intent.308
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Table 11: German Data Protection Laws, 1970-1999

Year

Name of law

Description

Total
Coded
Sentences
19

1970

Population
MicroCensus Law

Law permits some personal data release
of information collected during the 1970
survey, for the use of correcting
population registries, statistical use by
central and Land authorities, for town
planning, and for scientific use.

1971

Telecommunications
Universal Services
Act

1977

BDSG – Data
Protection Law

Law outlining provision of telecom
services, including voice telephony,
rates for customers, and directory
publications
First national data protection law,
protecting against misuse during
automatic processing.

1983

Census Act

Discusses the protections required by
the Basic Law, regarding personal data
collected during the national Census.
Also regulates the use of data collected
for statistical and public administration
purposes.

81

1990

Data Protection Law
Bundesdatenschutzge
setz (BDSG)

Revision of the 1977 law on federal
level personal data protections. Includes
details on responsibilities of federal
Data Protection Officer, the mandates
on data secrecy and transmission
provisions, and right afforded to data
subjects.

441

1995

Broadcasting Act for
North-Rhine
Westphalia (

62

11996

Telecommunications
Act

Addresses the licensure,
functionality, and monitoring of
broadcasting services in North-Rhine
Westphalia. Includes specific
protections for personal data of
subscribers and their and personal
viewing habits
Regulations regarding service
installation, fee scheduling,
environmental protection, and other
aspects of telecom service provision.
Also creates Regulatory and Advisory
bodies.

2

200

81

Text
Analysis
Scores
+7 Data
Protect
-5 Data
Protect
+4 Economy
-1 Economy
-2 Security
+2 Data
Protect

Net Score
+2 Data
Protect
+3 Economy
-2 Security

+2 Data
Protect

+139 Data
Protect
-50 Data
Protect
+2 Economy
+8 Security
-1 Security
+58 Data
Protect
-12 Data
Protect
+5 Economy
+3 Security
-1 Security

+89 Data
Protect
+2 Economy
+7 Security

+259 Data
Protect
-117 Data
Protect
+34 Economy
-4 Economy
+24 Security
-1 Security
+50 Data
Protect
-6 Data
Protect
+5 Economy
-1 Economy

+142 Data
Protect
+30 Economy
+23 Security

+39 Data
Protect
-12 Data
Protect
+20 Economy
-2 Economy
+8 Security

+27 Data
Protect
+18 Economy
+8 Security

+46 Data
Protect
+5 Economy
+2 Security

+44 Data
Protect
+4 Economy
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1997

Telecommunications
Universal Service
Ordinance

Provision of public telephone
equipment, as well as release of
subscriber information, as long as
subscriber has not barred release

2

-2 Data
Protect

-2 Data
Protect

1997

Digital Signature Act

10

1997

Act on the Protection
of Personal Data
Used in Teleservices

Regulation of digital signature keys,
including security measures and
monitoring capability.
Charges tele-services providers with
protection of personal data during
telecom service provision.

+9 Data
Protect
+1 Security
+31 Data
Protect
+4 Economy
+ 1 Security

1997

Telecom Customer
Protection

Various obligations of telecom service
providers for billing, service and
equipment provision

8

1997

Postal Act

Licensure requirements for postal
delivery contractors. Law also discusses
release of addressees’ personal
information and the protection of data
used by commercial actors when
sending postal content.

28

+9 Data
Protect
+1 Security
+37 Data
Protect
-3 Data
Protect
+4 Economy
+ 1 Security
+5 Data
Protect
-3 Data
Protect
+ 16 Data
Protect
-3 Data
Protect
+ 7 Economy
-1 Economy
+ 1 Security

45

+2 Data
Protect
+ 13 Data
Protect
+6 Economy
+1 Security

Sources: German Law Repository (University of Oxford), and Bundesgesetzblatt Online.

There are three factors that shaped the types of laws that emerged around data protection
in Germany. These include a history of aggressive state surveillance, second, the types of
challenges presented by a federal law-making structure, and last, the multiple stakeholders with
interests in data policy outcomes.
First, the history of the state under the Gestapo mechanisms of the Nazis had led to a
universal desire on the part of the German public for open accountability by central government
authorities regarding data collected during surveillance of the public.309 Similar to the other case
countries, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, German public authorities wrestled with the decision
to introduce regulations regarding computerized data banks used for public administration and by
the private sector. Population statistics and general demographic data collection and use were
permitted and utilized for civic planning and for scientific research purposes. All of the federal
data protection laws that emerged during the Post World War II era rested upon the foundations
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of the Grundgesetz, or “Basic Law.” The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany was
enacted on 23 May, 1949. It served and continues to act as the basic constitution for the country.
Within the Basic Law were provisions for fundamental human rights. “Human dignity shall be
inviolable. To respect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”310 The Law also included
outlines for the distinct obligations of the three branches and government, and constraints and
responsibilities for the states, or Länder. Over fifty changes have been made to the constitution
since 1950, but it still stands as the foundation for all federal laws, including those for data
protections.
The scope of the normative culture of lawmaking in Germany aimed to balance two
concerns: providing law and order on one hand, and setting limits for state use of personal
information on the other hand. Data protection in the early years was seen as an extension of the
core human rights protection for the “rights to a personality” or persönlichkeitsrechte, as there is
no German concept for privacy encoded in the Basic Law.311 Until the Constitution of 1949 was
deemed inadequate to perform the task of protecting personality as it related to personal data use,
little to no interest was shown by governmental or non-state actors to make laws specific to data
protection. Since 1950 there have been a series of laws that gradually developed a national
regime of human rights protections for personal and cyber data in Germany. The first law that
indirectly affected personal data management was the 1953 Basic Law on Statistics. The
statistics law allowed for use of data collection when needed to prepare federal laws and for use
by the federal and Länd governments to effectively execute public administration. All data
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collected for such purposes was supposed to be protected for secrecy, but data dissemination
among government authorities was unrestricted until the 1977 BDSG was passed.312
The identified need for more specific laws regarding data treatment gradually emerged
with the diffusion of ICT adoption in the 1960s.313 Bureaucratic efficiency via automatic data
processing was hugely beneficial to society, and the escalating use of ADP by public and private
actors was not correlated with public fears over privacy loss or data sharing amongst government
agencies until later in the 1970s and 1980s.314 In fact, another administrative law, the 1970
Census Law, permitted “widespread data dissemination under controlled conditions”315 including
use when correcting local population registries, for scientific research, and for local planning
needs, as long as confidentiality was protected (data subject names were removed).316 This
permissive attitude was also reflected in the leverage granted public authorities to collect and
disseminate individual data within the 1971 Law for Statistics on Higher Education. On the
books these laws looked as if protection was extended over personal data, but in reality, the
official Statistics Bureau had little power and no authority to enforce data confidentiality. The
protections over personal data distribution lay entirely within responsibility of Länd authorities.
This split management over public governance between the federal and Länd
governments added to the challenges of reaching national consensus on a federal data protection
law. Some authority was held by federal authorities and the Bundestag (Parliament), while other
responsibilities lay in the hands of Länd governments. In the 1960s, the Länd governments began
to set up data centers for daily administrative planning purposes.317 Hessian authorities instituted
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the first data protection law in the world, albeit at the Länd level, rather than at the national level.
The law applied to data use during automatic processing, and set up an independent Data
Protection Commission to oversee application of the law. Rheinland-Pfalz followed suit in 1974
with a similar law.318 Each of the Länd data commission offices were responsible for protecting
automatically-processed data, and operated independently of national authorities, including the
Ministry of the Interior, until the national law was passed in 1977. From the late 1960s until
1977 when the national law was passed, states bore the largest responsibility of evaluating the
risks associated with personal data processing and storage. Once the 1977 law was passed,
officials at both levels of government had to negotiate who would hold future responsibility over
data protection.
Fears and gaps in agreement over the needed legal protection for privacy and personal
data increased in the late 1960s, due to several factors. More and more databanks were being
used to process personal data by public and private actors. The government use of personal
identification numbers for public administration purposes led some to fear data breaches and
unauthorized data linkages across large databanks, similar to the worries expressed by the British
public. Finally, The Green party adopted the issue of data protection within its party platform
alongside other non-material issues, such as environmental protections and civil liberties
infringement, and began to challenge the national government to address the issue.319
Meanwhile, settling what type of federal law would be necessary required solving disagreements
among the various stakeholders involved with use of inter-federal data transfers. For instance,
the ICT sector sought laws to cover manual files, in addition to computerized or automatically
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processed data. Otherwise, the ICT sector would be commercially disadvantaged by any new law
that only applied to ADP processed data.320
The Bundestag requested general regulations on data protection in 1969. An
interparliamentary working group was created, and subsequently submitted a draft proposal in
January of 1970 for a “preliminary plan for the protection of privacy against the misuse of
automatically processed personal data.”321 Brandt’s SPD government did not prioritize laws
specific to data privacy and protection until 1971.322 The draft bill created by the working group
in early 1970 was tabled until December 1971, despite having the support of the majority of
political parties in the Bundestag.323 Some raised concerns about the level of specificity in the
law, which was much more detailed than the Hessian law. At this point, the judicial community,
joined those pressuring the government for legal protections, a point I will return to when
assessing the development of digital human rights in Germany. Though momentum was building
toward passing a data protection law, the process continued to be fractious.
Public hearings on federal data protection in late 1972 resulted in industry and national
administrators protesting the proposed law. It was a year later, on 29 November 1973, before
another bill draft was presented to the Bundestag by the Brandt government, which pushed for a
quick pass, but instead was met with opposition from various parties which asked for additional
revisions. The Brandt proposed law was not only stronger than the Länd laws, it had weaker
enforcement mechanisms. Bargaining continued throughout two more public hearings, a change
in government leadership through Scheel (FDP Party) to Schmidt’s Chancellorship (SPD), and a
series of meetings on the topic by the Federal Interior Committee from 1974-1976, all in efforts
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to resolve the disagreements over the levels of stringency behind the law and the type of
enforcement body that was needed to support it.324
Regional data protection advocates were called in to provide expert testimony on the type
of control authority needed. Spiros Simitis, the Data Protection Commissioner for Hesse,
strongly encouraged officials to choose an independent control authority, rather than utilize the
self-regulatory model preferred by industry leaders.325 The law had a second and third reading in
the Bundestag, but the Interior Committee was continually displeased with wording of the draft.
The CDU and CSU wanted the control authority to be under the umbrella of the Federal Audit
Office, rather than operate an independent agency. Länd data protection agencies were also in an
uproar over the bill, contending that an independent national DPC would threaten the rights of
the Länder to oversee their own public agencies. The Joint Conference Committee designed a
compromise in July of 1976, but the Lander were still displeased, and requested the committee to
reconsider, which it refused. Despite CDU and CSU opposition, the Bundestag endorsed the bill
on 10 November 1976; two days later it passed with formal opposition on record by Bavaria,
Baden-Württemburg, Rheinland-Pfalz, and Schleswig-Holstein. The president signed the bill in
January of 1977, and provisions took effect as of 1 January 1978. Although no one group was
totally pleased with the final version of the law, data protection was legalized in Germany at the
federal level.326 In total, it took 39 months from the date of creation for the first government
commission on data policy in 1973, to the making of an actual law in 1977.327
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4.3.1

Economy

Assessment of the outcomes of these policies and the contribution by the ICT sector
requires a look at the West German economy prior to unification, and then at the unified state
after 1991. The German approach to economic policy after World War II has followed the
Soziale Marktwirtschaft model, combining decentralized autonomy for businesses with social
protections for individuals.328 This approach had historical roots in learned experiences during
industrialization and the war years. The industrialization of the 18th and 19th centuries had
produced multiple social problems that had not been adequately solved by the Marxist socialist
system. The German ordoliberal economists in the Freiburg school of the 1930s directly
influenced the response of German economic planners in the post war period, and up until
today.329 The ordoliberals observed the failure of Russian economic planners of the Soviet
Republic to accurately predict and match production goals to current and future social
conditions. On the other hand, while market-based systems produced greater economic
opportunities than pure socialist systems, these economies failed to provide social protections for
individuals in the event of market gaps.330 The Ordnungspolitik plan called for institutional
designs to inform economic processes. The German social market economy, therefore, was
designed to rely upon three key goals: market conformity, defense of competition, and price level
stability. Policy measures could be used insofar as the measures did not create levels of
disequilibrium in the market that would warrant additional interventions. German economic
policy would focus on defending the competitive order, provision of public goods, and
prevention of monopolistic tendencies.
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West German policymakers after World War II achieved several important economic and
trade goals. The Deutschmark was stabilized.331 Produce markets were released from rationing in
1948, and prices allowed to fluctuate with market demands. GDP growth responded positively to
the economic initiatives, with levels >8% from 1951-56, and again above 8% from 1959-1961.
Admittedly, German economic growth was not consistently positive in the post-war era, given its
exposure to the global economy. Germany suffered economic recessions facilitated by oil crises
in 1973-1974, and again in 1979-1980. By the 1980s, GDP had fallen to 2%, and labor
productivity was half of what it had been in the 1960s. West German trade policy was designed
to encourage open markets and free trade, aside from subsidies to the coal and agricultural
industries. The country joined GATT in 1951. From 1950-1970, the state pursued an aggressive
export-led growth plan which relied upon low wages and production of high-tech engineered
goods.332 Exports increased throughout most of Phase 1, minus a slowdown after the merging of
the two states in 1990.
Table 12: German Exports, % of GDP

1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2002
Source: Siebert 2005

13.7%
21.2%
26.4%
31.1%
22.8%
35%

Export-driven growth eventually produced several challenges to the social market
economy. Policy coordination in Germany relies upon corporatist bargaining between trade
unions, firms, and government actors to set wage policies and adjust for market downturns that
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negatively impact labour.333 Unemployment in West Germany consistently rose after 1970, from
a nearly full employment state334 to some years having >10% of the working age population
unemployed. Social welfare for unemployment provided up 67% of full-pay for an unlimited
period for workers whose hours were reduced, actively de-incentivizing work-seeking. Fewer
workers in production decreased growth further still during economic recessions. Despite these
challenges, no political parties were willingly to promote the needed reforms which would
require cutting taxes to reduce social spending when fiscal budgets were pressured.335
Suffice it say that the early to mid 1990s presented a challenge to the state as it merged
two economies. Prior to unification the West German economy had price stability, a balanced
budget, and a 5% surplus in current account. After December 1990, policy-makers set about
privatizing the East German industries, and dealt with the challenges related to currency
exchange between the Ostmark/DDM and the Deutschmark. East German currency was
exchanged 1:1 with the Deutschmark, effectively quadrupling wage costs in East Germany, and
making it less attractive to foreign investors. West German social benefits were immediately
granted to East German residents, including early retirement and unemployment pay. This
extension negatively impacted labor competitiveness in the east. Finally, to pay for the extended
social welfare benefits to an additional 16 million people, government bonds were issued, which
greatly increased government debt. Rather than reduce social benefits to any citizens, German
policy-makers continued to pursue the dual goals of export-led growth alongside strong social
welfare spending, and hoped that exports would offset the spending. I now turn to the role that
high-technology firms in the ICT sector played in the German economy of Phase 1.
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As with the cases of Sweden and the United Kingdom, due to data availability, I
primarily measured contribution of ICT to economic growth using two subsectors of ICT
services: ICT services exports, and the insurance and financial services exports.
Table 13: ICT Services Sector Contribution, Germany, 1970-1999

Year

ICT Services
Exports, % of
services exports

Investment in ICT
Supplies, % of total
non-residential gross
fixed capital
formation
*

*
1970
15.17
*
1971
15.46
*
1972
16.22
*
1973
16.86
*
1974
17.11
*
1975
13.66
*
1976
13.90
*
1977
14.33
*
1978
14.16
*
1979
17.35
*
1980
15.17
*
1981
15.03
*
1982
16.16
*
1983
14.81
*
1984
14.33
*
1985
14.04
13.09
1986
15.04
13.36
1987
15.67
13.66
1988
17.94
13.79
1989
18.69
13.97
1990
20.49
13.76
1991
23.05
13.13
1992
23.06
13.21
1993
24.12
13.04
1994
26.76
13.29
1995
25.99
14.12
1996
27.74
14.44
1997
28.60
15.22
1998
28.50
16.47
1999
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Database; OECD
* Indicates no data available for these years

High Tech Exports,
% of manufactured
exports

Insurance &
Financial Services,
% of commercial
services exports

*

*

*
*
*
*
*
*

*
*
*
*
*
*

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
11.75
12.38
12.00
13.10
12.66
13.43
13.64
13.71
13.77
14.65
15.18
16.49

1.16
1.33
1.27
1.27
1.32
1.61
1.51
0.97
1.06
0.93
3.44
3.78
3.62
2.34
1.01
7.64
8.26
10.73
12.17
14.55
14.80
14.84
16.64

Table 13 shows that the ICT sector has been an increasingly important portion of the
German economy. Significant growth occurred in ICT services exports, which essentially
doubled from 1971 to 1999. However, this growth was dwarfed by the rampant increases to
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insurance and financial services exports, which rose from 1.16% to 16.64% of all services
exports in Phase 1. No data is available from during the two recessions (1973-74, 1979-80) to
determine what, if any, impact was felt by ICT firms regarding ICT investments and high tech
exports. We do see a drop in insurance and financial services to 25% of prior levels in 1983.
What is also noticeable from available data, is the reductions in growth for the ICT sector
occurring around the timing of unification. Only ICT services exports managed to maintain
upward growth from 1990-1994 without any down years. The other three variables show
temporary retraction; insurance and financial services fell by over 50% in 1991, but quickly
bounded back.
Economists noted that Germany, similar to most European states, lagged behind the U.S.
and Japan for investment in R & D in the ICT sector during the 1970s and 1980s.336 OECD
analysts noted that one reason for this lag was the “insider system” of close relationships
between firms and banks in Germany.337
First, to finance new industries, the financial system needs to facilitate the process of
creative destruction This implies reallocating capital to new forms and new activities at
the expense of declining ones…. Such a system differs from one primarily geared towards
he accumulation of physical assets in large, stable firms in well-established industries,
which were the basis for much economic growth in the post-war period.338
A further challenge to Germany’s ability to catch up with US first-mover advantage in
the area of ICT development is due to the reliance upon mature industries such as steel and
traditional manufacturing. Again, the OECD warned that for countries reliant upon such
industries, economic adaptation occurs in increments, tied to knowledge accumulation and
transfers. German investment in ICT remained consistent at around 13% from 1986-1995; even
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after this point, investment in ICT only reached 16.47% by the end of Phase 1. The level of
investment built much more slowly in Germany than it did in either Sweden (15.04% to 28.8%)
or the U.K. (13.95% to 27.18%).339 Furthermore, in their 2000 report on the role of innovation
and IT in economic growth, OECD analysts found that Germany relied much more upon use of
others’ inventions, contracting out of R & D, and purchasing of existing foreign tech firms, than
did most of their OECD counterparts.340 German firms were more reliant upon university
research to facilitate adoption of advanced ICT, and as a whole fell back on developing
“engineering excellence” since institutional incentives for creative measures did not exist.
Between 1980-1996, the contribution of ICT to output growth fluctuated from 1.4% (1980-85) to
3.6% (1985-1990) then fell again to 1.8% (1990-96).341 The only area where Germany showed a
leading role within ICT during Phase 1 lay in the area of secure server hosting of the top domain
names, a distinction it shared with Sweden and the United States.342
Based upon the data for ICT contribution to the German economy during Phase 1, there is
little evidence that German ICT firms were able to influence data legislation. Though the
country did increase investments, the majority of the export growth experienced by ICT in
Germany was due to services-based industries, and not products exported. Given the fact that the
German economy draws considerable strength from its manufactured goods exporting, ICT
during Phase 1 did not contribute a great deal to manufacturing exports.
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4.3.2

Security
Table 14: Security Incidents, Germany (West & East), 1970-1999

Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Total

Fatalities
7
0
23
1
1
1
4
6
0
0
17
2
5
2
0
9
9
2
1
5
1
10
17
*
2
10
1
0
0
3
139

Injuries
9
0
45
1
10
12
36
2
3
10
218
31
44
25
2
114
242
32
14
8
4
35
217
*
85
26
5
27
0
47
1304

Casualties
16
0
68
2
11
13
40
8
3
10
235
33
49
27
2
123
251
34
15
13
5
45
234
*
87
36
6
27
0
50
1443

Source: Global Terrorism Database

As with the Swedish and British cases, the Global Terrorism database provided the data
sourced on terror incidents in Germany. The main difference in the German case compared to the
others relates to the effects of unification in 1990-91 upon security issues. The Federal Republic
of Germany (RFD) faced many numerous attacks during Phase 1, primarily caused by the
activities of radical left gangs and Neo-Nazi groups. The RFD was the base location for a
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domestic terror group, previously referenced in the Swedish case discussion, the Baader-Meinhof
group. Also called the RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion), the group operated from the 1960s to the
1980s, and perpetrated the major security incidents that occurred during Phase 1 in West
Germany.343 This extreme left-wing radical group borrowed ideology from the left-leaning
student protest movement that arose in the mid 1960s in Germany. To understand the group’s
activities and the impact upon the German state and society, it is necessary to trace the origin of
the RAF within student movement organizations (SMOs), and how the RAF evolved and moved
away from the SMOs.
In the 1960s, a student protest movement emerged in West Germany, driven by an
ideology of discontent with university and state authorities.344 After World War II, many German
universities had retrenched many of their existing faculty who had been complicit or at least
compliant with National Socialist policies. This presented a staffing crisis, as replacement faculty
were not quickly put in place, and the decision led to a shortage of teaching instructors. In
response to the shortage, universities then reversed the decision and rehired previously fired
faculty, despite their political and ideological history. Compounding the faculty problem was the
content of German higher education which had become largely antiquated.345 Subject matter fell
behind the quality of the U.S. and Germany’s neighbors in Europe. German students felt that
university administrators were largely unresponsive to students’ concerns over the nondemocratic personal views of rehired faculty, the outdated facilities, and quality of content being
provided to students. Student movement activists framed university authorities as authoritarian
figures, similar to the Weimar Republic and Nazi regime leaders, who had forced compliance on
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the public and de-legitimized any forms of opposition. Former student activist Daniel Cohn
Bendit, who later founded the Green Party, recalled in a 2007 interview with Der Spiegel that the
protest movement’s anti-fascist ideology was motivated by a desire “to make up for the fight
against fascism that their parents had not led… but we failed to distinguish between the meaning
of ‘resistance’ in a fascist state and that in a democracy.”346 In short, the SMOs saw state
activities to suppress or manage the protests as anti-democracy.
The scope of student protests widened to include various actors and states that were
connected to perceived failures of true democracy in the Federal Republic. The student protests
came to height during the summer 1967, around a scheduled visit to Berlin by Reza Pahlevi, the
Shah of Iran.347 The Shah had made comments in newspaper interviews prior to coming to
Berlin that the students felt revealed a leader largely out of touch with the plight of impoverished
Iranians. Protests were organized by the leader of the Socialist Student Association, Rudi
Dutschke, and planned for 2 June, and to be located just outside the Berlin opera, where the
Shah, his wife, and German dignitaries were set to attend a performance of The Magic Flute.348
After the uproar created by students outside the opera entrance during the arrival of the
politicians and diplomats, a majority of students dissipated. A remaining 1000 protesters were
chased by police with truncheons; many were injured and hospitalized after being attached.349
One student, Benno Ohnesorg was shot and killed by an officer with a gun. Ohnesorg’s death
served as a symbolic catalyst for some whom had been present at the Berlin protest. It was from
this point that individuals later connected to the RAF began to mount a more violent response to
“fascist” police and state authorities.
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The RAF founders Andreas Baader and Gudran Ensslin increasingly self-identified as
“resistance fighters” inside the protest movement, and sought to fight on behalf of the
underprivileged against the Federal Republic of Germany and those the RAF felt were
victimized by the United States and its allies.350 Baader and Ensslin felt that peaceful protests
were unsuccessful in forcing state authorities to retaliate and reveal the true nature of their fascist
tendencies. Instead, what was needed was more violence to provoke the state to act aggressively
in retaliation. In addition to West German targets, countries that were allied with West Germany,
such as the U.S., were considered appropriate targets. RAF leaders correlated the American
military actions in the Vietnam war as an example of imperialist aggression to suppress the
socialist North Vietnamese. Further targets included Israeli, or Jewish connected persons or
property, because according to one RAF propaganda pamphlet, “The Jews displaced by fascism
have become fascists themselves, who in collaboration with US capital want to exterminate the
Palestinian people.”351
The group solidified its membership base, and accelerated plans for violent attacks. The
first act of increased violence was arson attacks on two department stores in Frankfurt in April of
1968. After 1970, the group only planned and executed attacks designed to result in significant
damage to property and/or life.352 To get their “formal training”, several of the group members
dispersed throughout West and East Germany in 1970, left the area to go to Jordan. There they
journeyed to a camp outside Amman, where they lived and trained alongside guerillas working
to free Palestine from Israeli control.353 This would serve as the basis for their later partnership
with the People’s Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which desired Marxist revolutions
350
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worldwide, and sought the overthrow of the nation of Israel. The PFLP aided Japanese, South
American and German terrorist groups with reason for use of violence due to “righteous
causes.”354
Looking at the data, the RAF put their terrorist training to use once the group members
returned to Germany in 1972. The RAF bombed the V-Corps headquarters of the U.S. Army
Officers Club on 11 May of 1972, during which 1 person died, and 13 were injured. A second
attack that year happened on 19 May 1972, when the RAF bombed the Springer Press building in
Hamburg. The bombing was planned after the extreme right newspaper Deutsche
Nationalzeitung, printed by Springer, called for the student protest leader Dutsche to be stopped
due to his radical views. This attack resulted in over $100,000 in damages and 24 injured
persons.355 Last, but not least, eight members of a like-minded Palestinian terrorist group called
the Black September Organization (BSO) attacked the Israeli athletic compound at the Munich
Olympics on 5 September 1972, taking hostages, and torturing athletes. A failed rescue during a
hostage exchange for Arab prisoners conducted by FDG authorities resulted in the deaths of 16
persons during a violent shoot-out, including deaths of the Israeli hostages and five terrorists.356
Following the failed rescue, Interior Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher launched a new program,
the Grnzschutzgruppe-9, or GSG-9, which would be a SWAT-like task force designated to
intervene during future crisis terror events.
RAF group leaders were gradually arrested during the summer of 1972, after a series of
tipoffs by the public. Ironically, three founding members, Baader, Baader’s lover Ulrike
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Meinhof,357 Ensslin, and RAF recruits Holger Meins and Ian Carl Raspe continued to plan RAF
assassinations and killings whilst in prison awaiting trial. Yet by the spring of 1976, each of
these individuals had either committed suicide or died by hunger strike while awaiting trial.
After their deaths, other RAF followers kept the movement going.358 A sister group to the RAF,
the Revolutionaïre Zellen, or “Revolutionary Cells”, was responsible for the June 1976 bombing
of the Frankfurt headquarters of the U.S. Army, which injured 16, and carried out a December
attack at the Frankfurt US Air Force Officers Club, where 18 were hurt. During that summer, on
27 June 1976, the Revolutionary Cells and the PFLP combined efforts to hijack an Air France
plane en route from from Tel Aviv to Paris. After making a touchdown in Athens, hijackers
forced the pilot to fly to Entebbe, Uganda, after which Jewish and non-Jewish passengers were
separated by the terrorist, and the Jewish group help for hostage and ransom. Israeli paratroopers
stormed the plane, freeing the hostages and killing the terrorists.359 The liberation of the victims
was framed as a defeat for the cause by “brutal, ‘fascist’ Israeli henchmen who had employed
Nazi ‘Blitkreig’ tactics.”360
Such splinter groups and second and third generation membership of the RAF kept up the
organized plan to perpetrate domestic terrorism, including kidnapping and later killing of
prominent industrialist Hans Martin Scheleyer in 1977.361 That same year, a partner attack
conducted by the PLO and German terrorists captured Lufthansa flight #181 after leaving
Mallorca on its way to Frankfurt. The pilot was killed, and hostages taken, with demands of the
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release of 11 RAF and Palestinian terrorists being held in prisons in Germany and Turkey.
During refueling in Mogadishu, the plane was retaken by GSG-9 forces, and all four terrorists
were killed.362 Moving to the increased activity of the 1980s, members of the RAF were
identified as being responsible for the 1985 bombings of the Frankfurt Alitalia airport hub (3
died, 42 injured), the Rhein Air base (2 died, 20 injured), and the La Belle Discotheque in West
Berlin, during which 230 suffered injuries.363 Although the concerns of the student social
movement were largely addressed when university reforms were instituted in the early to mid
1970s, the radical actors in the RAF had only intensified their violent activities during the late
1970s and 1980s, moving away completely from the foundation of peaceful, student-led
protesting.364
The RAF movement began to lose momentum and lessened their activities after 1990,
and other groups rose to prominence in committing domestic terrorism in the unified state. NeoNazi extremist groups were responsible for the bulk of domestic terrorism in the 1990s. These
attacks included attacking a Polish truck entering Germany in October 1991 (4 hurt), an assault
on a Bonn home for immigrants in 1991 (10 injured), and a major onslaught by 400 Neo-Nazis
who struck a police unit guarding a hostel frequented by foreign visitors (74 injured), in August
of 1992. The terrorist events of 1994 included assaulting another police unit in Bremen (22
injured), attacking a group of Turkish immigrants (7 casualties), and a protest turned violent by
left-wing extremist group targeting a Republican party rally in Ulm, who using stone projectiles
caused 13 casualties. The most significant single attack at the end of Phase 1 took place in
February of 1999; two hundred Kurdish rebels stormed the Israeli Consulate in Wilmersdorf,
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Germany, during which 3 people died, and 43 were hurt.365 In total, 139 people died, and 1304
were injured during domestic terrorist actions in Phase 1, from 1970-1999.
State responses to the above-mentioned attacks involved a multi-layered approach. After
World War II, West German policy responses to domestic terror were seen by some as a test of
the restored democracy, and how it would balance democratic rights against state
accountability.366 The state developed two main security goals that involved activity at both the
domestic and international levels; these policies were chosen based on lessons learned from the
past.367 The first goal, tied to experiences during the Weimer Republic, was to avoid allowing
“enemies of constitutional democracy” using the “grounds of the rule of law” to legally violate
the principles of the state.368 Practically speaking, this involved setting legislation that called for
judicial review of any new legislation by the Bundesnachrichtendienst, or Constitutional Court,
to ensure that any news laws dealing with terrorism complied with constitutional rights outlined
and protected in the Basic Law of 1949.369 The second goal related to experiences under the Nazi
regime: control state surveillance and information accumulation, making use of surveillance an
accountable process. Together these approaches would allow the state to respond in a balanced
way to the current threats, whilst keeping in mind the lessons learned from the past.
Politically, the parties differed in their approaches to terrorism and personal information
security. Social Democrats (SPD), were in control of the government in an alliance with the Free
Democrats (FDP) from 1969-1982. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) led the government
for most of the latter period of Phase 1, from 1982-1998. In the early 1970s, the SPD wanted to
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present calm responses to the increased terror activities; party leaders felt strongly that internal
security would best be ensured via legal institutions that would constrain any heady use of power
by the government during times of crisis.370 To the SPD, the domestic terrorism during the 1970s
and 1980s created a need for reforms of various institutions and powers that would not grant
overarching power to government authorities, while preserving the rights to protest and oppose
the government. Conservatives and CDU/CSU leaders perceived a weakness in SPD policies
during the 1970s and 1980s, which failed to manage the ongoing threat of domestic terrorism.371
Regardless of these differences, the SPD managed to get reforms in the 1970s that would
modernize police and public management, and incorporate the use of new technology.372
Counterterrorism efforts therefore shifted to proactive policing, as prevention would be better
than catching criminals after terrorist acts had been committed. This led to a series of changes.
As previously mentioned, the Federal Criminal Office (BKU) was expanded, and the new
agency head Horst Herold promoted computerized technology as a rational way to administer
justice and simultaneously avoid the human biases of past governments.373 Additionally, HansDietrich Genscher, then Minister of the Interior, expanded the budget and staff of the
Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), or Criminal Police Office, and centralized criminal investigative
power especially as regards information gathering, which reduced the ability Länder officials to
localize the handling of terrorist detection and counterterrorism.374 The BKA was given power to
use data processing for information gathering and police intervention purposes.375 Herold also
developed a computerized dragnet technique of profiling potential terrorists by cross-referencing
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multiple government databases and compiling a central record in the PIOS computer system used
by the Suppression of Terrorism department (TE) and the Special Branch (ST). However, there
were some limits to why and how personal data would be collected, how long it could be stored,
and with whom it could be shared.376
Post-unification, and under CDU leadership, Germany shifted to a proactive
counterterrorist agenda which included expanding efforts via technological means and by
international cooperation beyond German borders to stop previously successful terrorist groups.
German authorities increasingly expanded surveillance techniques as the technology developed
to do so. By the 1990s, German law enforcement utilized wiretapping surveillance to monitor
telecommunications by suspected criminals and terrorists, including land lines, cellphones, and
email content.377 Legislation in 1994 expanded the powers of the Bundesnachrictendienst or
Constitutional Court which would allow surveillance of “letters, conversations, or
communications” involving personal data to determine if an individual was exhibited behavior
that threatened state survival or democracy. Law enforcement and security personnel were also
authorized to practice “strategic surveillance” involving telephone, satellite, or other
communications if needed to repent an armed attack against the state. This expanded law was a
part of a package of policies that would allow information collection for all forms of illegal
actions against the state, including terrorism.
Regional prevention and catching terrorists required evaluating records from the former
East Germany and eliciting coordination of efforts across Europe and beyond. After committing
acts of violence in West Germany, many RAF members had escaped across the border and either
hidden or used East Germany as a travel hub for making plans to meet with sympathetic partner
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groups in the Middle East. State authorities were able to locate these individuals who had been
given temporary shelter in East Germany, when on the run from West German police, sometimes
using records from the Stasi files.378 State leaders also opened additional doors to regional and
international cooperation on larger efforts to thwart terrorism in Europe. German influence
pushed for and achieved a European secretariat of Interpol in 1986.379 Germany was also
responsible for promoting the creation of Europol during the Maastricht treaty negotiations.
The number and frequency of domestic terror incidents led to gradual increases in
the use of data securitization, with more use of data as a security tool in recent years. The
Federal Republic of Germany certainly experienced a significant number of domestic terrorist
threats during Phase 1, much more than Sweden, but five times less than the incident totals in the
U.K. German authorities did increase access to informational acquisition tools and did expand
interior security measures from 1970-1999. However, despite the increase in violence, neither
the political nor social will was present to grant unimpeded access to personal data. The shadows
of restrictions upon personal expression and dignity experienced under the National Socialist
regime were long. The SPD government in charge during the decade of the 1970s worked
diligently to enshrine fundamental human rights and to protect via legal institutions the rights to
democratically protest the government in power. Even after the more conservative CDU party
came to government in 1982, it was unwillingly to promote a highly intrusive use of data by the
state. Several scholars attribute this self-imposed restriction to an underlying “civility” and
“dignity” within the definition of individual self-determination in Germany’s culture.380 The
constitutional framework for individual protections on dignity was largely unchanged once it was
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granted by the Basic Law of 1949. To address why the protection of these rights are so strong in
Germany, I now turn to examine the contribution by legal professionals and human rights
activists.
4.3.3

Digital Human Rights

Early data protection laws beginning in West Germany and for the unified state after
1990 were motivated by two factors: strong norms of fundamental human rights within the
Basic Law of 1949, and the advocacy of the legal community. As the German language has no
specific word for privacy, the attempts at legislating protection for personal data utilized
persönlichkeitsrechte, or the “right to a personality” in Article 1(1).381 The right to develop their
personality is protected within Article 2(1) as long as someone does not violate constitutional
order. Legislation protecting data first emerged. The first data within individual Länder, and not
at the federal level. In 1970, the state of Hesse passed the first data protection law in the
world.382 The Hessian law established oversight using an independent Data Protection
Commission (DPC), which was accountable to the Länd Parliament. The law mandated security
measures for all Hessen-stored data files. In addition, new data processing technology had to be
reviewed by the DPC prior to implementation in public administration. Following Hesse,
Rheinland-Pfalz passed a data protection law in 1974. The Rheinland-Pfalz law differed from the
Hessian law, by giving supervisory power to a committee comprised of Landtag members and
two officials or judges. Notably, this law only applied to data processed by Länd administrative
agencies.383 Other Länder followed with data protection laws; Bonn passed a law in 1976,
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The demand for legal protection of personal data in Germany did not come from
parliamentary ministers, or administrators incorporating the data processing technology, but was
driven by the jurist community and public concerns. The author of the Hesse 1970 Data
Protection Act was Professor Spiros Simitis, a trained and practicing jurist.384 Simitis was Greek
by birth, but had immigrated to West Germany to study jurisprudence. After university, Simitis
later became the Professor of Labour and Civil Law in Gießen and Frankfurt, as well as at
UCLA, Berkeley. Simitis advocated for data protection in Hesse, in Western Germany, and in
Europe, and he was a part of a larger network of legal professionals who actively promoted
adoption of regulatory framework for computer use in West Germany. At the National
Conference of Lawyers in 1972 (Deutsche Juristentag), the group created a data protection group
to research the topic.385 Simitis’ role in expanding data protection beyond the RFG into EU level
legislation will be examined further in the subsequent chapter. In addition to the concerns of the
legal community, public opinion polls revealed fears over computer network linking across
sectors, the widespread sharing of personal ID numbers during automatic data processing (ADP),
and use of ADP during the population census collection. In the 1970s and 1980s public opinion
shifted away from trust in government management of personal data, toward an increased fear of
ADP by public authorities. In 1976, 62% of people polled said the state should be able to know
as much as possible about residents, but by 1983, 65% of the public felt the state should have as
little access as possible to their personal information as was possible.386 Recall that this period of
distrust was highest during the height of the RAF domestic terror spree.
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At the federal level, the Bundestag created a resolution in 1969 asking for regulation on
data processing, and made a proposal for a “preliminary plan for the protection of privacy against
the misuse of automatically processed personal data.”387 The first draft bill was tabled in
December 1971, because of controversy over the level of specificity I the bill compared to the
Hessian law, as well as the concerns by the ICT sector which wanted the law to apply to manual
as well as computerized data in order to prevent competitive disadvantage.388 Throughout 1972
and 1973, the Ministry of the Interior reviewed versions of the proposal and held public hearings
to assuage concerns over weak enforcement mechanisms and continued preference for the looser
Hessian model. Between 1974-1976, the Interior committee held more public hearings, and
called on expert testimony by advocates including Spiros Simitis, who attempted to direct the
parties toward support of a federal law that included an independent control authority, rather than
a loose self-administering surveillance model.389 Additional differences of opinion in 1976
among the CDU and CSU, added friction in the Bundestag over whether the control body would
be within the Federal Audit Office, rather than be independent as Simitis had promoted. Despite
disagreement over the independence aspect of the DPC, the Bundestag endorsed the bill in
November of 1976, and the bill passed on 27 January 1977.390 The wording was not perfect, but
the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG) had become national law.
The BDSG created a new and independent Data Protection Commission, led by a federal
Commissioner. The new agency was to operate in tandem within the Federal Ministry of the
Interior. The DPC was responsible for recommending updates to the law, and giving advice to
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ministers or public authorities about special regulations for data protection. Initially the DPC
could only provide information to the Bundestag and Interior Ministry; later powers were added
to serve as ombudsman over data protection violation complaints made by individuals. Each
public agency had to have its own personal data protection officer, to ensure that that the agency
complied to the BDSG. Any data processor must be registered with the DPC authority. Lastly,
the DPC produced an annual report of the state of data protection in the FRG; this report was
submitted to the Bundestag for review on an annual basis.

Table 15: Commissioners of the National Data Protection Commission, FRG

Years Served in DPC

Name of Commissioners

1978-1983
1983-1988
1988-1993
1993-2003

Hans Peter Bull
Reinhold Baumann
Alfred Einwag
Joachim Jacob

The federal office was led by four different Commissioners during Phase 1, all of whom
had previously held legal and/or academic careers.391 Their legal training and experiences
informed their management of the DPC Commission, as each promoted the continued protection
for human rights within data protection, albeit using different styles. Hans Peter Bull acquired his
Doctor of Law in 1963, and had worked as a lawyer and academic since 1967. Bull was a
member of the Social Democrats when appointed as the first federal DPC, but saw himself as a
federal civil servant, and used his platform to focus national attention on the social effects of
computer technology diffusion. 392 To Bull, state bureaucrats including that of the DPC provided
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a functional service for the state, not directly serving the public. When it became apparent that
Bull may not be reinstated when his 5-year term ended, there was some discussion of Hessian
DPC Spiros Simitis becoming the next federal Commissioner. In the end, Bull was succeeded by
Dr. Reinhold Baumann, who had been a lawyer for 30 years within the federal Ministry of the
Interior prior to coming to the DPC. His leadership style was more “managerial” than Bull’s and
placed more emphasis on public concerns rather than state’s interests.393 After Baumann retired,
Dr. Alfred Einwag was appointed in 1988. Einwag acquired his doctorate in law from the
University of Munich in 1952, after which he worked for district government offices and the
Ministry of the Interior until 1964. His other public service posts included advisement on legal
matters for the Federal Border Police after 1964. Finally, Joachim Jacob was appointed to lead
the DPC in 1993. Jacob also held a doctorate in law; his previous positions in the Ministry of the
Interior, and as a consultant to State Secretary Günter Hartkopf of the FDP.
Each DPC had liberty to choose his/her personnel. Agency staff were typically lawyers or
jurists, or those with some data processing experience. Due to the career mobility framework of
civil service in the FRG, it was difficult for any DPC to keep staff for very long, as career
advancement was conditional upon moving around the Ministry of the Interior. Just as soon as
staff had become trained and proficient in the tasks of the Commission, they often left, making
long-term continuity and speedy action on complaints ongoing issues for the agency.
The purpose of the BDSG was to “ensure against the misuse of personal data during
storage, communication, modification and erasure (data processing) and thereby to prevent harm
to any personal interests of the person concerned that warrant protection.”394 Personal data was
defined as “details on the personal or material circumstances of an identified or identifiable
393
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physical person.”395 Prevention of harm to individuals required data processors to fulfil three
main tasks. Manual and automated data files must be protected. Personal data could be stored as
long as using the data was necessary for completion of a legitimate task. Finally, data subjects
possessed the right to be informed of personal data existence, have their incorrect data amended,
request that their data be restricted from additional use, and could request their personal data be
deleted. As the first federal Data Protection Commissioner stated, the bill was to act, “As a kind
of human rights protection in a technological society.”396 The BDSG was amended or updated in
1994, 1997, and 2001.397 The 1997 and 2001 changes reflected the necessity of maintaining
compliance with EU data law directives, including Directive 95/46/EC which will be discussed
in detail in the next chapter.398
The law was challenged by two political events during Phase 1. First, public opposition to
computerized data use arose around the proposed 1983 national Census, which would be an
update to the 1970 census. An opinion survey conducted by the Klaus Lange Society for
Mathematics and Data Processing discovered that 81% of the public surveyed feared a loss of
privacy during the collection and storage of personal data during the national census.399 Spiros
Simitis, then the Hessian Data Protection Commissioner, stated that hundreds of citizens had
called their office to complain over fears of government surveillance related to the propose
census. The Constitutional Court delayed the national census collection while it reviewed public
privacy concerns. On 15 December 1983, the Constitutional Court ruled that in the instance of
personal data on rent and housing, West Germans had a “constitutional right to self-
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determination about the use of their own personal information on the basis of articles 1 and 2 of
the Constitution.”400 This ruling served as yet another critical juncture during which German
citizens received expanded power to determine whether they would relinquish information to a
government agency. Meanwhile, public protests were held in 1983 and 1987 over the proposed
collection of personal data which during the upcoming census. 25% of surveyed households
admitted they were planning on not completing the census forms.401 After adjustments to data
management plans, the census was finally carried out in 1987.
Secondly, the DPC faced opposition to its oversight from various aspects of the national
security community. As mentioned in the domestic terrorism discussion, BKA head Dr. Herold
Horst had adopted the PIOS data retrieval system for profiling of suspected terrorists during
BKA investigations. The DPC felt this use of personal information was dangerous, as data
collection could potentially involve the information of non-suspects, without their consent. Horst
clashed with Bull regarding the control and use of this police data. Bull requested the BKA
delete some fingerprint data in storage, and offered a set of guidelines in 1981 that involved data
collection best practices.402 In 1986, Baumann complained that security officials were not
following Commission advice for limits to police power over personal data according to a new
article of the Code of Criminal procedures. Ministers of the Interior Zimmerman complained of
DPC interference with security measures, but Baumann took the issue to the Interior Committee
of the Bundestag in 1986 and won his case. Like his predecessor, Baumann and Bull had argued
that security officials were still subject to constitutional law and must provide protection for
personal information.403
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In the case of Germany, there is substantial support for the development of a digital
human rights regime. The Hessian state developed its own data protection law and Commission
in 1970, under the influence of legal professional and human rights advocate Spiros Simitis.
Simitis then went onto influence the national legislative debate in the early to mid 1970s, by
providing expert testimony to the Bundestag and various investigative bodies. In addition, the
state was pressed to create national data protection legislation by the Deutsche Juristentag, a
highly organized network of lawyers and jurists. After the BDSG law was passed in 1977, the
implementation of the law was challenged by the previously scheduled census collection order,
and by security services in pursuit of terrorist organizations. In both instances, the power of the
law and the validity of DPC efforts were supported, and not weakened by judicial and
Parliamentary review.
4.4

Summary of National Case Findings
4.4.1

Economic Commodification

Comparing the cases in the area of economic dependence upon ICT, I found that in
Sweden, whatever the contribution of the ICT sector, data laws were not written to allow firm
freedom in personal data management. In the United Kingdom, ICT firms were granted more
significant freedom over data treatment than were their competitors in Sweden or Germany. The
uniqueness of British ICT firms pressuring the government to adopt data protection in order to
strengthen competitiveness was an unforeseen direction of legislative pressure. Regarding
Germany, though ICT firms did increase their market share of economic contribution during
Phase 1, the continued strength of the manufacturing sector diminished the ICT impact upon data
law provisions.
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4.4.2

Security Incidents and Threats

Swedish society did not face significant threats from domestic terrorism to warrant any
adjustments to data protection. However, in the United Kingdom, overwhelming numbers of
security problems in Northern Ireland contributed to the desire in Parliament to increase access
for law enforcement to personal data. In the German case, I found mixed support for law
enforcement access to data during Phase 1. When challenged by DPC officials, security officers
had to comply with the digital rights protections of the BDSG passed in 1977.
4.4.3

Digital Human Rights

Among all my cases, there was the most evidence across all countries for the mounting
influence of the legal epistemic community upon data protection creation and ongoing
compliance. Swedish lawyers served to advise the regulatory bodies of the Riksdag and held
DIB positions of power. Data rights advocates among Parliament and the legal community faced
more difficulty in getting a law passed in the U.K., than did their colleagues in Sweden or
Germany. Only by creating linkages between concerned MPs such as Alex Lyon, with British
advocates like Paul Sieghart, and the pressure of ICT firms, did the Thatcher government U.K.
establish data rights. Finally, German legal professionals began the institutionalization of data
protection at the Lander levels, and promoted the same rights in federal law. This hypothesis had
the most support of the three.
I now turn to examine the development of data legislation during Phase 2 (2000-2015). In
particular, I focus on the efforts made by the EU Commission and Working Party 29. As the data
will show, these individuals were very influential in shaping supranational legislation into a
regional regime of digital human rights.
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5
5.1

DATA PROTECTION LAWS AT THE EUROPEAN UNION LEVEL

Theory
The theoretical argument posits that data governance in the EU occupies a space of

regime complexity.404 Regimes are a type of institution, or the rules used around a given issue
area. Creation of or membership in a data protection regime involves commitments to
organizational norms and policy expectations around data treatment that are driven either by
domestic interests (national regimes) or international interests (international organizations or
regimes). Regime complexity occurs in the presence of multiple national or international regimes
which offer competing ideas on how to manage an issue.

Figure 3: Data Regime Complex
The development of data governance regimes is divided into two time periods: Phase 1
(1970-1999) and Phase 2 (roughly the late 1980s-2016). Data governance was managed at the

404

For this chapter, I have included the most pertinent documents which propelled forward the regimes of
data legislation in the EU. An exhaustive examination of all documents within the Member States
legislative repositories, the Council of Europe database, the OECD database, and the Official Journal of
the European Communities is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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national level during Phase 1 but moved to the international level of policy coordination during
Phase 2. Policy-making followed the causal pathway of Putnam’s two-level games and that of
Milner’s spatial negotiations arguments.405 National policymakers move back and forth between
their national legislative environment and the international stage, seeking policy compromises
that please their obligations in both arenas. At both the domestic and international levels, policymakers will utilize epistemic professionals for the purpose of advising for present needs and
long-term implications of any proposed policies. As the human rights literature notes, norm
“entrepreneurs” can and will often diffuse norms throughout the international system by calling
attention to issues of importance and attempting to link with elites who hold decision-making
power.406
From the 1970s-present, data legislation in European states has involved competition
among domestic interests along the three main areas introduced in the national case chapters:
ICT firms continually sought economic gains from data use, national security authorities
increasingly tried to use personal or cyber data during criminal investigations and anti-terrorism
efforts, and human rights activists pushed back against free use of personal or cyber data, asking
for human rights protections. As has been established in Chapter 4, at the national level states
had to choose a hierarchical preference when these interests conflicted with one another. Various
individual states legalized data protection as a fundamental human right, a fact I labeled as a
regime of “digital human rights.” Digital human rights originated in Sweden and Germany and
diffused across Europe.

405
406

Milner 1987; Putnam 1988.
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998.
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5.2

National Efforts in Phase 1 (1970-1999)
To recap the national policies chosen during Phase 1, in the case studies of Sweden,

Germany, and the United Kingdom I examined how each of the three domestic interests
attempted to influence national data legislation. Did the state have an economic dependence upon
the ICT sector (Information and Communications Technology), a history of domestic security
incidents, or to what degree was there advocacy by legal and human rights experts? These factors
contributed to diverse types of domestic regimes that would govern data to the advantage of the
three primary interests.
Sweden experienced few to no domestic security problems during Phase 1, and the ICT
sector was minimally influential upon economic growth. The country did, however, have a
history of public access to government records. In the 1970s, government records were
computerized, causing public concern about privacy loss. Legal professionals advocated for the
first national law in Europe for personal data protection. As a result, the Datalagen of 1973
protected personal data very heavily. Since the 1970s, Sweden has continued to push for digital
human rights across Europe.
West Germany experienced a significant number of security attacks by extreme left-wing
gangs and neo-Nazi groups during the 1970s-1990s. Despite the casualties associated with the
attacks, a pervasive public fear of government surveillance prohibited the Bundestag from
developing a law with unrestricted access to personal data for governmental authorities,
including security and law enforcement. In addition, when West German lawmakers decided to
create national data protection, regional data laws were already in place in the Länder. The
national government consulted with regional data protection authorities (DPA) who were mostly
legal professionals for the Länder, and the DPAs suggested a policy of restrictive protections for
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personal data. Combined with the lagging development of the German ICT sector compared to
technology firm growth in other states, and Germany had the highest number of data protection
laws passed among my cases. Germany and German legal rights experts have continued to push
for the internationalization of data protection norms.
The U.K. experienced an enormous domestic security problem due to terrorists’ actions
in Northern Ireland during the Troubles Years (1960s-1990s). Though nearly 8000 people were
hurt or killed during in this time period, security officials did not heavily pressure the Commons
or the government to gain access to personal data in the U.K. Here, ICT interests were the most
aggressive. Tech firms were very concerned about losing comparative advantage to the
Americans and other European states within the global marketplace. This fear was predicated by
the fact that Britain had not ratified Convention 108 of the Council of Europe, which outlined
personal data protection for all members, so that data mobility would be safe throughout the
OECD trade community. The British ICT sector feared they would lose business if other OECD
states had data protection laws that would allow for transborder data movement, but the UK did
not. The Thatcher government eventually acquiesced to the pressure from ICT firms and passed
the Data Protection Act in 1984.407
5.3

European Efforts in Phase 2 (late 1980s-2016)
Applying the theoretical expectations to data governance in the European Union, I argue

that states occupy international spaces that include overlapping, nesting, or duplicative
international regimes that may compete with their domestic regimes on data governance.408

407

Convention 108 advised member states to create national policies of protection for personal data
during automatic processing. Such policies were to include allowances for transborder movement of
personal data within the OECD membership, foreseen as a necessary mechanism for ICT business
growth. This will be discussed later in this chapter.
408
This statement serves as my theoretical argument for EU-level policies on data protection.
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Since international regimes involve a commitment to some degree of policy-matching among
members, states that have domestic laws in place for data governance will also face a second
decision point for data policy. Within the international system of organizations (regimes),
national representatives will advocate for the international agreements to match the preference of
domestic interests on data treatment. The EU is an example of such an international regime in
which national laws must be harmonized across many issue areas.
Following the logic of complex interdependence, the more powerful states of the EU
should be able to get their preferred data policies passed into EU legislation.409410 I therefore
traced the level of influence of the most powerful EU states - France, Germany, and the U.K. upon the EU data policy process from the 1980s to present. To assess the argument, I needed
predictions for how the individual states will pressure other organizational member states toward
specific policies. I measured for each of these three countries the levels of economic dependence
upon the ICT sector. Measures were in two forms. First, I looked at Value Added as a % of GDP;
this data was sourced from the OECD. Second, I developed a new composite of ICT variables to
measure the additive export effect of all these sectors within the economy. These findings will be
discussed below. To assess the impact of domestic security problems to preferences for using
data in security surveillance, I utilized the Global Terrorism database for a gross measure of
numbers of domestic terror incidents from the 1970s-2014.411 Finally, to evaluate the role of

409

This statement provides my hypothetical predictions for the EU policymaking process from the 1980s
to present.
410
Keohane and Nye 1989. Complex interdependence argues that states with larger amounts of military
and/or economic power can more readily create international organizations, and that once created, they
can pressure small and mid-sized states to follow the policy preferences of the more powerful states. Once
the organization (regime) is created, even if the power of the state declines, due to institutional rigidity,
these preferences/rules will persist.
411
Data points through 2016 were not available for all case countries, so the date cut-off point was set at
2014 to capture consistency of available data for the three countries.
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legal and human rights experts in pressuring the EU to pass data protection, I looked for the
presence of individuals from these professions who either advised EU legislators during the
policy-making process, or when such individuals were given oversight on data legislation
compliance. Understanding the national preferences of each powerful state in the three structural
areas allowed me to predict individual states’ preferences for EU data policy and to evaluate the
success of these predictions.
5.3.1

ICT Sector Dependence

To what extent did the powerful states have dependence upon the ICT sector in the
national economy? The purpose of this dissertation is not to show that the ICT sector was more
important than other sectors to each national economy. However, it is necessary to show that the
ICT sector was growing in importance for the national economies of Europe, due to the financial
value of data to these firms. It is also important to establish that the economic impact of ICT
firms differs across countries. Chart 5.1 represents the impact of data upon the digital economy,
based upon how much these firms contributed to the overall GDP in each country. The ICT
sector was broadly measured with the following variables: share of the ICT sector in GDP, share
of the ICT sector personnel in total employment, the growth of the ICT sector in value added, the
share of ICT investment in research and development, and the share of the ICT sector used in
research and development personnel expenses. ICT manufacturing and services includes the
variables manufacturing of electronic components, computers, communication equipment,
magnetic media, consumer electronics, ICT equipment, software, telecommunications, computer
programming and data processing, and repair of computer and computer-related equipment. All
data was sourced from Eurostat and the OECD.412
412

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/isoc_se_esms.htm “Units of measure: The units
published are: % of the ICT sector in total value added at factor cots, % of the ICT sector in total
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We see that the contribution to each economy among the more powerful EU states differs
significantly. The German ICT sector grew the least, contributing from 3.5% to a maximum of
4.5% of GDP in the years under discussion. Both France and the UK started the 1990s with
levels between 4.6-4.7%. The UK reached a high point of 7.23% in 2000, and although the sector
retracted in the early 2000s, levels have remained about 6%. Finally, French growth was
relatively stable, hovering between 4-5% until recent years with a decline.

Table 16: ICT Value Added, % of GDP, Powerful EU States

8.00
7.00
6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

2.00

France

Germany

UK

Data Sources: World Bank WDI Database, OECD, Eurostat

Given the fact that the U.K. showed the most growth by the ICT sector, and therefore the
highest contribution made to the national economy, the United Kingdom should be the most

employment, % of the ICT sector in total R&D expenditure of businesses and % of the ICT sector in total
R&D personnel.”

166

likely of the three powerful states to push for more open data access and data
commodification in EU data legislation, followed by France.413
The challenge with the above measure is the inability to isolate the value created within
the export market. As seen in the UK case study chapter and will be discussed at the EU level in
this chapter, ICT firms have not been hesitant to argue for data legislation based on the use of
data as a mobile commodity, as it moves across state lines during all types of business activity.
The “Value Added” measures does not capture this aspect of data value. I therefore created my
own measure of the value of data exportability, which is called the Data Technology Export
Contribution Composite (or DTEC). The DTEC contains four variables used by the OECD,
IMF, and World Bank when measuring the export value of data-based firms; ICT goods exports,
ICT services exports, high-tech exports, and insurance-financial services exports. The data below
reports values of the powerful states of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.414 All
variables were standardized in STATA, then averaged for 5-year periods for simplification. The
DTEC composite table below reflects the five-year mean percentage of contribution by the ICT
sector within the exports of each country.

Table 17: Data Technology Export Contribution (DTEC) Composite
Country

1985-1989

1990-1994

1995-1999

2000-2004

2005-2009

2010-2014

2015-2016

France

-0.94

-0.90

-1.91

0.01

-0.90

0.34

1.44

Germany
U.K.

-4.22
0.36

-3.49
0.36

-1.56
1.73

-0.15
5.42

-0.55
3.54

-0.41
1.89

0.01
1.98

Sources: Eurostat, OECD

413

Note the dip in economic contribution in the UK and Germany immediately following the 2008 global
financial crisis. The consistent growth of ICT in France during this time was particularly interesting.
414
The choice of these states to exemplify powerful states in the EU aligns with the arguments made by
Keohane and Nye in chapter 2 of Power and Interdependence (1989).
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Again, the United Kingdom experienced a higher percentage of ICT products and services
exported as compared to the other two states. All years under consideration revealed positive
contribution to the export market, even following the 2008 financial crisis. Although France and
Germany made considerable gains across time in ICT exports, they still lagged behind the UK. I
therefore expected that the UK would advocate against any EU legislation that would restrict data
mobility. As France showed the next highest level of ICT exports, French representatives could
hesitate to provide any data protections that would impede data flows across borders.

5.3.2

Influence of Security Risks
Table 18: Domestic Terror Casualties, 1970-2014, France/Germany/UK

Total
Casualties
France
Germany
United
Kingdom

19701974
70
97
1772

19751979
138
74
1250

19801984
617
346
1202

19841989
470
436
1494

19901994
67
371
1312

19951999
333
119
956

20002004
56
58
103

20052009
35
8
934

20102014
36
4
101

Totals
1823
1513
9124

Source: Global Terrorism Database

5.3.3

United Kingdom
The greatest number of security casualties occurred in the United Kingdom. Notably, the

volume of domestic attacks peaked from 1984-1989, and peaked again between 2004-2009. The
U.K. figures are largely attributed to the Troubles Years of unrest in Northern Ireland between
1968-1998, and to the rise in increased domestic terrorism following the 2005 bombings in the
London Underground. EU parliamentarians debating on data legislation in the Commons during
the Troubles frequently noted the importance of information access to law enforcement and
security officials. As domestic terror attacks have been an issue in the past and have risen to the
fore again more recently for the state, British representatives should be the most likely to prefer
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granting more freedom of access to national security officials. However, British security
officials will have to balance their desire to access data with the legislative preferences for data
profiteering desired by the technology sector.415
5.3.4

France

France experienced the second largest number of domestic terror casualties among the most
powerful states of the EU. Broadly speaking, after World War II when France was led by Charles
de Gaulle, national security policy focused on nuclear deterrence development and acquiring
security partnerships that limited the global hegemony of the United States.416 Then in the 1970s
and 1980s, France experienced a series of domestic security attacks by individuals linked to a
variety of ideological goals. Carlos the Jackal, a self-styed “professional revolutionary” carried
out grenade, rocket, and bombing attacks, which killed and injured dozens in the 1970s-1980s.417
During the 1980s, the country was also plagued by a series of attacks on the Turkish consulate,
and on retail stores, airports, and public spaces (hotels, train, cafes, cinema, and offices). ASALA
(Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia), Hezbollah, and Action Directe were
believed to be responsible for much of the violence in this decade.418
After the September 11 bombings in the U.S., French security white papers linked domestic
and international security together, highlighting the importance of information-gathering by
national intelligence agents, and cited a need for cyber strategy to protect ICT firms. 419

415

See the UK case chapter for the full discussion on competitiveness in data mobility related to
Convention 108 by the OECD. As a part of the Convention, the OECD promoted personal data
protection, so that the transborder movement of data would not be prohibited between OECD states due to
differences in protection between data sending and data receiving states.
416
Gordon 1993
417
NBC News 2017
418
Domingo 2010
419
Domingo 2010; French White Paper, 2013; Defence and National Security Strategic Review, 2017;
NY Times 1986; Segell 1999
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Additional attacks after 9/11 involved an Air France hijacking by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA),
and the Nice bombing by the National Liberation Front of Corsica (FLNC). 420 Most recently, the
2015 incidents of the Charlie Hebdo shootings by adherents to Al-Qaeda, and the Paris sports and
music venue attacks in November were attributed to ISIS members. The Bastille Day celebration
in Nice was targeted by a truck driver who turned out to be a Tunisian extremist.421
These occurrences caused France to shift national security approaches from perceiving
mainly external aggressors, to investigating domestic terrorists. French authorities expanded the
powers of existing law enforcement agencies responsible for counter-terrorism, intelligence
gathering, and internal security. Important to this dissertation, information-gathering was
expanded.422 In 2006, data collection powers were expanded to include traveler information,

423

internet and telecom firms are now required to grant police access to customers’ data, and a
biometric data collection program is now administered by Air France during flights through the
Roissy airport (Programme d’Expérimentation d’une Gestion Automatisée et Securisée).424
France started with with an externally focused security policy in the 1960s. With the increased
numbers of domestic attacks by nationalist and fundamentalist terrorists, data and information use
by security has evolved and expanded from the 1970s forward. I therefore expected French
representatives to support higher levels of data access for national security reasons when
negotiating EU data policy.

420

Nundy 1994; BBC News World Edition 2002.
Rawlinson, Chrisafis and Dodd 2016
422
The Ministry of the Interior has the power to administer information databases on passengers and noncitizens entering the country. The new database was an expansion of the Fichier National Transfrontière
database created in 1991. The new database expanded the information gathering and data available to
security officials. See Domingo 2010, p. 123.
423
Domingo 2010, p. 149.
424
Passenger participation was voluntary. See Domingo p. 150, 151.
421
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5.3.5

Germany

Turning to Germany, as outlined in the case studies chapter, the state had the least number
of domestic security attacks of the three countries. The country did experience a large number of
bombings related to domestic terrorism during the 1980s and 1990s. The majority of these attacks
were attributed to an extreme leftist group, the Baader-Meinhof gang, which was neutralized in
the mid 1990s. As shown in the case chapter, the German public continues to remain skeptical of
granting overarching surveillance power to the state. When these fears are combined with the fact
that Germany has more personal data protection laws than the other states under consideration, I
expected to see that Germany will allow for security access to information, as long as this access
does not override the individual protections for personal information that are imbedded in both
regional and national laws.
5.4

The Role of Legal Professionals and Human Rights Advocates
The final internal influence upon EU policymaking on the issue of data governance could

be made by the legal and human rights community. When a policy-making environment includes
uncertainty and institutional coordination is required for policies that concern politicized issues,
epistemic professionals have served as technical experts and information providers for policymakers during the research phase of designing a new law.425 Furthermore, the advice of technical
experts often reflects their shared normative beliefs that may or may not involve systemic policy
bias among the profession.426 Haas (1992) points out that researchers looking to assess the power
of epistemic communities should identify community members, trace community beliefs among
common to the profession, and then posit credible outcomes that would occur as a result of the

425
426

Haas 1992
Haas 1992, p. 25.
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consulting work for lawmakers.427 This requires examining advisory publications, testimonies,
press releases, etc. to identify content promotion and subsequent suggested policies. As noted in
the case chapters, Germany and the U.K. each had legal professionals, academic elites, and
jurists that served as consultants for national parliaments when making domestic data laws. In
this section I draw from the the content of national data protection laws, the professional
background of those who head each national data protection authority, and the role afforded to
legal and human rights experts during the EU legislative process.
Table 19: Summary of National Data Law Content - France, Germany, UK, 1970-1999

Country

Total # of Data
Laws, Phase 1

Coding Results

Percentage of
Provisions for
Security Access

Percentage of
Provisions for
Economic Use

0

Percentage of
Provisions for
Data
Protection
100%

France

1

+ 14 Data Protect

Germany

12

United
Kingdom

3

+42 Security
Access
+405 Data Protect
+ 72 Econ Use
+36 Security
Access
+360 Data Protect
+17 Econ Use

4.3%

41.4%

7.4%

5.2%

52.4%

2.5%

0

When the content of the French law is added to the data, it reveals a stark difference to that
of the German and British Laws. Though the original French data law is much shorter than either
the first UK or German laws, it is devoted entirely to data protection rights, with no provision for
security authorities to violate the human rights protections, nor any content that allows for data
commodification exclusive of digital human rights. It is important to discuss the process of
choosing data legislation in France, since this was not covered in Chapter 4.

427

Haas 1992, p. 34.
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5.4.1

France
Year

1978

Name of law
Law No. 78-17
(French Data
Protection Act)

Description
Initial data protection law, applying to
“informatique et libertés” covering computer data
processing, data files, and personal freedoms;
created the Commission nationale de
l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL), the national
data protection authority

From 1970-2016, France passed three data protection laws. The first data protection law
became law in 1978. This law was in response to public outcry over a proposed government
database known as SAFARI (Système Automatise ́ pour les Fichiers Administratifs et le Ré ́
pertoire des Individus).428 The French government had been planning a national data base to
organize personal data to be used in all public records and databanks. The Minister of Justice
appointed an investigative commission to determine the potential for rights violations; the
“Tricot Commission” proposed the need for
“…measures to ensure that the development of data processing in the semi-public and
private sectors will take place in the context of respect for private life, individual liberties,
and public liberties.”429
After so much public concern, the government passed the French Law on Informatics, Data
Banks and Freedoms which provided personal data protection, such that “information technology
should be at the service of every citizen.”430 Though the law was brief, it provided the foundation
not only for significant personal data protection in France, the law would also inform EU
policymakers when designing EU data laws, a point I return to later.
First, provisions within the 1978 law established a permanent agency charged with
monitoring data protections, but the agency staff selection has been somewhat controversial. The

428

Flaherty 1989, p. 166.
P. 7, Council of Europe 1976 English translation of the Report of the Committee on Informatics and
Liberties 1975; Flaherty 1989, p. 166.
430
Loi no. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à la informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés
429
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National Commission on Informatics and Freedoms (CNIL) oversees and regulates data
protection. The CNIL is comprised of a college of 17 persons, drawn from a variety of political
institutions in France. The mix includes two National Assembly deputies, two Senators, two
members of the Economic and Social Council, two state attorneys from the General Assembly,
individuals from the court system (Administrative Supreme Court, Financial Supreme Court, and
French Judicial Court), as well as one individual appointed by the President of the National
Assembly, one appointed by the President of the Senate, and three people chosen based on their
expertise in the area of data protection.431 The college itself votes to determine who will serve as
the college President. Since its creation, some academics have argued that the functional
structure of the CNIL has kept control over data privacy sequestered within the CNIL, rather
than allowed it to be openly debated in the national Assembly.432 In other words, those that make
it onto the CNIL come from a variety of political backgrounds and a majority are politically
appointed. However, once they join the CNIL college, their data policy suggestions and the
amount of independent power wielded by the CNIL college is significant. The CNIL college
members have a great deal of autonomy and there are few obligations to accept input from any of
the external stakeholders involved in the issue of personal data protection, including individuals,
human rights organizations, businesses, or the security segments of government.

431

Commission nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés 1978; Righettini 2011.

432

Flaherty 2014
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Table 20: French National Commission on Informatics and Freedoms

Presidents of the CNIL

Term Length

Professional Background

Pierre Bellet

1978-1979

Attorney, Jurist

Jacques Thyraud

1979-1983

Mayor, Politicians

Jean Rosenwald

1983-1984

President of the Court of Auditors

Jacques Fauvet

1984-1999

Former Director of Le Monde

Michel Gentot

1999-2004

State Councilor/Attorney

Alex Türk

2004-2011

Politician, Chairman of Schengen Committee,
French Europol Supervisor

Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin

2011-2019

State Councilor, OECD Expert on Internet, Chair
of EU Article 29 Working Party

Marie-Laure Denix

2019-2024

Administrative Court Auditor, Telecom Regulator

As seen in Table 20, the CNIL presidents have included those with legal expertise, as well as
politicians, and a journalist. This mix of professions and training has contributed to the variety of
missions pursued by the CNIL as each president attempted to shape the mission in accordance
with government goals as well as their own interpretation of the needs of the time. The longest
serving presidents, such as Fauvet, Türk, and Falque-Pierrotin have had the greatest impact.
Fauvet led the CNIL when Directive 95 became EU data legislation; this Directive forced EU
states to adjust any national laws in place in order to implement EU data protections. Directive
95 will be discussed in the sections to follow. Türk served as CNIL president following 9/11 and
the Madrid and London bombings, after which all Western states revised their data surveillance
practices. Falque-Pierrotin is the most powerful and impactful CNIL president; her influence
spread much beyond France to the hugely influential Article 29 Working Party of the EU which
worked to expand the scope of personal data protection to establish digital human rights.
Regardless of the background of CNIL presidents, the 1978 law and the CNIL have set
new boundaries for data treatment that differed from the influence by Swedish or German laws.
France introduced the right to be forgotten, and prohibited large-scale data collection on data
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subjects, both of which have subsequently been added into EU data legislation.433 The French
law was amended in 2004 to protect personal data used during digital marketing purposes, and a
further decree added in 2011 which regulated the trafficking of personal data when developing
online content. Regarding organizational functionality, unlike in Sweden or Germany, the
Presidents and members of the CNIL have not always come from a legal background, but often
served in political or private sector positions prior to coming to the CNIL. Given the politicized
nature of CNIL college appointments, and due to the increased use of information surveillance
by French security authorities as a result of increased domestic terrorism, I expect that French
representatives will promote digital human rights alongside promoting national
sovereignty over data surveillance used during domestic anti-terrorism efforts.

5.4.2

Germany
Table 21: German Data Protection Laws, Phase 1: 1970-1999

Year
1970

Name of law
Population
MicroCensus Law

Description
Law permits some personal data release of information collected during the 1970
survey, for the use of correcting population registries, statistical use by central and
Land authorities, for town planning, and for scientific use.

1971

Telecommunications
Universal Services Act
BDSG – Data
Protection Law
Census Act

Law outlining provision of telecom services, including voice telephony, rates for
customers, and directory publications
First national data protection law, protecting against misuse during automatic
processing.
Discusses the protections required by the Basic Law, regarding personal data
collected during the national Census. Also regulates the use of data collected for
statistical and public administration purposes.
Revision of the 1977 law on federal level personal data protections. Includes details
on responsibilities of federal Data Protection Officer, the mandates on data secrecy
and transmission provisions, and right afforded to data subjects.

1977
1983
1990

433

Data Protection Law
Bundesdatenschutzgese
tz (BDSG)

In Europe, the right to be forgotten has been applied to various aspects of personal information,
including having a history of criminal convictions and participation in pornographic media. A full
discussion on this right cannot be fully explored in this dissertation, but the right has evolved and
expanded within Europe, due to many court cases. https://gdpr-info.eu/issues/right-to-be-forgotten/
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1995

Broadcasting Act for
North-Rhine
Westphalia

Addresses the licensure, functionality, and monitoring of broadcasting services in
North-Rhine Westphalia. Includes specific protections for personal data of
subscribers and their and personal viewing habits

1996

Telecommunications
Act

1997

Telecommunications
Universal Service
Ordinance

Regulations regarding service installation, fee scheduling, environmental protection,
and other aspects of telecom service provision. Also creates Regulatory and
Advisory bodies.
Provision of public telephone equipment, as well as release of subscriber
information, as long as subscriber has not barred release

1997

Digital Signature Act

1997

Act on the Protection of
Personal Data Used in
Teleservices

1997

Telecom Customer
Protection

Various obligations of telecom service providers for billing, service and equipment
provision

1997

Postal Act

Licensure requirements for postal delivery contractors. Law also discusses release of
addressees’ personal information and the protection of data used by commercial
actors when sending postal content.

Regulation of digital signature keys, including security measures and monitoring
capability.
Charges tele-services providers with protection of personal data during telecom
service provision.

As with the other countries studied, German authorities struggled to define legal
protections for personal data when computerization of government data began. German
politicians began to investigate the possibility of a data law in 1969. The eventual law passed in
1977 was based upon regional laws in the Länder, and the 1949 Basic Constitutional Law for the
Federal Republic, which stated that “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect it shall be the
duty of all state authority.”434 The Data Protection Directors from the Länder argued not only for
a strong national law, but wanted an independent, national agency to oversee country-wide
implementation. 435 Professionally, German Data Protection Commissioners had all received
legal training, and had extensive experience with the Minister of Interior or other Civil Service
branches.German Data Protection Commissioners, Federal Level

434
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Grundgesetz, Artikel 1 (Basic Law, Article 1).
OECD 1976.
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Table 22: German Data Protection Commissioners, Federal Level

Name of Commissioner

Term Length

Professional Background

Hans Peter Bull

1978-1983

Lawyer, Academic

Reinhold Baumann

1983-1988

Lawyer, Civil Servant with Minister of Interior

Alfred Einwag

1988-1993

Doctorate in Law, Federal Border Police Career

Joachim Jacob

1993-2003

Doctorate in Law, Deputy to Federal Data Protection Commission

In addition to the epistemic background in law by all federal DPC leaders, other DPC
staff and regional Data Protection Commissioners often served as outside consultants for various
international organizations when these IGOs investigated data policy suggestions for state
members. For example, the Data Protection Commissioner for Hesse since 1970, Spiros Simitis,
was consulted by Interior Ministry officials when the design was being chosen for the data
agency structure.436 Simitis also served as legal consultant for data policy in the OECD treaty of
1980, and was an advisor during European Union policy debates in the 1990s. German human
data rights experts had a profound impact not only within their own country, but outside as well.
For the purposes of this chapter, as supported by the findings in the national case study in
Chapter 4, German law provided the most extensive data legislation based on legal and
human rights at the regional and national levels. Germany also used legal experts as leaders
over data protection oversight more than the other powerful states and gave the data
protection authorities the most significant power for investigating data protection. I therefore
expected German officials to advocate quite extensively for European Union data
protection laws.
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5.4.3

United Kingdom

Table 23: UK Data Laws, Phase 1: 1970-1999

Year
1974

Name of law
Consumer Credit
Act

Description
Individuals granted right of access to credit source
information for correction purposes.

1984

Data Protection
Act

1998

Data Protection
Act

Regulates use of automatically processed personal data
regarding individuals; designed to ensure compliance
with Council of Europe Convention 1981
Created new provisions for regulation of processing
personal information; designed to ensure compliance
with EU Directive 95/46/EC

The United Kingdom was the last of my case states to adopt data protection legislation
(Sweden 1973, Germany 1977, UK 1984). As noted in the British national case chapter, the UK
lacked the written constitutional structure for human rights protections. Britain also experienced
a a very politicized struggle for data protection, with political will cycling up and down based on
which party held the majority in Parliament. Conservatives were very hesitant to provide data
protection and ignored repeated efforts by various MEPs from other parties who attempted to
introduce data protection legislation. Human rights advocates like Paul Sieghart and various
MEPs outside the Tory party introduced multiple data protection bills in the late 1960s and the
1970s that were unsuccessful until the ICT sector pressured Margaret Thatcher to pass data
protection legislation in the early 1980s.437
The 1998 Data Protection Act created the initial permanent position of Data Protection
Registrar (DPR). In 2000, Parliament passed the Freedom of Information Act, granting all British
citizens rights of access to documents held by the Government. As a result of the 2000 law, the
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DPR was changed to the Information Commissioner’s Office and given oversight not only of
personal data protection (established in the 1984 law, and updated in 1998), but also granted
oversight of the 2000 Information Act (and later also the Environmental Regulation Act of
2004). The agency is led by an individual appointed by the crown the Crown, typically serving a
five year term.438 Term lengths for the UK Commissioners have varied somewhat due to
changes in the law that created the Commission. The ICO falls under the jurisdiction of the
Justice Committee.439Data Protection Register/Information Commissioner's Office (ICO)*
Table 24: Data Protection Register/Information Commissioner's Office (ICO)*

Registrar/Commissioner

Dates of Term

Professional Background

Eric Howe

1984-1993

BBC Journalist

Elizabeth France

1994-2001

Magistrate, Legal Expert

Richard Thomas

2002-2008

Christopher Graham

2009-2015

Civil Service
Politician, BBC Secretary, Advertising
Standard Agency Head

Human rights advocate, Privacy
Commissioner in British Columbia
*Agency name was changed from the DPR to ICO in year 2000.
Elizabeth Denham

2016-present

Though the UK did create a full-time data protection agency to guard data protection, the
agency was gradually given additional responsibilities that watered down the focus on digital
human rights. Regarding the professional background and standing of the UK officials
responsible for managing data legislation implementation, the government did a specific agency
for this task following the passage of the 1984 Data Protection Law. However, as with the
French CNIL, the DPR/ICO office of the UK was led by individuals from a variety of
professional backgrounds. While some did have training in law or human rights, others had
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experience in politics or media. Furthermore, the DPR/ICO leadership was expected to manage
a variety of issues, not just data protection, indicating that the UK government had less intent on
making digital human rights a separate and respected division of protections. Going forward, I
expected the UK officials to oppose rigid EU personal data legislation efforts and to also
thwart attempts to expand the narrative around data beyond a human rights issue.
To summarize my expectations of the behavior of France, Germany, and the U.K., during
the EU legislative process for data governance, I predicted the United Kingdom would push for
data protections that would do not restrict data use or movement, so as not to threaten ICT
sector growth and economic contribution. German authorities should seek great levels of
personal data protection, seeking to align EU legislative protections with the scope of
digital human rights. French authorities should seek a mix: stringent data protection, but
promote national sovereignty over using data as surveillance and security tool against
domestic terror.
5.5

The Policy-Making Process in the European Union: Agenda and Influence
To reiterate: my expectations during EU law-making are two-fold. First, individual EU

states will seek to promote an EU data policy that aligns with national policies already in place.
(Thus, my predictions for each of the powerful states in the prior section.) This can be done by
leveraging their influence when serving in the Commission or Council presidencies, or within the
consultative committees. The predictions for these preferences were explained in the previous
section. Second, borrowing from the international level of Putnam’s two level game, EU policymakers should also be influenced by pressures from any additional international organizations to
which the EU states share membership. Within international organizations (regimes),
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membership obligations will pressure states to pass laws that comply with the treaties or
international agreement they sign. EU Member States’ International Organization Membership
Table 25: EU Member States’ International Organization Membership

Country
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Republic of
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom

European
Union
1995
1958
2007
2013
2004

OECD
1961
1961
*
*
*

Council
of Europe
1956
1949
1992
1996
1961

United
Nations
1955
1945
1955

2004
1973
2004
1995
1958
1958
1981
2004
1973
1958
2004
2004
1958
2004
1958
2004
1986
2007
2004
2004
1986
1995
1973

NATO

1960

*
1949
2004
2009
*

1995
1961
2010
1969
1961
1961
1961
1996
1961
1962
2016
*
1961
*
1961
1996
1961
*
2000
2010
1961
1961
1961

1993
1949
1993
1989
1949
1950
1949
1990
1949
1949
1995
1993
1949
1965
1949
1991
1976
1993
1993
1993
1977
1949
1949

1993
1945
1991
1955
1945
1973
1945
1955
1955
1955
1991
1991
1945
1964
1945
1945
1955
1955
1993
1992
1955
1946
1945

1999
1949
2004
*
1949
1955
1952
1999
*
1949
2004
2004
1949
*
1949
1999
1949
2004
2004
2004
1982
*
1949

During the years under examination neither NATO nor the United Nations had a highly
developed data policy regime.440 I therefore anticipate that the data policy suggestions offered
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The United Nations Global Pulse project emerged following the 2008 financial crisis. The project
includes data privacy recommendations built into the program which was introduced from 2011-2014.
Guardian 2011; United Nations 2019.
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by the agreements made in the Organisation for Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the
Council of Europe to have significant influence upon EU states and the European Union.
5.6

International Regimes
The OECD originated the first international effort at harmonization of data processing

protection, as a result of the desire among members to prevent disruption to data use as computer
diffusion occurred.441 442 Multiple OECD member states had already adopted national legislation
during the 1970s, including Sweden (1973), the U.S. (1974), and Germany (1977). Simultaneous
to the interest by governments, academics and human rights advocates brought additional
attention to the issue with several published works on the topics, such as Alan Westin’s Privacy
and Freedom (1967), and Paul Sieghart’s Privacy and Computers (1976).
OECD progress on recommendations followed several conferences in 1974 and 1977
which looked at privacy, citizens’ access to data, and cross-border data mobility. The OECD
(European Union 1973) Peter Gassman (Germany, engineering and economics consultant), Louis
Joinet (France, drafter of French Informatique et Liberté law), and Professor Peter Seipel
(Sweden, Professor of Law).443 They raised concerns about “reconciling fundamental but
competing values such as privacy and the free flow of information.”444 The OECD Council
formally adopted the OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder
Flows of Personal Data on 23 September 1980. The Guidelines had eight core principles,
including:
•
•
•
441

Limit personal data collections to lawful means, preferably with data subject consent
Collect personal data only for original use purposes, and limit use to these purposes
No disclosure of personal data without either data subject consent OR the authority of the
law

Gassman 1976.
OECD 2011, p. 15.
443
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•
•
•

Provide security measures against unauthorized data access or disclosure
Provide a transparent policy on policies concerning personal data.
Data subject rights shall allow confirmation of data held, and data corrected/ erased when
requested by the data subject
Member governments were encouraged to incorporate the Guidelines into national

practices, but no formal enforcement mechanism was in place. Concurrent to the work being
done by the OECD on setting guidelines for data use, was activity within the Council of Europe
also dealing with data protection measures.
5.7

International Regimes for Data Governance
5.7.1

Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to

Automatic Processing of Personal Data, “Convention 108”
The Council of Europe’s foundational principles include the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), of which Article 8 of the
ECHR states that “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home, and
his correspondence…”445 The origin of the Council of Europe (CoE) data protection regime
began in the late 1960s: the CoE Legal Committee handled two motions coming from the
Consultative Assembly of 1967 which requested the Committee examine the impact of
technological developments upon privacy.446 In 1973 the CoE adopted Resolution 73 (22), which
targeted protection of privacy of individuals inside electronic databanks used by private sector
firms. At the 236th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, the Council of Europe passed Resolution
(74) 29, On the Protection of Privacy of Individuals Vis-à-vis Electronic Data Banks in the
Public Sector, which noted the increased use of computerized data banks by member
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184

governments and expressed similar fears to those raised by the OECD. Resolution 74 (29)
suggested protections by states should include:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Informing the public of government use of electronic data banks for storage or
processing of personal information.
Keeping information current and using it only for designated purposes
Creating storage time limits
Precautions should be set, and codes of conduct designed to limit misuse of
information
Databank access should be restricted to authorized users with necessity of use
Statistical use of such information must assure anonymity

The CoE formalized the final treaty designed to protect personal data during automatic
processing, thereafter known as Convention 108, on 28 January 1981, creating the first truly
international regime for personal data protection. Original signatory states from the EU
included France, Germany, and Sweden. The CoE regime had much more impact on the EU
states that did the OECD Guidelines for several reasons: it asked specifically for “data
protection”, it linked protection to the obligation to provide fundamental rights, and it invited
regional institutions, such as the EU to pressure their member states for implementation.
Though the CoE Convention asked states to protect data to include during transborder
flows – an economic goal – the framing of personal data protection as a human right would be
incorporated into the strategy of legal and rights experts working within the EU to set
supranational policy in the decades to come.
The CoE Convention 108 treaty finally entered into force on 1 October 1985, following
ratification by five CoE members, including Sweden (1982), France (1983), Norway and Spain
(1984,) and Germany (1985). Note that Germany and Sweden are two of the national case states
from Phase 1, both of whom had stringent national data protection laws in place from the early
1970s. States that delayed ratification included the U.K., which did not ratify the convention
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until 1987; this delay of ratification supports my prediction that for the British, data protection
was driven by the fear of reduced trade if they country did not adopt some form of data
protection, rather than human rights concerns about personal data.
5.8

EU Member States’ Actions during EU Policy-making: The Commission, Council of
Ministers, Parliament
As the Commission is the point of origin for putting topics on the EU legislative agenda,

I looked at the calls for data legislation made by the EU Commission, as this would indicate an
opening political opportunity for personal data protection.447 If a powerful state holding the EU
Commission presidency requests to add data protection onto the legislative agenda in a format
that matches national laws, this would substantiate the claim that powerful states attempt to
shape EU policy around domestic preferences of their interest groups.
The first calls for EU legislation occurred in 1973 and 1974, and the narrative on data
legislation singularly focused on the economic value of data processing under French
Commission president François-Xavier Ortoli. Ortoli448. Ortoli asked the Parliament and Council
to take up the issue of data governance, contextually framing the issue as relevant to the growing
economic potential in the data processing industry.449 450 In 1974, the Commission requested a
study group comprised of “governmental experts” to offer advice on such legislation.451 452 453
This was followed by a motion submitted by a mixed coalition of MEPs in April, 1976, who
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asked the Commission to draft Community legislation regarding "protection of the rights of the
individual, aware of the legitimate concern of the public at the risks of misuse or abuse of
information stored in regional, national or international data banks." 454 The Commission agreed;
a lack of data protection legislation would be costly to the economies of EU states, prompting a
statement released on 29 July 1981, in which Commission asked that members sign and ratify
Convention 108 by the end of 1982. The strong action taken by the Commission to coerce EU
Member States to ratify Convention 108 supports to my argument concerning the influence of
international regime membership upon national and regional policy. 455
The next Commission President, Roy Jenkins (UK), did not promote a particular data
legislation agenda. 456 Following Jenkins, Commission President Gaston Thorn (Luxembourg)
tied data protection to the need for a “common commercial policy, to the progressive abolition of
restrictions on international trade.”457 458 Despite the persistent pressure by the EU Commission
that EU States ratify and adopt the CoE Convention 108 regime, few EU community states
ratified or adopted it early on. By March of 1983, two members of the European Parliament
(Sieglerschmidt of West Germany, and Glinne of Belgium) submitted a Working Document on
behalf of the Socialist Group asking exactly when the Commission would follow-up with a draft
proposal for a Directive “to ensure a uniform level of data protection within the European
Community.”459 Only under the Delors Commission (France, 1985-1995) did EU data protection
legislation cross the tipping point of momentum toward becoming real law. Jacques Delors’
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goals for the Commission of 1985-89 largely revolved around successful completion of the
single market programme by 1992.460 However he had no specific initiatives that involved data
processing industries nor personal data protection; his work on data protection would come
under the umbrella of his promotion of the tech sector for EU economic growth.
Regarding efforts by the Council presidents to lead data policy efforts, in the mid to late
1980s, the Council presidency was held by the United Kingdom (Margaret Thatcher, 1981),
West Germany (Helmut Kohl, 1983), France (Francois Mitterrand, 1984), back again to the UK
(Margaret Thatcher, 1986), then again to France (Francois Mitterrand, 1989). I found no
documentary evidence that any of these leaders were focused on data processing or personal data
protection legislation as a part of their agenda when leading the European Council. The Council
did promote legislative process for personal data protection, albeit built into policy for common
market telecommunications.461 It took an additional two years for the Commission to issue a
proposal for a Directive on protecting individuals’ personal data.462
5.9

The Decade of Change for EU Data Legislation – The 1990s and the Role of Epistemic
Advisors
The decade of real change for data protection was most definitely the 1990s. The

influential factors during this decade include the increased utilization of investigatory
bodies staffed with industry and legal experts and a momentum of activity to legislate the
issue among all three units of Community leadership to produce data legislation. In April 1990,
consultants to the Commission advised that since “information is considered more and more as a
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tradeable commodity…[a] resource of great value which is sold at high prices by specialized
companies” within Europe, thus the Community should develop policy for this issue area.463 464
In July 1990, the Commission presented a new proposal to the Council asking for a Directive on
data governance.465 The Economic and Social Committee reviewed the request in 1991, and the
Delors Commission formally presented the proposal for a Council Directive on the legal
protection of databases on 13 May 1992.466 In the midst of these negotiations on data policy,
general changes to core EU treaties impacted data policy as well. Maastricht set norms of secrecy
around Community use of data and gave states permission to exchange data during police
cooperation.467 468 When Jacques Santer (Luxembourg) became Commission president in
January of 1995, he continued the efforts of generating data legislation, based on economic
goals. The Council of Ministers follow Parliament early in 1995, by adopting of the amended
position on data governance passed in 1992, and it accepted Parliament’s agreement on the
common position in June of 1995. Directive 95/46/EC came into effect on 24 October 1995.
Though it started as an economic initiative, the final wording of Directive 95 became
the premier regional framework for digital human rights in Europe. This Directive provides
a critical juncture for EU data legislation; after Directive 95, digital human rights became
an accepted community norm. As a Directive, it set a mandatory regulation for protecting
information privacy via data protection by ALL Community members. Note that the directive
also prohibited restrictions on cross-border data transmission. Directive 95 provisions included:
•
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•
•
•
•
•

Applied the scope of protection on automatically processed data, in addition to
provisions in national laws
Restricted personal data use to legitimate uses, for originally collected purposes,
with corrections during use, and anonymization post use
Prohibited personal data use which reveals race, ethnicity,
political/religious/philosophical opinions, trade union membership, health, or sex
life
Required consent for use by data subject, who is to be informed on data changes
or change to use
Mandated that Member States create (if not already in existence) a national office
for personal data projection, led by a designated officer to monitor such protection

Exemptions built into the Directive allowed for personal data use in matters of national or
public security, preserving national sovereignty on security matters, which was of particular
importance to France, as predicted earlier in this chapter.
Other than the specified mandates on data protection within the Directive, the greatest
impact of the Directive occurred around the establishment of an advisory Working Party
comprised entirely of legal rights experts
5.10 The Article 29 Working Party (WP 29)
Article 29 of Directive 95 established a permanent and independent Working Party solely
focused on the protection of personal data during processing (hereafter known as Article 29
Working Party, or WP 29). The group was charged with providing the Council of Ministers with
information on any matters related to data protection. WP 29 met from 1997-2016, only being
disbanded when the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) replaced Directive 95/46/EC.
The Article 29 Working Party was not staffed by representatives chosen from a variety of
backgrounds (potentially including civil society, private sector, or public actors), but the
members came exclusively by those serving as directors or supervisors of the national Data
Protection Authority (DPA) in Member States. Remember from the national chapters of
Germany and Sweden, that DPA directors were overwhelmingly from legal or academic
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professions trained in human rights advocacy. Also recall that the French CNIL was
organized in such a manner that prohibited outside input by legislators or by civil society. The
organizational structure of WP 29 replicated this insularity found in the French CNIL, combined
with the single source staffing from legally trained individuals found in Sweden and Germany.
Furthermore, the scope of competencies of WP 29 were particularly wide, including the abilities
to:
•
•
•

•
•
•

Oversee national application of Directive 95
Give the Commission opinions on protection in third countries
Advise the Commission on proposed amendments that would “safeguard the rights
and freedoms of natural persons with regarding to the processing of personal data,
and on any other proposed Community measures affecting such rights and
freedoms.”469
Search for diverse levels of protection among Member States practices
Make recommendations via reporting to the Commission on “all matters” relating to
personal data protection; the Commission is obliged to respond with any actions taken
Issue annual reports on the status of personal data protection within the Community
and in third countries, reporting to the Commission, Parliament, and Council of
Ministers.

To sum, WP 29 was staffed by “experts” in legal matters, given a wide range of
responsibilities, with little to no oversight or input by multiple stakeholders inside or outside EU
bodies. The structural arrangements of WP 29 would have profound effects upon the way that
future data protection was framed in EU legislation, how protection would be implemented and
changed across time, and how the Union would harmonize policies along the preferential lines of
particular states. Between 1997 and 25 May 2018 when WP 29 was replaced with the new
General Data Protection Board, the committee released hundreds of guidelines, letters, official
opinions, annual reports, and press releases, all geared toward expanding digital human rights,
and not toward a reduction in protection in any way.

469
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The proactive measures taken by WP 29 to expand the scope of EU data legislation
following the passage of Directive 95 cannot be overstated. Working Party 29 submitted a stream
of reports on a regular basis to both the EU Commission and Council of Ministers, all of which
were used by these institutions when amending or creating new data legislation from 1997-2016.
Using the methodology discussed in Chapter 3, the content analysis of the recommendations,
opinions, and annual reports submitted by Working Party 29 to the EU Commission is seen in
Table 26. 58 documents were analyzed for content. First, I assessed the 100 most common
phrases of up to 4 words. Overwhelmingly, the most common phrases used discussed data
protection during automatic processing. These words became the core words for my auto-coding
scheme, along with the most common words that discuss security and/or economic interests. See
Table 26 below for the findings.

Table 26: Communications Content of Article 29 Working Party, 1997-2016
Topics Discussed
Security terms (security, police, court, judicial)
Protection terms (processing of personal data, protection of
personal data, consent, right to privacy, fundamental rights
and freedoms)
economic terms (business, marketing, economic)
Free movement of data
Total
N= 6334 sentences coded

Percentage of
Mentions
49.05
37.96
12.96
0.03
100

Note that as mentioned in the methodology chapter, this was a “blunt” auto-coding of the
content. Each sentence with one of the mentioned words was auto-coded for presence of the
word/phrase. While security terms comprise the largest mentions category, in reality, the words
have both positive and negative framing within the text of the communications by WP 29. For
example, some sentences with the words security are referencing the Common Foreign and
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Security Policy instituted in the Maastricht treaty, but do not actually discuss data treatment at
all. In other sentences, the security terms may be granted permission or setting restrictions on
securitized use of data. In contrast, the protection and economic terms more generally reflect
positive mentions.
5.11 Findings Summary of 1980s-1990s
The preferences for data protection in the EU started out in the 1980s following the
national preferences of the UK, who had a big stake in data profiting tied to ICT growth.
By the 1990s, data protection had shifted away from an economically-necessitated model
(preferred by the UK), to a regime of digital human rights (preferred by Germany, and to a
lesser degree, France. Subsequent changes to data protection established in the 1990s were
driven by specific states with nationally tight data protection regulations (Sweden,
Germany, France), and at the suggestion of legal and human rights experts (WP 29, Spiros
Simitis, Britain’s Paul Sieghart).470
Directive 95 would be adjusted via changes to EU law written into the Treaty of
Amsterdam in 1997, and with the addition of a new Charter of Fundamental Human Rights. The
Amsterdam Treaty guaranteed personal data protection, but allowed data transfers without data
subject consent during police cooperation.471 A new “Charter of Fundamental rights of the EU”
incorporated data protection as a fundamental human right (something WP 29 had advocated
during the formation of the Charter).472 473 Despite protest by the UK against the expanding
scope of EU human rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU became EU law on 7
December 2000 at Nice.
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Regarding activity in the Commission, neither the Santer nor Marin Commissions
expanded data protection, nor did the Prodi Commission (1999-2004), other than to emphasize
the importance of technology growth in the Union.474 Thus we see throughout the mid-1990s,
the Commission’s actions on increasing digital human rights came as a result of input from
expert advisory bodies. Additional pressure came from Member States such as Germany and
Sweden which already had firm national regimes for digital human rights. The only consistently
dissenting state to the expansion of digital human rights was the UK whose representatives
argued against rights expansion including that of data protection.475 Once the key epistemic
experts in WP 29 linked the need for data protection to application of democratic human
rights in the Union, it was difficult for hesitant states, such as the UK, to argue against
protections when so many Member States also had national protections in place. The
Commission consistently followed all recommendations made by WP throughout the 1990s and
into the 20002.
5.12 2000-2010 – Expanding the Scope of Digital Human Rights
The expanded provisions for data protection in the early 2000s were a result of applying
data protection to newly developed areas of technology. Some changes also followed the 9/11
terrorist attacks in the United States and in Europe. In 2001 the EU Parliament and Council
passed Regulation (EC) No 45/2001, which required additional measures for data protection
during cross-border movement. In 2000, the US-EU Safe Harbour framework was created to
allow such data transfers to the US, which had no similar law to Directive 95; this would later be
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replaced due to inconsistencies in the nature of compliance by US companies.476 The Nice Treaty
(2001) established a new EU oversight body - the regional European Data Protection Supervisor
authority. Peter Johan Hustinx was appointed to the first five year term as Supervisor in 2004.477
The next significant shift in the EU narrative around data protection was driven by EU
Commission President Manuel Barroso (Portugal, 2004-2005). Barroso was the first key EU
leader to link data protection and heightened anti-terrorism concerns. In a statement, he
argued that, “Preventing radicalisation and protecting our critical infrastructure are of pivotal
importance…the implementation of the policies and legislative proposals…[may compromise]
data protection and access to the Visa Information System.”478 His Commission acknowledged
the ongoing and important role of expert advisors, who would continue to “reinforce and update
[Commission] knowledge”.479 In an age of increasing amounts of terrorist activity, the Members
of the European Parliament wanted data legislation to be moved out of third pillar competencies
(under the control of national governments) and into the first pillar (supranational policy), in the
jurisdiction of EU bodies. 480 After two years of “reflection”, the Lisbon Treaty reworked the EU
pillar structure; the treaty moved cooperation on issues of freedom, security, and justice (FSJ)
between police and judicial authorities out of the third pillar into first pillar governance. These
changes applied to data protection legislation.481 Thus the limits of data protection were
redefined in a post 9/11 world: data protection would be a fundamental human right, but
this right could be overridden due to national or regional security threats. One last note
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should be made about the Lisbon framework; Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom had
exclusion clauses to reduce mandatory participation with rules on personal data sharing during
judicial or police cooperation, again an instance of resistance against EU supranational data
policy from the UK.482
Directive 95 had weaknesses along with strengths; these necessitated its eventual
replacement by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), effective in 2018.483 Meetings
were held between 2009-2011 to engage national data authorities, WP 29, and the European Data
Protection Supervisor in discussions as to what changes should be made in the wake of
exponential technological changes to the ways data was used along with the ongoing need for
data cooperation for security officials. In January of 2012, the Barroso Commission released
Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World: A European Data Protection Framework for the
21st Century. The report asked for a new Regulation to replace Directive 95, and it requested
rules for use of personal data during criminal investigations and judicial processes. The law
should preserve individuals’ “right to be forgotten” and set parameters for data breach
notifications. The new data law should also encourage the growth of the Digital Single Market
plan by keeping the burden placed on businesses as least cumbersome as possible. Finally, it
should help security authorities in all Member States with the fight against terrorism by
permitting the free flow of data during police cooperation. Notably, in Safeguarding Privacy”,
there was no further mention of the responsibility to adhere to Council of Europe’s
Convention 108 that had been included in multiple EU-level documents on data protection
and had served as the foundational motive for much of EU policy from the 1980s-2000s.
From this point forward, EU policy-makers and institutions “owned” the digital human rights
482
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regime, essentially asking EU Member States to initiate data protection legislation based solely
on their obligations to the EU, rather than on their obligations to other IGOs like the Council of
Europe or the OECD. Supranationalism reigned over data policy in this view.
5.13 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
In 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker (Luxembourg), the new EU Commission President,
announced a series of actions to strengthen the norm of data privacy. His agenda further
entrenched digital human rights in the EU, but did so based upon internet-based data, or “cyber
data.” On 15 July 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker released his “Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness
and Democratic Change” which listed “A Connected Digital Single Market” as his first priority.
Juncker wished to complete the data legislation overhaul within his first six months, because,
“Information and Communications Technology (ICT) is no longer a specific sector but the
foundation of all modern innovative economic systems.”484 Digital economic growth required
data protection legislation that reduced the fragmentation within national legislation. Crafting
such a law challenged regional cooperation within Europe and set up barriers with outside-EU
business relationships.
The GDPR replaced the outdated Directive 95 and extends digital human rights in three
key ways. First, the law harmonizes EU data protection to “protect people” and “ensure free data
movement.”485 By providing for data mobility, GDPR keeps intact the goals of the OECD
Convention 108, without explicitly mentioning it. Additionally, special provisions were made for
the protection requirements set on small and mid-sized businesses in order to reduce the financial
burden of firms that employ <250 persons, and for whom providing data protection may be
disproportionately expensive. (This helped to address concerns raised by French representatives.)
484
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Next, national authorities should cooperate on matters of data exchange, such as during security
investigations and judicial proceedings (Articles 23, 45 and 50).486 Finally, third countries are
now required to meet the standards of intra-EU protections if the data of EU citizens will be
collected by firms from third party states and/or if EU citizens data will be transferred outside the
Union.487 Growing resentment by EU ICT firms against US tech giants like Google motivated
the latter provision, in combination with a series of violations by US firms against existing EU
data protection laws. (See Table 27.)
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Table 27: EU Data Laws, Auto-coded Content

As with the WP documents, when auto-coded, the content of EU data laws reveal that
digital human rights has maintained importance in EU law across time since it became a matter
of supranational law in 1995. Recall that mention of the security terms can indicate either
positive or negative permission for access to personal or cyber data. Economic concerns can also
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be worded as to promote or constrain data commodification. However, all of the data protection
terms concern positive provision of digital human rights. While the auto-coded method is not
ideal for revealing the exact changes to EU data law, it does show the constancy of data
protection across time. The numbers of laws that mandate data protection harmonization across
the Union has increased since 1995. What began as data protection for economic cooperation
purposes, has spread into data protection during information exchanges as a part of police
cooperation as well as data protection for the sake of human rights alone.
5.14 Chapter Summary
Table 28: Powerful States Efforts to Shape EU Data Laws

Country
France

Predicted Policy Preference
1) Digital human rights
2) Security Access

Germany

Digital human rights

Fulfilled Y/N
Yes; Delors Commission opened door for digital
human rights. French also pushed for national controls
and security access post 9/11.
Yes; pressed the Commission for digital human rights.

United Kingdom

1) Data commodification
2) Security Access

Somewhat. Opposed digital human rights multiple
times. Less pressure to achieve security access.

EU data legislation has evolved across time. Initial legislation was motivated by pressure
from the Council of Europe Convention 108, which laid the groundwork for data protection
premised upon technological growth and the growing economic value of data. When EU data
protection was under negotiation, the Commission presidents of France and Luxembourg played
a crucial role by opening the door of opportunity for data protection to be legislated for the
Union. However, it was the presence of epistemic experts within advisory committees such
Working Party 29, which had long-term impact. These legal and academic elites advised the
Commission to gradually expand the scope of data protection to match up with the preferences of
EU states who already had powerful data protection legislation, such as Germany and Sweden,
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and to a lesser extent, France. Directive 95 and the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights both
codified digital human rights as an area of supranational EU competence, despite frequent
opposition by the UK. Today, the GDPR has expanded data protection further still by setting
obligation for third party states such as the US to comply when using EU citizens’ data. One
could argue that this last component is an effort by the EU to globalize the norm of digital human
rights.
Digital human rights are likely here to stay, but these rights do have limits. Preserving
national security in a post 9/11 world has led EU states to open data access not only to national
law enforcement authorities, but also for use by outside security authorities across state lines.
Combined with the ongoing financial value of the digital economy, and the question must be
asked as to whether digital human rights provide the extent of coverage that the national and
supranational laws claim to provide. As things exist, data continues to be seen as an economic
commodity and as a tool for preserving national security. Ultimately, states remain sovereign
over all that concern citizens, including their personal and cyber data. The rights of individual
data subjects are protected only in so far as these individuals are able to understand and
adjudicate for protection and control over their own personal and cyber data. Individual data
subjects and epistemic legal elites will continue to need to advocate for personal data protection
in an atmosphere of data commodification and security fears.
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6

DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH

This dissertation has contributed additional knowledge to the field of political science as
regards data governance, but the findings have implications for social science more broadly in
many other areas.
First, supranational EU data legislation occurred as a result of particular domestic
changes, namely technological change. Sweden was the first European country to adopt national
data protection legislation due to a history of open records access legislation. When records were
paper-pound, the population knew others could access government held personal information,
but it was not easy to do so. With the advent of computerized data banks, open records access
meant sharing of personal data not only between government agencies, but this technological
advancement increased the risk that personal information could easily go public in exponential
ways. In Germany, computer technology raised the risk of a return to the surveillance state.
People living in West Germany recalled Nazi record-keeping as a tool to facilitate genocide. East
Germans remembered the mass surveillance state practices of the Stasi under the USSR.
Regional data protection moved up to become federal law in Germany and set a precedent of
legal norms and legal epistemic experts driving data protection legislation. British human rights
advocates and politicians were unsuccessful in achieving data protection legislation introduced in
the 1960s and 1970s. The OECD emphasis on data protection legislation raised economic
concerns in the minds of the nascent ICT sector of the UK in the 1980s. Without some form of
data protection legislation, British firms could be shut out of business opportunities dependent
upon data security assurances. The Thatcher government supported and passed data protection
laws when it was linked to the potential for economic loss. The primary domestic interests that
shaped national laws formed the basis for each state’s preferences for EU data legislation when
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the window for such policy opened in the late 1980s and early 1990s. We would do well to
remember that individual interests differ among states, and that successful introduction of new
national legislation often hinges upon links between interest groups.
For researchers studying supranational policymaking in the EU, the path taken from
economic to human rights to security concerns about data governance can inform our
understanding of EU policymaking as a whole. As noted by several EU scholars, openings within
the EU legislative agenda are controlled by the EU Commission. EU data protection began as a
mechanism to facilitate EU economic growth. The Delors Commission opened the door for data
policy solely because of the economic potential in growing ICT firms within the Single Market.
After the door was opened for general data protection, human rights experts were able to expand
the scope of basic protections to include not just storage and movement requirements, but also
added data subject consent, data retention limits, and the right to be forgotten. Finally post 9/11
and the London and Madrid bombings, states’ willingness to cooperate in data exchanges during
anti-terrorism missions increased significantly. Security attacks expanded the “shared
information space” beyond typical state borders to an external EU border. EU data legislation
began as an economic issue, transformed into a human rights issue, and then became a security
issue. Today, it remains all three albeit in mixed percentages. The fact that data legislation is not
an either-or issue exposes the reality that regional policy-making is driven by multiple issue
concerns, which happen simultaneously. The complexity of settling shared policies in a
globalized world means that policy coordination difficulties are likely to persist, rather than
wane.
The third important finding from this dissertation concerns the power of epistemic
professionals to influence regional norms around a particular issue. From the very beginning
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when the national debate opened for data legislation in Sweden and Germany, both countries
relied extensively on legal experts for information and suggestions about the structure of new
law to be created. After the laws were made, each of the case countries established a national
agency tasked with oversight of both private and public sectors. In Sweden and Germany, the
data protection administrations were led by attorneys and judges who brought to government the
human rights norms associated with identity-based protections. In contrast, the UK chose a
director for their Data Protection Registry who was a former BBC journalist, highlighting the
fact that the British linked data protection to concerns about limits to press freedom rather than
human rights. Later, leadership of the DPR/ICO shifted to those with legal expertise, after EU
Directive 95 passed, which mandated data protection harmonization across the Union. Directive
95 included digital human rights and data protections which were much more specific and
detailed than the 1984 British data protection law. This required someone with greater
professional training in human rights to oversee the adaptation of British law and future EU law
compliance in Britain.
The influence of legal elites did not end with the formation of national data legislation
and the creation of national data oversight agencies. As theorized in the norm diffusion literature,
the DPA leaders of Germany, Sweden, and later France, acted as “norm entrepreneurs” when
serving as advisors and consultants to the EU Commission and Council. They successfully
spread the digital human rights framework beyond their respective national borders to push for
expanded data protection obligations in the EU. The Article 29 Working Party had a tremendous
impact on the direction chosen by the Commission and Council regarding changes to Directive
95 and subsequent initiatives that concerned data treatment. The various documents released by
WP 29 from 1997-2016 served as the major source of information for the Commission during the

204

entire period when Directive 95 was the primary EU data law. Serving as the primary source of
input during the legislative process around one issue gave the committee a large amount of
power over the framing of data governance. They used this power to shift the narrative away
from economic-based concerns toward human rights expansion for EU data laws. Even after
regional security problems mounted with the increased terror attacks and the refugee crisis of
2015, WP 29 was able to keep the focus of EU data legislation as one of fundamental human
rights, despite the competition from economic and security concerns.
Fourth, the policy power held by Working Party 29 speaks to the larger debate about EU
democratic deficit. Advisory bodies such as Working Party 29 are not elected by EU citizens in
any way. All the members of WP 29 were and are the heads of national data agencies. Their
positions as national DPAs are appointed, often by the executive or the Ministry of Justice or
Interior. These individuals have not been elected by their own citizens nor were they elected in
an EU election. Though the official documents of WP 29 were publicly available online, the
committee deliberations were not open to the public nor minutes released for the meetings. There
is no indication that they consulted with any of the multiple stakeholders involved in the process
of data use, such as ICT firms, members of the public, or law enforcement or security officials.
One could argue that the advisory perspective they brought to the EU Commission could have
been driven entirely by legal community norms. While this was good for human rights
protections, it did not contribute in a meaningful way to the demand for increased accountability
and accessibility among EU institutions and bureaucracy. The ongoing complaints about
disconnect between Brussels bureaucrats and the EU public is fed by just such levels of
disassociation between the EU legislative process and EU citizens. The process and people that
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worked seemingly well for EU data policy-making could be exacerbating feelings of democratic
deficit.
Furthermore, the EU is changing the global environment for data management in
profound ways. The Court of Justice for the European Union and the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) have shown the willingness and ability to prosecute violators of EU digital
human rights. The main oversight body for EU data protection compliance, the European Data
Protection Supervisor (EDPS), keeps an online website informing the public of ongoing cases
involving violations of data protection.488 The EDPS has also released working documents
outlining current and pending cases in the CJEU and ECHR regarding the cases.489 The EDPS
documents also outline national cases pending on data violations. The courts have not shied
away from pursuing high profile targets, such as Google, accused of misuse of personal data in
several cases (Vidal-Hall, Hann and Bradshaw v Google Inc and Google v Spain). The EDPS
tackles potential cases involving data protection, net neutrality, encryption, the Charter of
Fundamental Human Rights, surveillance, border and immigration issues, biometrics, and police
and judicial cooperation. All such areas utilize personal data, and the EDPS has been called on to
intervene in cases before the Court of Justice as well as before General Court and the Civil
Service Tribunal. All such hearings or cases involve personal or cyber data. Litigants can be
individuals, firms, or countries. Through the EU courts, digital human rights have an
enforcement mechanism which solidifies these rights alongside more traditional human rights.
Another way the EU has impacted the diffusion of the digital human rights norm is via
the mandates of the recently passed General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The GDPR
expects third countries to comply with all aspects of the data protections included in the law. In a
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practical sense this solidifies practices that emerged after Directive 95 which held outside
countries and firms in those countries accountable for how they were managing the data of EU
citizens. The EU attempted to allow “self-policing” of non-EU firms when it signed the Safe
Harbour agreement with the United States. The Safe Harbour agreement permitted data
controllers outside the EU within the US to transfer personal data to the US when voluntarily
complying with EU data protections. The US Federal Trade commission was given oversight of
compliance. In reality, not all US firms that used EU data fully complied. In 2013, the EU
Commission requested an audit of the agreement and its outcomes.490 The Commission action
was taken at the request of German regulators who felt that US assurances of compliance were
less than accurate. The issue was taken to the Court of Justice, which ruled in October of 2015 in
Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner that Safe Harbour was invalid as a protection tool.491
The topic was carried into the discussion about changing needs of data protection in the 21st
century. Safe Harbour was replaced with a more stringent agreement with the US, known as the
EU-US Privacy Shield. Free transfers of EU citizens’ data are permitted when the firms are
registered with the EU. In addition, Directive 95 was replaced with the GDPR. With the GDPR,
lawmakers considered the recommendation made by the Article 29 Working Party, which had
suggested that cloud computing firms were susceptible of skirting the protection requirements.
The GDPR requires compliance with EU data law outside the EU, whether the third country has
a similar law in place or not, applicable to all countries outside the EU. With the GDPR and the
Privacy Shield, the EU is attempting to export the norm of digital human rights.
Finally, this dissertation shows the growing importance of non-state actors in the EU
legislative process and within intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). The ICT sector pushed
490
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through data protection in the UK when the government had resisted it for twenty years. German
and Swedish attorneys successfully achieved human rights protections for data less than ten
years after computerized databanks were adopted by public administrators, and diffused
protections to cover private sector use as well. Certain human rights advocates (Spiros Simitis,
Paul Sieghart) moved back and forth between their home countries, EU advisory panels, and
committees in the OECD and Council of Europe, testifying before decision-makers in all of these
places as to the importance of digital human rights. Individuals and firms have been accused of
data violations before national courts and called to account for their accused crimes. Returning to
the story told in the introduction, after the Cambridge Analytica scandal, Mark Zuckerberg and
Cambridge Analytica executives were asked to testify before Members of European Parliament
and the House of Commons to explain how and why the extensive use and perhaps abuse of
personal data is justified given data legislation in the EU.492 Originally, executives attempted to
explain the overreach of third party actors, arguing that personal and cyber data abuse was
neither intended nor sanctioned. Now, Zuckerberg is attempting to control the digital human
rights narrative by offering an op-ed in the New York Times, advising lawmakers on what areas
of data governance they should better focus upon, namely “harmful content, election integrity,
privacy, and data portability.”493 It would seem that data brokers are moving from the defense to
the offense in the battle for control over digital human rights.
Ultimately, personal and cyber data is forever linked to the individual. This link
intrinsically gives it both economic and security value. Powerful data brokers like Facebook and
Google cannot function without data; it is the core of a business model that relies upon
surveillance capitalism as its fuel. However, as seen with the Cambridge Analytica, and various
492
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other recent data breaches that have received press coverage, the public does not like the thought
that third parties are using their data – particularly data tied to personal beliefs. Because data can
expose an individual’s religious, political, or ethical values, there are aspects of data use that may
not be as tolerated by the data creators – the public. This is where epistemic elites within the
legal and human rights community have leverage to bridge between governments and the public
to continue to shape the evolution of data governance. In a world continually threatened by
security and economic demands upon data use, the competition between state actors, economic
interests, and the human rights community is likely to continue. For now, we live in a datadriven world that at least within the EU, does have digital human rights protections in place.
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